Trucial States: Abu dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat 1969-1974

(1)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1-101		General Correspondence, telegrams, memoranda, and memcons re: US - Trucial States relations See attached itemized list.	1969-1974	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 632

FOLDER TITLE: 1

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	memo	Saunders to HAK (3 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/1	01/30/1974	B
2	memo	Scowcroft to Sec/State with attachments (5 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/2	12/11/1973	B
3	report	Bahrain (2 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/3	07/15/1973	B
4	memos	Davis to Saunders with attachments (6 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/4	06/25/1973	B
5	memo	Eliot HAK (3 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/5	03/03/1973	B
6	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to AmEmb Amman (2 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/6	04/30/1973	B
7	memo	Secretariat Staff for NSC Secretariat (2 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/7	12/01/1972	B
8	memo	Saunders to Davis with attachments (4 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/8	01/08/1973	B
9	memo	HAK to Secretary of State with attach., (4 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/9	06/02/1972	B
10	cable	Muscat and Oman (3 pages) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/10	07/28/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER: 632

FOLDER TITLE: Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [1 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
11	memo MANDATORY	Saunders to Secretariat with attachments, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/11	04/12/1972	B
12	memo MANDATORY	Davis to Eliot with attachments, 7 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/12	07/20/1971	B
13	telegram MANDATORY	SecState to AmEmb Abu Dhabi, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/13	07/31/1974	B
14	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to AmEmb Tunis, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/14	08/01/1974	B
15	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/15	07/29/1974	B
16	telegram MANDATORY	SecState to AmEmb Manama, 4 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/16	07/29/1974	B
17	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/17	07/24/1974	B
18	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/18	07/24/1974	B
19	telegram MANDATORY	SecState to AmEmb Manama, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/19	07/18/1974	B
20	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/20	07/17/1974	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

632

FOLDER TITLE

Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [2 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
21	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/21	07/24/1974	B
22	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/22	07/24/1974	B
23	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/23	07/24/1974	B
24	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/24	07/24/1974	B
25	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/25	07/24/1974	B
26	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, (2 pages) REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/26	07/23/1974	B
27	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/27	07/22/1974	B
28	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/28	07/19/1974	B
29	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/29	07/13/1974	B
30	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 4 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/30	07/03/1974	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

632

FOLDER TITLE

Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [3 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
31	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/31	07/11/1974	B
32	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/32	07/04/1974	B
33	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/33	07/15/1974	B
34	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/34	07/10/1974	B
35	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 6 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/35	06/25/1974	B
36	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/36	6/31/1974	B
37	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/37	05/19/1974	B
38	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 4 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/38	06/18/1974	B
39	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/39	05/04/1974	B
40	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/40	04/15/1974	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

632

FOLDER TITLE

Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [4 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
41	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/41	03/31/1974	B
42	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/42	03/31/1974	B
43	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to RUESJCS, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/43	01/28/1974	B
44	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 6 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/44	12/29/1973	B
45	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/45	12/17/1973	B
46	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/46	12/10/1973	B
47	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/47	11/14/1973	B
48	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to AmConsul Bombay India, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/48	11/02/1973	B
49	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/49	10/16/1973	B
50	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 8 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/50	12/02/1973	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER: 632

FOLDER TITLE: Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [5 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
51	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/51	10/17/1973	B
52	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/52	03/31/1974	B
53	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 4 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/53	10/17/1973	B
54	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/54	10/17/1973	B
55	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/55	10/15/1973	B
56	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/56	10/11/1973	B
57	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 3 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/57	10/11/1973	B
58	telegram	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/58	10/11/1973	B
59	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/59	09/28/1973	B
60	telegram	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/60	09/19/1973	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER: 632

FOLDER TITLE: Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [6 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
61	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/61	09/13/1973	B
62	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/62	09/04/1973	B
63	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/63	09/01/1973	B
64	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 5 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/64	09/01/1973	B
65	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/65	08/30/1973	B
66	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/66	08/29/1973	B
67	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to AmEmb Sanaa, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/67	08/22/1973	B
68	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/68	08/20/1973	B
69	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/69	08/07/1973	B
70	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 4 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/70	08/02/1973	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

632

FOLDER TITLE

Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [7 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
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F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
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H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
71	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 5 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/71	08/02/1973	B
72	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/72	07/31/1973	B
73	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 6 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/73	07/30/1973	B
74	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/74	07/23/1973	B
75	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to AmEmb Tehran, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/75	07/16/1973	B
76	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/76	05/12/1973	B
77	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi toSecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/77	05/12/1973	B
78	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/78	04/19/1973	B
79	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/79	04/17/1973	B
80	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/80	03/26/1973	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER: 632

FOLDER TITLE: Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [8 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
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F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
81	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/81	03/19/1973	B
82	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to AmEmb Amman, 3 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/82	03/11/1973	B
83	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to AmEmb Kuwait, 4 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/83	03/08/1973	B
84	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to AmEmb Kuwait, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/84	03/06/1973	B
85	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages NLNS 01-23/85 REVIEW REQUEST	02/12/1973	B
86	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Kuwait to AmEmb Abu Dhabi, 1 page REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/86	02/03/1973	B
87	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi toSecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/87	02/07/1973	B
88	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Abu Dhabi to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/88	02/06/1973	B
89	telegram MANDATORY	AmEmb Manama to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/89	04/11/1972	B
90	telegram MANDATORY	AmConsul Dhahran to SecState, 2 pages REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/90	01/05/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

632

FOLDER TITLE

Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [9 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
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F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
91	telegram	SecState to AmEmb Abu Dhabi, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/91	07/26/1973	B
92	telegram	SecState to AmEmb Abu Dhabi, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/92	04/26/1973	B
93	telegram	SecState to AmEmb Abu Dhabi, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/93	03/20/1973	B
94	telegram	SecState to AmEmb Abu Dhabi, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/94	02/07/1973	B
95	telegram	SecState Rogers to Kissinger, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/95	08/20/1969	B
96	telegram	Bahrain to SecState, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/96	05/26/1969	B
97	telegram	SecState to AmConsul Dhahran, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/97	05/26/1969	B
98	telegram	Comments concerning Bahrain, 2 pages MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/98	06/13/1969	B
99	telegram	Jordan, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/99	08/19/1969	B
100	telegram	re: UN Draft Resolution, 1 page MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/100	08/19/1969	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER: 632

FOLDER TITLE: Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [10 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
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E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
101	telegram	re: Meeting of Middle East officials, 1 page	08/19/1969	B
	MANDATORY	REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 01-23/101		

FILE GROUP TITLE	BOX NUMBER
National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East	632

FOLDER TITLE

Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat [11 of 11]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

SANITIZED COPY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

X/RK Lno
Accn

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

ACTION
360

January 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Emissary from the Sultan of Oman

Sultan Qaboos of Oman has sent an emissary to you this week with a letter of introduction. I know you will be receiving recommendations from NEA on this subject, but I wanted to add my own perspective. The one action that should be taken this week is to sign a letter to the Sultan of Oman which NEA will give you, but this is just a small part of the larger picture in the Gulf which I know interests you.

The emissary is a man named Ghassan Shakr. About 40, he is a Saudi banker-merchant with activities centered in Beirut. Since October 1971, he has been a political and economic adviser to the Sultan. He was the architect of the rapprochement between King Faisal and the Sultan in late 1971 and of a policy which has gradually strengthened the Sultan's relationships with Jordan and with all of the North African Arab states. Most important from our point of view, Shakr has been the central figure in expanding the US presence in Oman since 1971, principally through the introduction of several major American investments there. [redacted]

SANITIZED 25X(1)

Background. You may recall that Qaboos is himself a young man who took over in July 1970 and has since been trying to put Oman on its feet. Since 1971, he has balanced support from two sources: (1) On the one hand he has developed broad support in the Arab World for his efforts to end the Dhofar rebellion. This has included not only active prosecution of the Dhofar war with British mercenaries and Jordanian help but also efforts to develop Arab political support against South Yemen, which aids the Dhofar rebels. The Saudis have promised help [redacted] (2) He has also relied heavily on the very effective military help the Iranians have sent him and has developed a good political relationship with the Shah. [redacted]

SANITIZED 25X(6)

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

SANITIZED COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 per Sec 25X(1)(6)
NLNS 01-23/1 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By: KMG NARA, Date 3-22-02

SANITIZED COPY

SANITIZED 25X(6)

[redacted] he feels a desperate need for more assistance to cope with the growing Soviet-supported threat from South Yemen. Qaboos believes that an expression of increased US interest is important if he is to maintain his balance between the Arabs and the Shah. Qaboos will visit the Shah on February 26. He anticipates that the Shah will make offers of expanded aid of all kinds and in exchange will attempt to extract from Qaboos commitments on their relations in the Strait of Hormuz. He is looking for some indication of US interest.

Against this background, Qaboos through Shakr is making the following points:

--He would like a strong US Ambassador resident in Oman. He has nothing against Ambassador Stoltzfus, but Stoltzfus is resident in Kuwait and can only come to Oman occasionally.

--He would like to hear an authoritative statement of US interest in the Persian Gulf. In this connection, Qaboos would like either to visit Washington himself or to have a high official, presumably you, visit Oman.

--He would like to be assured of export license for modest military purchases in the US. This does not mean that he will seek less support from the Iranians, the Jordanians, the Saudis or the French.

Our interest in Oman is the following: We will want to continue efforts to strengthen Saudi Arabia as the main element of stability in the Arabian Peninsula. However, [redacted] Without [redacted] it would seem a wise course for us to develop our own position in the Gulf states. This is not only sensible in its own right, [redacted]

SANITIZED 25X(6)

As I understand it, you will be receiving recommendations from NEA that will be responsive on the point of raising our ambassadorial representation and sending a letter to the Sultan to acknowledge that his message has been received. The purpose of the letter is simply to tell the Sultan that we hear his concerns. In addition to acting on these, you may want to consider two other points:

--You might want to think about the possibility of a stop in Oman at some point in your future travels. [redacted]

SANITIZED 25X(6)

--You have the option of seeing the Sultan's emissary while he is in the United States this week. He is a very articulate and sensible fellow. On balance, I think that enough has probably been done for him this time so that you do not need to see him. He has met with Admiral Zumwalt, Rodger Davies and me. [redacted] If your letter to the Sultan can be given to him, that should be enough on this visit. But I wanted you to be aware of the possibility.

SANITIZED 25X(6)

I would like to see him _____

No need this time HK

SANITIZED COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has reviewed and concurs in the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary of State that the appointment of Ahmad Abdul Nabi Makki as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of Oman would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. You are requested to so inform the Government of Oman.

Brent Scowcroft
Major General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Dispatched 12/11/73 (rb)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 6437

ACTION

December 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis

SUBJECT: Agrement for Omani Ambassador

Attached for your signature is a memorandum for the Secretary of State concurring in the appointment of Ahmad Abdul Makki as the Ambassador of Oman to the U.S.

Attachment:

Tab A-Memo to SecState

6437

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 10 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR JEANNE W. DAVIS

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Agrement for New Ambassador from Oman

In the attached, State recommends the agrement for Oman's new ambassador to the US -- Ahmad Makki -- be granted. By Omani standards he is considered to be able. We have no problems.

Recommendation: That you seek General Scowcroft's signature on the agrement for Ahmad Makki at Tab A.

6437

7322584

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 29, 1973

Dear Mr. President:

The Government of Oman has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Ahmad Abdul Nabi Makki as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Sultanate of Oman to the United States. A biography of Ahmad Makki is enclosed. A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of the Sultanate of Oman.

Respectfully,

Kenneth Rush

Kenneth Rush

Enclosure:

Biography.

The President,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/2 305 letter 2-26-02
By KMG NARA, Date 3/25/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~GDS-DECLAS Dec. 31, 1979~~

BIOGRAPHY - Ahmad Abdul Nabi Makki

Sultanate of Oman

Ahmad Abdul Nabi Makki, who is being proposed by the Sultanate of Oman as its second Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, is currently Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Described as by all odds the most able man in the Foreign Ministry and one of the most capable men in the Omani government, Makki was born in 1939. From 1959 to 1962 he studied in Cairo, and from 1962-65 in Paris, where he says he unlearned the political philosophy the Egyptians tried to teach him in Cairo. Makki headed the Omani student organization while in Egypt and received a B.A. in Commerce from Cairo University in 1965. He was greatly affected by his stay in France and has expressed the view that more Omanis should be educated in the West to balance the number of Omanis who were forced to study in Communist countries in the 60's for lack of alternate opportunities.

After his studies he worked for some time for UNESCO in Paris and then as an adviser to a Canadian firm in Abu Dhabi. Following the accession of Sultan Qabus, Makki returned to Oman to become Director of the Prime Minister's office in 1971 and then temporarily Omani representative to the United Nations for the 1971 and 1972 UNGA sessions. He was appointed Undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry in February 1972. Described as a strong personality, Makki has frequently travelled abroad on behalf of Sultan Qabus on delicate missions.

Besides his native Arabic, Makki speaks English and French. He is married to a French and English-speaking Spanish national, the former P. Manso-Fernandez. They have one child, a daughter named Dina.

A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
11	29	11	30	09	6437	Saunders

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTN

TO: PRES ✓ FROM: ROGERS Rush, K

KISSINGER ____ RICHARDSON ____

SCOWCROFT ____ SCHLESINGER ____

ELIOT ____

UNCLAS ____ LOU ____ C ✓ S ____ TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____

NO FORN ____ NODIS ____

EYES ONLY ____ EXDIS ____

CODEWORD ____

SENSITIVE ____

SUBJECT: Agement for Ahmad Abdul Makki as Amb of Oman to US

REFERENCE: S/S 7322584 OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	■		
STAFF SECRETARY		✓	✓
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	✓		✓
EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
Ch, Protocol			✓

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (____)

MEMO FOR PRES ..... (✓)

REPLY FOR ____ (____)

APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... (____)

MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... (____)

RECOMMENDATIONS ..... (____)

JOINT MEMO ..... (____)

REFER TO ____ FOR: ____ (____)

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... (____)

CONCURRENCE ..... (____)

DUE DATE: (12/04)

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

* Follow agement procedures

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
12/10/73	Saunders	Dwin	S	~~Sign memo to~~ S'craft	
12/10		S'craft	X	Sgn memo to Kissinger (12/14)	
12/11			C	S'craft sgd memo to Kissinger	

Done

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH ____ NOTIFY ____ & DATE ____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) ____

OR RECORD COMMENT:) ____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ____

CROSS REF W/ ____ JOINED BY LOG # ____

SEE # ____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D ____ BY ____

CYS FOR) SA ____

) [illegible] ____

ORIG) WH ✓

TO) PA ✓

) SF ____

) NS ____

) EP ____

DESTROY) DY ____

DEC 13 1973

Originally sent to Kissinger on Helms 7/24/73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15 July 1973

File

THE U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN

HISTORY

The MIDEASTFOR Command was created in 1949 and the British gave the U.S. Government, via an informal agreement, access to the Royal Navy's base (JULFAIR) on Bahrain to support this command. In 1951 the U.S. Navy established a small office on Bahrain to oversee this support. In 1966 JULFAIR was made the home port of COMIDEASTFOR and the staff was increased and families brought out.

The U.S. Navy units now homeported in Bahrain include the flagship, the USS LaSalle (a former amphibious transport dock - 500' long, 84' in beam, drawing 21', manned by 380 men, armed with 4 twin 50 caliber guns and having 6 utility boats and a helicopter), two destroyers, and a flag aircraft (C-131). Also, since the British pulled out in 1971, the number of support personnel has had to be increased.

MISSION

The mission of COMIDEASTFOR is basically one of showing the flag, via numerous port calls, in an area in which the U.S. does not have a variety of contacts, i.e. the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. It has no military or political commitment or function. The U.S. has scrupulously referred to the U.S. Naval presence in Bahrain as a "facility" rather than a base. It has tried, purposely, to keep a low profile. The flagship spends about 50 percent of its time in Bahrain while the two destroyers, which rotate from Norfolk, Va. every six months, spend about two weeks each in Bahrain yearly.

SHOULD THE MISSION BE CONTINUED

With the withdrawal of British military presence in the area and the uncertainty with which the new states face the future, it is important that the U.S. maintain its facility in Bahrain. For too long the U.S. has deferred to the British in the Persian Gulf and a concomitant pull out by COMIDEASTFOR would be an indication to the new states that the U.S. was following the same policy; that it had not adopted a new policy for new circumstances. This would only add to the "vacuum" complex under which these small states are already suffering. This complex is based on the all-

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/3 per DOS letter 2/26/02 25x(6)
By SKH NARA, Date 3/25/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SANITIZED COPY

too-often used phrase "the vacuum created by the British withdrawal." Although the Shaykhs are not physicists, they know that there is a relentless trend to fill vacuums and they see too many willing to fill that "vacuum" [redacted] The U.S. presence is, to these [redacted] Shaykhdoms, the stability of situation which they seek [redacted] This is also true in the broader, Indian Ocean, context. We have our own interests and policy to preserve and follow. COMIDEASTFOR has admirably fulfilled that function in the past and should continue to do so.

SANITIZED

SHOULD THE SIZE OF THE MISSION BE INCREASED

It has been said that, with increased U.S. interest in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, the scope of the mission of COMIDEASTFOR and its size should also be increased. That would be a mistake, for reasons outlined below. First, if we want to promote some kind of cooperation among the littoral states, we should not give the impression that we will enforce or police this cooperation. Second, an increase would bring the wrath of the leftist-nationalist press to bear on Bahrain, [redacted] Third, an increase in U.S. presence, would likely bring increased Soviet presence, while losing the propaganda value of the current Soviet activities at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. Fourth, the Iranians, who are building their own naval force in the area, might feel the U.S. increase was planned to offset their effort vis-à-vis the Arabs. Fifth, although there are many more examples that could be cited, we face the "vacuum complex" in that the littoral states might feel a U.S. increase is a reaction to the "vacuum" created by the British departure, i.e. the littoral states cannot handle their own affairs. Sixth, an increase might provoke renewed congressional criticism and result in additional exaggerated and unfavorable publicity [redacted]

SANITIZED

SANITIZED

SUMMARY

The current strength of COMIDEASTFOR is sufficient to carry out its mission as that mission is currently defined. The U.S. has had a presence in the Gulf for nearly 25 years; we need not yield to outside pressures, even from our friends, to change this, particularly as the Arab states in the Gulf accept this presence and welcome it. It serves the same useful function: showing the area states that we care, that we respect their sovereignty and that we want to share our experiences with them. An increase in this force would upset this carefully balanced and sustained effort and cause undue pressures on the area states without any net strategic or political gain.

SANITIZED COPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Date: June 25, 1973

TO: MR. SAUNDERS

For clearance and/or comment
and return to me.

Jeanne W. Davis

Carole Rosenzweig - O.K.

→ Jeanne Davis

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/26

Jeanne:

You will see from my attached draft that I concur in your action.

I would suggest that you consider dropping your last line. I don't think it's quite accurate and you don't need the line anyway. I don't feel strongly.

Hal Saunders

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Invitation to Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi to Visit the U.S. (S/S 7307767)

In the light of the President's extremely heavy schedule for the balance of 1973, it is recommended that an invitation to Shaykh Zayid be considered by the State Department when you prepare your recommendations for visits by Heads of State/Government for 1974.

James R. Haddock
for Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

SANITIZED COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/4 pm 25X(6) DOS 2/26/02
By KMH NARA, Date 3-25-02

2506

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

~~May 31~~, 1973
June —

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

THROUGH: JEANNE W. DAVIS

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: State Recommendation that Persian Gulf Leader be Invited to Washington 1973 or 1974

Secretary Rogers has sent the President (~~at back~~ TAB A) a recommendation that he invite in 1973 (or at least extend now an invitation for 1974) Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, oil-rich leader of the United Arab Emirates in the Gulf.

Substantively, the idea is not a bad one given our interests in the Gulf. However, it is difficult to present the President with a single visit recommendation when his 1973 schedule is already full, his 1974 schedule is beginning to catch some holdovers from 1973 and State has not put the Zayid invitation in any priority perspective as far as State's overall recommendations for 1974. ~~The~~ Attached is a memo from you to the President recommends you go back to State and ask them to resubmit this proposal in the context of their overall 1974 recommendations.

Recommendation: That you seek the President's guidance on the attached memo.

if you feel you need his decision.

~~since this is not a high priority invi~~

There may be some cases where circumstances warrant making a special decision, but on this one, I should think we ought to handle it in the context of other visits.

2506

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WASHINGTON ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Visit Invitation to Leader of United Arab Emirates

Secretary Rogers at TAB A ~~in the attached~~ recommends you invite ~~or at least indicate you will invite~~ Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, the oil-rich leader of the United Arab Emirates, to ~~the US~~ Washington this year ~~or in 1974~~ or at least extend an invitation now for 1974. ~~Zayid has made his desire to come here known.~~

Abu Dhabi has a lot of oil and a position of leadership ~~since~~ in the Gulf since it has become the capital of the UAE. Zayid [redacted] has also encouraged a pro-American bent in the UAE but the Secretary feels we need to consolidate that trend, given our Gulf interests, and the best way to begin would be with a Zayid visit to see you.

I agree we have important interests in the Gulf and in Abu Dhabi and that a Zayid visit maybe a useful gesture. However, given your schedule already this year and probables ~~now~~ slated for 1974, ~~however,~~ I believe that this recommendation should be be considered in the context of your overall visit schedules ~~73 and 74~~ so that priority choices can be presented to you.

Recommendation: That I ask State to resubmit the recommendation for a Zayid visit in the context of overall visit recommendations by State for 1974.

Approve _____

Put Zayid on the 1974 calendar and extend invitation in principle _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED

SANITIZED COPY

SANITIZED

E0 12958 25X(6)

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PRO .E

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	OG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
5 03	5 04 9	2506	Saunders

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ✓ KISSINGER ___ SCOWCROFT ___

FROM: ROGERS ✓ RICHARDSON ___ SCHLESINGER ___ ELIOT ___

UNCLAS ___ LOU ___ C ✓ S ___ TS ___

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ___ NO FORN ___ EYES ONLY ___ CODEWORD ___ SENSITIVE ___ NODIS ___ EXDIS ___

SUBJECT: Sec State recom invitation to Shaykh Zayid, Ruler of Abu Dhabi & Pres of United Arab Emirates, to visit the US

REFERENCE: S/S 7307767 OTHER ___ NOT XEROXED ___

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			
STAFF SECRETARY (Farrar)			X
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	✓		X
EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... (✓)
REPLY FOR ..... ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
MEMO ___ TO ___ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO ___ FOR: ___ ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE: (5/07)

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
~~6/26/73~~	~~Saunders~~	~~Davis~~			
6/26		Q	C	Davis SGD memo to Eliot	
		6/26			

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH ___ NOTIFY ___ & DATE ___
SPECIAL DISPOSITION) ___
OR RECORD COMMENT:) ___
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ___

CROSS REF W/ ___ JOINED BY LOG # ___

SEE # ___ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✓

JUN 27 1973

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D AOC BY ___

CYS FOR) SA ___
) HP ___
ORIG) WH ___
TO) PA ✓
) SF ___
) NS ___
) EP ___
DESTROY) DY ___

★ GPO: 1973—489-668

S/S 7303828

1123

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 3, 1973

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Helicopters for Oman

The Sultan of Oman has recently asked Iran and Saudi Arabia for helicopter assistance to relieve a 500 man Omani force located in the hills near the South Yemen border. The force, originally put there last summer to interdict lines of supply from South Yemen to insurgents operating in Oman's Dhofar province, is dependent on being resupplied by air. Early in February, insurgent forces in Dhofar, which are sustained by the radical South Yemen regime with Chinese Communist materiel support, managed to lay heavy fire on the airfield used to supply the force making the field unusable for transport aircraft. The only feasible way to continue to support this force or to allow its evacuation if this were necessary is by the use of helicopters. The Sultanate has seven Agusta Bell 205 helicopters but these are not sufficient for this new requirement.

In response to the Sultan's request, Iran has sent on loan six Bell 205 helicopters to Dhofar. The Saudis have agreed to provide two Bell 205s to the Omanis. Since February 17, a British naval supply ship has been off the coast of Dhofar and the Omani and Iranian helicopter forces have managed to resupply the garrison. On February 21, we were informed by the British that the military situation had improved and that the Omani force had supplies for at least one month.

At the time the Saudis received a request for helicopter assistance from Oman, King Faisal turned

~~SECRET~~
GDS--DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/5 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3-25-02
[3 pages]

to the US Government to assist either directly or through the Saudis in providing four Bell 205 helicopters. We responded immediately on February 16 by informing the Saudi Government that the US Government was ready to approve a Saudi request to transfer four of its Agusta Bell 205 helicopters to Oman. If the transfer were made, we would need the Oman Government's assurance that the helicopters would not be transferred to a third party without US concurrence. We also offered the Saudis to replace these helicopters with four Bell 205 helicopters within 90 days through our Foreign Military Sales procedures. Alternatively, we would approve a license for the commercial sale of replacement helicopters.

In response, King Faisal has let us know that he believes the US Government should be willing to make the helicopters available on a grant basis either directly to Oman or to the Saudis to replace the ones they are providing. We are telling King Faisal that the US Government is not in a position to supply grant aid to Oman. Oman is, however, eligible to purchase reasonable amounts of equipment under the Foreign Military Sales Act. Oman is not a grant military assistance (MAP) recipient and all available credits under the Foreign Military Sales Act in FY 1973 have been earmarked and are in fact oversubscribed. We believe we have been as responsive as we can be to the Saudi request.

We have not received any request for helicopters from the Oman Government. These requests have come from the Saudis and the Jordanians who have been concerned at the threat posed by the insurgents in Dhofar.

The policy of the United States has been to keep Oman's friends in the area in the forefront in providing military assistance and not to become openly and directly involved as a supplier. Such direct US involvement at this stage could possibly stimulate new requests from the South Yemen regime for stepped-up Soviet and Chinese assistance.

Another issue is that, except for helicopters which are now apparently available in sufficient numbers, there is a tactical question whether the trapped Omani force should remain in its present location. Some of

his military advisors believe the force should be removed but the Sultan of Oman wishes it to remain for psychological reasons. We are not in a position to judge the tactical military situation. At the present time, Oman has a British special force, an Iranian special force, Jordanian and Saudi military advisors, and British officers on loan or on contract advising the Sultan's armed forces.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
3 03	3 05 11	1,2	Kennedy

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER X SCOWCROFT ____

FROM: ROGERS ____ RICHARDSON ____ SCHLESINGER ____ ELIOT X

UNCLAS ____ LOU ____ C ____ S X TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ NODIS ____ EXDIS ____

SUBJECT: Oman requests helicopter asst from Iran + Saudi Arabia

REFERENCE: S/S 7303828 OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST		X	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		X	
EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING	X		
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK ..... (X)
- MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
- REPLY FOR ____ ( )
- APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
- MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... ( )
- RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
- JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
- REFER TO ____ FOR: ____ ( )
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )
- CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
- DUE DATE: 3/10

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
4/25	Saunders	NSC/S	C	Close file. This has been handled in memos on US-Saudi military assistance cooperation in conjunction with possible war in Yemen. Pinckney + Kennedy concurs. Hal Saunders	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH ____ NOTIFY ____ & DATE ____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) ____

OR RECORD COMMENT:) ____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ____

CROSS REF W/ ____ JOINED BY LOG # ____

SEE # ____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✓

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D ____ BY ____

CYS FOR) SA ____) HP ____ ORIG) WH ____ TO) RA ____) SF ____) NS ____) EP ____ DESTROY) DY ____

APR 30 1973

★ GPO: 1973-489-668

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 369 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00549 300812Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 064225

R 300745Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0551
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USCINCEUR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
APR 30 AM 9:30

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 549

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, JO, TC
SUBJ: MILITARY SALES: TRANSFER OF 106S/THIRD COUNTRY COMMITMENT AND PURCHASE OF AMMUNITION

REF: A. STATE 078565
B. ABU DHABI 495

1. REQUEST EMBASSY CONTACT GOJ TO ASCERTAIN STATUS COMMITMENT COVERING TRANSFER 106S FROM JORDAN TO ABU DHABI (REFTEL B). IN VIEW TANGLED WEB ENVELOPING THIS WHOLE TRANSACTION, WE CONTINUE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE FOR GOJ TO OBTAIN WRITTEN COMMITMENT FROM ABU DHABI GOVT IN ORDER AVOID INVOLVING USG DIRECTLY IN TRANSFER THESE WEAPONS. IF AMB SHUMAYLEH NOT RETURNING TO POST, EMBASSY MIGHT SUGGEST TO GOJ THAT IT CONSIDER DESPATCH SPECIAL REP TO FINALIZE THIS MATTER WITH ADG.

2. FYI: EMBASSY RECEIVED LETTER DTD APRIL 23 FROM AD MINDEF REQUESTING USG PROVIDE FULL TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA ON 106 MM GUNS AND AMMO, AND FURNISH PRICE, AVAILABILITY AND DELIVERY TIME FOR 106 AMMO. COPY OF LETTER BEING POUCHED. ON BASIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/6 DOS 2-26-02
By KMG NARA, Date 3-25-02

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ABU DH 00549 300812Z

THIS CABLE, WOULD APPRECIATE DOD BEGIN ASSEMBLING REQUESTED INFO SO WE CAN BE IN POSITION RESPOND PROMPTLY TO ADG AS SOON AS COMMITMENT ISSUE RESOLVED AND PATTERN ESTABLISHED FOR FUTURE FMS SALES TO ADDF (PARA 2, REFTEL A).
GRIFFIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

900/10/2590

8300

7218918

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 1, 1972

Memorandum for: NSC Secretariat
The White House

Subject: Message to President from
Ruler of Bahrain

The Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered to our Embassy in Manama on November 12 the attached diplomatic note, which the Embassy then pouched to the Department. It contains a message to the President from the Ruler acknowledging the President's greetings which had been sent on the occasion of the Ramadan holiday, Id al-Fitr.

No reply is necessary.

Robert Blackill
Secretariat Staff

Attachment:

State of Bahrain
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note,
Reference No. 16/2/6-6855
Dated November 11, 1972

Rec'd NEA/ARP 11/22/72
Fwd. S/S

دولة البحرين
وزارة الخارجية

STATE OF BAHRAIN

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Protocol Section

الرقم .....

التاريخ .....

Ref. 16/2/6 - 6855

Date 12/11/1972

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Bahrain presents its compliments to the American Embassy and has the honour to forward herewith a massage from H.H. the Amir of the State of Bahrain to H.E. Richard Nixon.

" With great pleasure I received your very kind congratulations on the occasion of Id Al-fitr, and I would like to extend to your excellency my best regards, wishing your excellency more health and happiness, and to the American people further progress and prosperity."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Bahrain avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the American Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

American Embassy

Bahrain

وزارة خارجية دولة البحرين
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The State of Bahrain

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
12	1	12	1	10	8300	Saunders

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER ✓ HAIG ____

FROM: ELIOT ✓ ROGERS, W ____ LAIRD, M ____

U ✓ LOU ____ C ____ 'S ____ TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ BUO ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODE WORD ____ SENSITIVE ____

NODIS ____ EXDIS ____ LIMDIS ____ RES DATA ____

SUBJECT: Talks of Bahian ccl Gen greeting on the occasion of Ed ed. Tito

REFERENCE: S/S 7215 18 OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

APP'TS: PRES ____ HAK ____ TALKER ____ MEMCON ____ DATE REQ. ____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	✓		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ( )
REPLY FOR ____ SIGNATURE ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
REFER TO STATE ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
CONCURRENCE ( )
DUE DATE: 12/6

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
12/4/72	Saunders	NSC/S	C	No action necessary. rosemary neaher	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH ____ NOTIFY ____ DATE ____

SEE LOG ____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO ____

JOINED BY LOG ____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) ____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: ____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ✓ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA
DO ____ INIT ____ DATE ____
DEC 18 1972
ORIG) NSC ____
TO) PAF ✓ WHC ____ SUBF ____

☆ GPO: 1972-455-927

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 8, 1973 #85

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. JEANNE W. DAVIS

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal

SUBJECT: Agrement for Ambassador to Oman

I see no reason why we should not go ahead and process the attached Agrement as soon as Henry is back in Washington. This gentleman seems an entirely reasonable representative for Oman.

NSC/S -
O.K. as soon as signature is possible!
JFH

85

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 6, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Oman that the appointment of Faisal bin Ali al Bu-Said as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of Oman would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

H. A. Kissinger

Henry A. Kissinger

7300218
85

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. President:

The Government of Oman has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Faisal bin Ali al Bu-Said as its first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States. A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Oman.

Respectfully,

William P. Rogers

Enclosure:
Biography.

The President,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/8 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KMD NARA, Date 3-25-02

GDS--DECLAS Dec. 31, 1979

BIOGRAPHY - Faisal bin Ali al Bu-Said

Sultanate of Oman

Faisal bin Ali al Bu-Said, who is being proposed by the Sultanate of Oman as its first Ambassador to the United States, is currently Oman's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Born in 1927 in Muscat, he is a cousin of the present Sultan, Qaboos. Sayyid Faisal, as he is called, was educated in Muscat, Iraq and Eastern Europe. From 1950 to 1953 he served as Director of Education and from 1953 to 1956 in the Foreign Ministry. He left Oman for Cairo in 1957 to work for the Imam of Oman, an exiled Omani religious leader who opposed the then-Sultan, Taymur.

Throughout the 1960's, Sayyid Faisal worked with the many Omani exiles opposed to the despotic rule of Sultan Taymur. In 1960-61 and again in 1966 he was head of the Omani Imamate office in Damascus. Upon Taymur's overthrow by his son, Qaboos, in 1970, Faisal returned to Muscat to become first Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of Education, then Minister of Economy in the spring of 1971. As Minister his responsibilities included agriculture, industry, commerce, fishing, ports, and customs. In December 1971 Sayyid Faisal was appointed Oman's first Ambassador to the United Nations.

Politically active, Sayyid Faisal is a dedicated nationalist who is especially interested in the progress of his country. As Minister he envisaged wide-ranging and sometimes over-ambitious plans for developing Oman. He was an early advocate of a U.S. scholarship program for Oman, which has now begun.

Mild-mannered and courteous, Sayyid Faisal speaks English fairly well but prefers Arabic. He also has a smattering of French. He is unmarried.

A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
1	5	1	5	13	5	Saunders

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ✓
KISSINGER
HAIG

FROM: ELIOT
ROGERS, W ✓
LAIRD, M
Rogers

U
LOU
C ✓
S
TS

LOG IN/OUT ONLY
NO FORN
BUO
EYES ONLY
CODE WORD
SENSITIVE

NODIS
EXDIS
LIMDIS
RES DATA

SUBJECT: Agreed Aim the Law of Sea for Travel from the Ocean Bed not Just to the U.S.

REFERENCE: S/S 7300298 OTHER NOT XEROXED

APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ.

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	■		
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		X
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ( )
REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
MEMO TO Rogers for Pres (+)
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
REFER TO STATE ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
CONCURRENCE ( )
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
1/8/73	Saunders	Davis	S	Concurred in agreement	
1/8/6			C	H H signed see Mr Rogers	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE
SEE LOG DISPATCH: LETTER MEMO 1-8-72
JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO

MICROFILM DATA
DOC
INIT
DATE
ORIG
TO)
NSC
PAF
WHC
SUBF

JAN 10 1973

☆ GPO: 1972-455-927

4266

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of the State of Qatar that the appointment of Abdullah Saleh al Mania as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of the State of Qatar would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger

4266

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

May 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. DAVIS

FROM: SAMUEL M. HOSKINSON

SUBJECT: Agrement for First Ambassador from Qatar (Persian Gulf)

Attached is an agrement for Abdullah Saleh al Mania as Qatar's first ambassador to the U. S.

We do not know him but, based on the information which the Secretary and the State Department have provided, there would seem to be no grounds for objection.

Recommendation: That you process the attached agrement for Mr. Al Mania.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/9 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KWD NARA, Date 3-25-02

7208840

4366

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1972

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

The Government of the State of Qatar has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Abdullah Saleh al Mania as its first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States. A biography of Mr. al Mania is enclosed. A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of the State of Qatar.

Respectfully,

William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Biography.

The President,
The White House.

~~SECRET~~

BIOGRAPHY - Abdullah Saleh al Mania

State of Qatar

Abdullah Saleh al Mania, who is being proposed by the State of Qatar as its first Ambassador to the United States, was born in Doha, Qatar in 1946. After completing his secondary education in Qatar, he was employed by the Ministry of Education. Subsequently, he studied at the Arabic University in Beirut where he has graduated with a B.A. in economics and political science. He was then appointed to a position in the Ministry of Economics and Trade in Qatar and in this capacity he attended the Conference of Arab Ministers of Economics and Investments. Early in 1972, he was appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served for a short period in Qatar's Embassy in London.

A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
05/18	05/19/13	42660	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X
KISSINGER
HAIG

FROM: ELIOT
ROGERS, W
LAIRD, M
Rogers, W

U X
LOU
C
S
TS

LOG IN/OUT ONLY
NO FORN — NODIS
BUO — EXDIS
EYES ONLY — LIMDIS
CODE WORD — RES DATA
SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Appt. of Abdullah Saleh al Mana as Amb. from Qatar

REFERENCE: S/S — OTHER — NOT XEROXED

APP'TS: PRES — HAK — TALKER — MEMCON — DATE REQ.

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	[redacted]		
STAFF SECRETARY		X	
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. (X)
REPLY FOR — SIGNATURE ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
MEMO — TO ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
REFER TO STATE ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
CONCURRENCE ( )
DUE DATE: 5/24

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
5/30	Hoskinson	Davis		Move agreement.	
6/1				HAK Sgd Memo to Rogers	
				M/R Dispatch Friday AM	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH — NOTIFY — DATE
SEE LOG — DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
JOINED BY LOG — COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: — SA, — HP, — HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: Chief of Prot / Haig
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES — NO

MICROFILM DATA
DO
INIT
DATE
JUN 05 1972
ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF
WHC
SUBF

☆ GPO: 1972-455-927

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 10 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/12/72

TO THE SECRETARIAT

Attached original returned for files. We have retained information and subject has fairly well unfolded in media and on Hill.

Hal Saunders

7200231

NSC 162

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 6, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: New York Times Article on Middle East Force Agreement

Pursuant to the decision in National Security Decision Memorandum 92 of November 7, 1970 we concluded on December 23, 1971 with the Government of Bahrain a stationing agreement to provide for continued presence of the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area. The appropriate Senate and House committees have been fully informed of the negotiations and the substance of the agreement and have been promised the text of the final agreement, which we intend to publish in Treaties and Other International Acts Series once a certified copy of the final version is received from our Embassy in Bahrain.

On January 4 New York Times Capitol Hill correspondent John Finney contacted the Department to inquire about the "Executive Agreement to establish a U.S. military base in Bahrain." Department officers attempted to put the Bahrain arrangement in the proper perspective for Mr. Finney, assuring him that it was a simple logistic arrangement, necessitated by the British withdrawal from Bahrain, to continue the long-standing Middle East Force presence in the Gulf, and that it in no way constituted a United States political or military commitment to Bahrain or any other state in the area.

Subsequently Mr. Finney reported the agreement in the January 6 edition of the Times. This account was generally well balanced with respect to the purpose and nature of

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/11 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3-25-02
[4 pages]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the Bahrain arrangement. He focused, however, on the use of Executive Agreement in this case, noting the standing contention of some Foreign Relations Committee members that use of such agreements was an Executive device to enter into foreign commitments without the consent or advice of the Senate. In this connection, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has written the Department expressing his concern that the Bahrain arrangement was concluded by Executive Agreement.

for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

NSC CORRESPONDENCE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
1	6	1	7	10	00162	Saunders

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER X HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT X ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____ Finney, John

U _____ LOU _____ C X S _____ TS _____

NO FORN _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

NODIS _____ EXDIS _____ LIMDIS _____ RES DATA _____

SUBJECT: Finney Article in NY Times on ME Force Agreement with Bahrain re: US Presence in Persian Gulf & Indian Ocean

REFERENCE: S/S 7200231 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK (X)
MEMO FOR PRES. ( )
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
REFER TO STATE ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
CONCURRENCE ( )
DUE DATE: 01/10

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
4/12/72	Saunders	NSC/S			

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: See HS Memo atch

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA

DO _____ INIT _____ DATE _____

APR 20 1972

ORIG) TO) NSC _____ PAF ✓ WHC _____ SUBF _____

* GPO: 1971—412-412

30182

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Relations with Bahrain and Qatar (S/S 7109859)

The President has approved the two recommendations contained in Secretary Rogers' memorandum of July 2 for:

(a) U.S. recognition of Bahrain as that state becomes fully independent and establishment of diplomatic relations by accrediting our Ambassador to Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador;

(b) U.S. recognition of Qatar as that state becomes fully independent and the establishment of diplomatic relations by accrediting our Ambassador to Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/12 DOS ltr, 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 3-25-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dispatched 7/20/71 w/NSC/Receipt (PS)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7/17/71

Loretta –

I informed Gorbachev that President approved both recommendations. I also informed Ted Curran – State Secretariat.

The package is coming back from Don Clemente and written confirmation to State should then be sent over.

HK

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION
30182

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SUBJECT: U.S. Recognition of the Gulf States of Bahrain and Qatar

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memo (attached) recommending that you approve now U.S. recognition of the two largest Persian Gulf states--Bahrain and Qatar--when they declare their independence some time before the deadline for applications to the U.N. in early August. The Secretary also recommends that you approve the establishment of diplomatic relations with those two states by accrediting your Ambassador to Kuwait [John Patrick Walsh] as your non-resident Ambassador to Bahrain and Qatar. The Secretary notes that in NSDM 92 of last November you approved in principle the expansion of U.S. diplomatic representation to the lower Persian Gulf as the British protective treaties come to an end this year.

The purpose of these actions is to pre-position the U.S. to respond to what appears to be the irreversible decision of Bahrain to declare its independence this summer. When this happens, it is most likely that Qatar will follow suit. By approving now, the U.S. would be able to extend its recognition immediately upon a public announcement by these states. The best estimate now is that they will declare independence before the end of this month. Early diplomatic recognition of Bahrain and Qatar is in our interest and should not cause any significant problems with the other Persian Gulf states.

As you know, the British have been intensely engaged in attempting to establish a federation of the Persian Gulf entities before they depart at the end of this year. For some time, Bahraini intentions have been clear and the British conceded earlier this year that a federation of all nine, or even eight, states was a non-starter. A federation of the seven plus two independents was felt to be the most viable alternative and the problem became one of getting serious attention turned in that direction. An early declaration of independence by Bahrain would have provided incentive for that movement but the Bahrainis have been reluctant to do this without King Faisal's approval. Faisal, mainly because of his

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

rivalry with Abu Dhabi (the state which would dominate the federation of the remaining seven) and sensitivity to the appearance of acquiescing to British pressure, has held back to date on this approval. Meanwhile, Bahrain is performing every pre-independence act short of a public statement and, with British help, probing avenues to Faisal's formal acceptance before the U. N. deadline in August.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve U.S. recognition of Bahrain as that state becomes fully independent and the establishment of diplomatic relations thereupon by accrediting our Ambassador in Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you approve U.S. recognition of Qatar as that state becomes independent and the establishment of diplomatic relations thereupon by accrediting our Ambassador in Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

7109859

30182

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Diplomatic Relations with Bahrain and Qatar

I recommend that you approve U.S. recognition of the Persian Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar as they become fully independent in the course of the next few weeks. I also recommend you approve establishing diplomatic relations with these states by accrediting the American Ambassador to Kuwait, John Patrick Walsh, as non-resident Ambassador.

National Security Decision Memorandum 92 of November 7, 1970, indicated your approval in principle of expanding U.S. diplomatic representation to the lower Gulf once the British protective treaties with the nine Gulf states terminate. For the last seven months the political future of these states has been obscured, first by the British Government's review of its predecessor's decision to withdraw from the area and subsequently by efforts to include all nine Gulf states in one federation. Bahrain, the largest of the nine states, has now determined to become independent separately, perhaps as early as July 7, and has indicated a desire to establish diplomatic relations with the United States as soon as possible thereafter. All indications are that Qatar, the second largest state, will follow Bahrain's example promptly. There are reasonable prospects that the remaining seven states will subsequently establish a single federation and become fully independent by the end of the year.

In view of the significant U.S. strategic and economic interest in the Gulf and the relative importance of Bahrain and Qatar among the lower Gulf states, I recommend that you now approve:

a) U.S. recognition of Bahrain as that state becomes fully independent and establishment of diplomatic relations by accrediting our Ambassador to Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador;

b) U.S. recognition of Qatar as that state becomes fully independent and the establishment of diplomatic relations by accrediting our Ambassador to Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador.

William P. Rogers

MEMORANDUM

Dispatched to Pres 7/14/71

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION
30182

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG

FROM: Samuel M. Hoskinson

SUBJECT: Groundwork for Eventual U.S. Recognition of Two Gulf States as Independent

Attached is a memorandum for you to send to the President transmitting a recommendation from Secretary Rogers that the U.S. agree now to grant recognition to the Persian Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar as soon as they become fully independent. Our Ambassador in Kuwait would be accredited as a non-resident Ambassador to both Bahrain and Qatar.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the attached memo on to the President as soon as possible since Bahrain's declaration of independence followed by Qatar could come within several days and, in any event, probably before the end of the month.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
7	2	7	3	9	30182	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X
KISSINGER
HAIG

FROM: ELIOT
ROGERS, W X
LAIRD, M

U
LOU
C X
S
TS

LOG IN/OUT ONLY
NO FORN — NODIS
BUO — EXDIS
EYES ONLY — LIMDIS
CODE WORD — RES DATA
SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: U.S. Diplomatic Relations with Bahrain and Qatar

REFERENCE: S/S 7109859 OTHER NOT XEROXED

APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ.

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY		X	
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		X
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING		X	X
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. (X)
REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
MEMO TO ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
REFER TO STATE ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
CONCURRENCE ( )
DUE DATE: 7/8

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
7/10/71	Hoskinson	Haig	X	Pres for Decision (7/13)	
7/19				Pres approved Recons	
7/19	Hay	HAS	S	~~Haig~~ cc Pres Davis to Eliot 7/22	
7/20/71	Saunders	Davis		For signature of memo to Eliot	
7/20				Davis Sgd memo to Eliot	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE
SEE LOG DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO ✓

MICROFILM DATA
DO ✓
INIT EMH
DATE JUL 21 1971
ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF ✓
WHC
SUBF

* GPO: 1971—412-412

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9656

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/13 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 3-25-02

AGE 01 STATE 166565

3
RIGIN SS-30

NFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

RAFTED BY NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN:CEJ
PPROVED BY S:LPBREMER
EA:ALATHERTON
/S: MR. LUERS
EA:SSOBER

---------- 055698

311944Z JUL 74
M SECSTATE WASHDC
O AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 166565

XDIS

.O. 11652: GDS
AGS: PFOR, TC, SA
UBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO UAE PRESIDENT
HAIKH ZAYID
EFS: ABU DHABI 1009; ABU DHABI 1014

. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY
O UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID.

. BEGIN TEXT: YOUR HIGHNESS, I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU MY
ARM CONGRATULATIONS UPON THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT
ETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND SAUDI ARABIA ANNOUNCED
N JULY 29 DURING THE VISIT OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE
AHD. I UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT RESOLVES VARIOUS ISSUES
ETWEEN YOUR TWO COUNTRIES.

. AS FRIENDS OF BOTH THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND SAUDI
RABIA, THE UNITED STATES IS GRATIFIED TO SEE THIS LONG-
TANDING ISSUE RESOLVED AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES
LACED ON A NEW FOOTING. BOTH SIDES ARE TO BE COMMENDED
OR THEIR FAR-SIGHTEDNESS AND STATESMANSHIP IN REACHING AN
GREEMENT WHICH WILL DO MUCH TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY

'74 JUL 32 AM 8:00
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGE 02 STATE 166565

HROUGHOUT THE AREA.

. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR
OUR HIGHNESS' STATESMANLIKE ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT THIS
AVORABLE DEVELOPMENT. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER.

. FYI: THE SECRETARY HAS ALSO SENT A MESSAGE OF
PPRECIATION TO PRINCE FAHD. END FYI. KISSINGER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1576

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01030 011057Z

15
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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O P 011025Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1883

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ABU DHABI 1030

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR TC SA
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO UAE PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 166565

WE DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTRY TODAY, BUT, BECAUSE MOST GOVERMENT OFFICIALS ARE ABSENT FROM ABU DHABI WE DO NOT HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE THAT MESSAGE WILL BE DELIVERED PROMPTLY THROUGH UAE CHANNELS TO SHAIKH ZAYID, WHO SHOULD NOW BE EN ROUTE FROM BAGHDAD TO TUNIS. WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE IT IF EMBASSY TUNIS COULD DELIVER SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO TUNISIAN MFA WITH REQUEST THAT IT BE HANDED TO SHAIKH ZAYID AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MESSAGE FOLLOWS.

QUOTE YOUR HIGHNESS:

I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS UPON THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND SAUDI ARABIA ANNOUNCED ON JULY 29 DURING THE VISIT OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE FAHD. I UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT RESOLVES VARIOUS ISSUES BETWEEN YOUR TWO COUNTRIES.

AS FRIENDS OF BOTH THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED STATES IS GRATIFIED TO SEE THIS LONG-STANDING ISSUE RESOLVED AND RE-LATIONS BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES PLACED ON A NEW FOOT-

'74 AUG 1 PM 3:12
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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/114 DOS ltr 2-26-02
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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01030 011057Z

ING. BOTH SIDES ARE TO BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR FAR-
SIGHTEDNESS AND STATESMANSHIP IN REACHING AN AGREE-
MENT WHICH WILL DO MUCH TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY
THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

I WOULD LIKE TO ADD MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION
FOR YOUR HIGHNESS' STATESMANLIKE ROLE IN BRINGING
ABOUT THIS FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT.

WARM REGARDS,

HENRY A. KISSINGER END QUOTE

STERNER

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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00560 290802Z

17
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
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O R 290410Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1382
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON UK
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN
COMIDEASTFOR

74 JUL 29 PM 2:21
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 2-26-02
NLNS 01-23/15 DOS 25X(6)
By KMB NARA, Date 3-25-02

~~S E C R E T~~ MANANA 0560

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT: RETENTION OF MIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN

REF: STATE 163984

1. I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER JULY 28 TO DELIVER NOTE AUTHORIZED AND TO MAKE POINTS CONTAINED PARA 1 REFTEL.

2. DRAWING ON PARAS 2-5 REFTEL, I DISCUSSED WITH FONMIN OUR DESIRE TO MEET BAHRAIN'S REQUEST TO PRESERVE CONFIDENTIALITY OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT POINTED OUT REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY TRANSMITTAL OF FORMAL AMENDMENTS TO CONGRESS, SHOULD FORMAL AMENDMENTS BE REQUIRED. FONMIN INDICATED UNDERSTANDING OF THIS PROBLEM POINTING OUT THAT GOB FACED WITH SOMEWHAT SIMILAR ONE SINCE IF ACTUAL TEXT OF AGREEMENT IS TO BE AMENDED GOB MAY FEEL IT HAS TO BRING THE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. FOR THIS REASON HE FELT GOB MIGHT PREFER AVOIDING AMENDMENT TEXT IF THIS WERE POSSIBLE.

3. I SAID, WHILE I WAS NOT TRYING TO GET INTO NEGOTIATION OF JURISDICTION QUESTION WITH HIM, IT SEEMED TO ME THERE WOULD BE BETTER

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CHANCE OF AVOIDING AMENDMENT OF TEXT IF GOB COULD ACCEPT SOMETHING LIKE JURISDICTION ARRANGEMENT WE HAD PROPOSED IN DEC. 29, 1973 NOTE. ADDED, THAT SINCE I WAS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS QUESTION IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN EXPEDITING SETTLEMENT IF WE HAD BETTER IDEA OF WHAT EXACTLY GOB HAD IN MIND IN WAY OF JURISDICTION. FONMIN INDICATED THAT GOB HAD FOUND SOME PROBLEMS IN OUR DEC. 29 PROPOSAL.

[redacted]

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4. I HAVE ARRANGED TO MEET WITH MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS TO GET A MORE DETAILED IDEA OF GOB PROBLEMS ON JURISDICTION QUESTION AND HAVE ASKED CMEF HANKS TO JOIN ME IN THAT MEETING. I ALSO WILL BE MAKING COURTESY CALLS ON PRIME MINISTER AND ACTING AMIR PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE.

5. PLAN TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON THIS COMING AMERICAN WEEKEND AND

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PAGE 03 MANAMA 00560 290802Z

BE AVAILABLE TO BEGIN CONSULTATIONS MORNING AUG. 5. FONMIN EXPRESSED NO PRACTICAL PROBLEM WITH PUTTING OFF VISIT OF LEGAL TEAM UNTIL LATTER PART OF AUGUST. HE ALSO ADMITTED THAT IN REGARDS TO "ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS" ABSENCE OF KEY GOB MINISTERS CONCERNED WITH THESE QUESTIONS REQUIRES THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS BE DELAYED UNTIL EARLY SEPT.

6. DEPT PASS DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.
TWINAM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
JUL 29 AM 8:38

~~SECRET~~ 2226

PAGE 01 STATE 163984

72
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:SBUCK/L/NEA:SCNELSON:EMP
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
EA/EX:DLWILLIAMSON
PM/ISO:MR. FLEMINGS
G/PAS:MSTANLEY
L/OM:JMICHEL (SUBS)
S/S-O:K KURZE
DOD/ISA/NEA:GSICK
OD/N/JAG:FRUCHTERMAN
DODISA/FMRA:BARRINGER
DOD/ISA:GEN SUNMER
H:KFOLGER(SUBS)
S/S-O:KAKURZE

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O R 280031Z JUL 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
COMIDEASTFOR

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 163984

EXDIS

DOD FOR ISA, CNO

E.O.11652:GDS
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT:RETENTION OF MIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN

REF: (A) MANAMA 538; (B)MANAMA 539 (NOTAL);

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/16 DOS ltr. 2-26-02
By AWD NARA, Date 3-25-02

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 163984

(C) MANAMA 540 (NOTAL); (D) MANAMA 542 (NOTAL); (E) MANAMA 543 (NOTAL)

1. BAHRAINI "OFFICIAL" NOTIFICATION TO USOFMIDEASTFOR RETENTION MOST WELCOME DEVELOPMENT. AS CONSEQUENCE AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER NOTE REF B TO FONMIN. IN SO DOING YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR APPRECIATIONOF GOB DECISION, OUR COMMITTMENT TO WORK SWIFTLY ON VARIOUS QUESTIONS RAISED BY MINISTER, AND OUR DESIRE FOR EVEN CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH BAHRAIN. AT SAME TIMEYOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT WHILE NOTIFICATION OF MIDEASTFOR RETENTION MOST ENCOURAGING, POINTS RAISED BY FONMIN WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. BEFORE WE ENTER THEM, BELIEVE EMBASSY AND FONMIN SHOULD BE AWARE THAT, AS MATTERS HAVE NOW DEVELOPED, WE FACE SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED SITUATION VIS-A-VIS THE CONGRESS. THE ORIGINAL BAHRAIN AGREEMENT WAS A MAJOR ISSUE IN CONGRESS, AND MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY INTERESTED IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF TERMINATION PROBLEM, PRESUMABLY ON EXPECTATION THAT ANY CONTINUATION OF OUR PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN WOULD INVOLVE, IN EFFECT, A RENEWAL OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENT, POSSIBLY WITH AMENDMENTS.

2. THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THAT, IN CONTEXT OF SATISFYING BAHRAINI PRECONDITIONS TO WITHDRAWAL OF TERMINATION NOTICE, BAHRAIN SHOULD BE AWARE THAT NEW U.S. UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THEM ARE LIKELY TO HAVE TO BE REGARDED, AT LEAST FOR PURPOSES OF U.S. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, AS CONSTITUTING NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE CASE IF GOB HAD ACCEPTED OUR DEC. 29, 1973 NOTE ON CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OR IF WE WERE DEALING ONLY WITH INCREASE OF RENT AND REDUCTION OF PIER TIME. NOW, HOWEVER, OTHER MATTERS IN QUESTION GO DIRECTLY TO PROVISIONS OF EXISTING AGREEMENT AND THUS WOULD CONSTITUTE EITHER AMENDMENTS OR NEW AGREEMENT, DEPENDING ON HOW WE DRAFT THEM.

3. THERE ARE REALLY TWO ASPECTS TO OUR DEALINGS WITH CONGRESS ON THESE ISSUES.

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PAGE 03 STATE 163984

A. FIRST, THE CASE ACT OF 1972 REQUIRES THAT WE TRANSMIT ALL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OTHER THAN TREATIES TO CONGRESS WITHIN SIXTY DAYS AFTER THEIR ENTRY INTO FORCE. CLASSIFIED AGREEMENTS MAY BE TRANSMITTED TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES UNDER AN INJUNCTION OF SECRECY, BUT THE NEED FOR A PERSUASIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CLASSIFICATION IS OBVIOUS. UNLESS AGREEMENTS ARE CLASSIFIED, THEY WILL BE PUBLISHED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SERIES.

B. SECOND, AND MORE CRUCIAL, THE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATIONS REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE CONCLUSION OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. IN LIGHTOF PAST SENSITIVITY OF THE BAHRAIN AGREEMENT ON THE HILL, WE CONSIDER PRIOR CONSULTATIONS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO NEGOTIATE EVEN ON THE RELATIVELY LIMITED RANGE OF ISSUES ENVISIONED BY THE BAHRAINIS.

4. REQUEST AMBASSADOR RAISE WITH FONMIN THOSE ASPECTS OF FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE. YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM THAT GIVEN ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS AND NUMBER OF ISSUES WHICH MUST BE DISCUSSED, WE HAVE DECIDED IT WOULD BE BEST FOR YOU TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR CONSULTATIONS. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THESE CONSULTATIONS WE WOULD PLAN TO FIELD LEGAL TEAM FROM DOD AND STATE TO DISCUSS VARIOUS LEGAL QUESTIONS INCLUDING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.

5. IN YOUR MEETING WITH FONMIN, YOU SHOULD ASSURE HIM THAT EVEN THOUGH CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY, WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM CONFIDENTIAL. WHILE WE CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE ANY PUBLICITY WE HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF AVOIDING IT BY THIS ACTION THAN IF WE CHOSE TO MOVE AHEAD WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING CONGRESS.

6. FYI. ALTHOUGH THIS WILL REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY, OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION IS THAT CHANGING TERMINATION PROVISION FROM ONE YEAR TO SIX MONTHS WILL BE POSSIBLE WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTY. END FYI.

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PAGE 04 STATE 165984

7. TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION AND FISCAL DATA FOR AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL AS FOLLOWS: TA-4401-500075 DATED JULY 26, 1974 CHARGE: 1950113-4401-500075-2154. INGERSOLL

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00965 220905Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
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R 220730Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1834
INFO USINT ALGEIRS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONGEN DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY MANAMA

'74 JUL 24 AM 9:32
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
ALNS 01-33/17 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By ___ NARA, Date 3-15-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ABU DHABI 0965

EXDIS

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD; KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT AND DOHA

FO 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, TC
SUBJ: UAE POLICY ON OIL PRICES

1. I TOOK OCCASION OF CONVERSATION AT LUNCH WITH UAE FON MIN SUWAIDI JULY 21 TO MENTION OUR CONCERN ABOUT OIL PRICES. I GENERALLY FOLLOWED STATE 152797 WHICH STRIKES ME AS EXCELLENT BASIS FOR PRESENTATION.

2. SUWAIDI HAD BEEN EXPLAINING, WITH SOME PRIDE, WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE UAE POLICY OF MODERATION AND RESTRAINT

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00965 220905Z

TO GULF AFFAIRS. "WE HAVE TRIED TO FOLLOW THE POLICY THAT LONG-TERM STABILITY IN THIS AREA IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN SPECIFIC PIECES OF TERRITORY." I SAID THIS WAS A THEME THAT INVITED EXTENSION INTO WORLD ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. WE WERE ALL LINKED IN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY. ALL OF US COLLECTIVELY STOOD TO LOSE MUCH MORE THROUGH DISLOCATIONS TO WORLD ECONOMY THAN ANY OF US MIGHT GAIN THROUGH TRYING TO FORCE MOMENTARY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. FULLPKKENTIB# SHOCK CAUSED BY QUADRUPLING OF WORLD OIL PRICES ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO APPEAR, AND THEY WERE WORRISOME. WE BELIEVED THAT AT PRESENT LEVELS OIL PRICES WERE TOO HIGH, AND THAT THEY WERE CAUSING SEVERE STRAINS TO WORLD ECONOMY. WE HOPED UAE WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO ALLOW PRICE OF OIL TO ADJUST TO MORE REALISTIC LEVELS.

3. SUWAIDI SAID HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH THIS VIEW. HE ASKED ABOUT SAUDI POSITION. I SAID SAUDIS WANTED LOWER OIL PRICES, BUT THEY WERE FINDING THEMSELVES OUTNUMBERED IN OPEC. SUWAIDI SAID HE THOUGHT UAE SHOULD COOPERATE WITH SAUDI ARABIA ON OIL POLICY. I SAID I WELCOMED THIS VIEW BUT HAD RECEIVED IMPRESSION FROM MINPET OTAIBA THAT HE HAD SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POSITION. SUWAIDI SAID, QUOTE I WILL SPEAK WITH SHAIKH ZAYID ABOUT IT. END QUOTE.

4. COMMENT: OIL POLICY IS GENERALLY PROVINCE OF MINPET AND ADNOC RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT OIL OF COURSE AFFECTS MUCH THAT SUWAIDI, AS FON MIN, IS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. BY MOST ACCOUNTS HERE SUWAIDI IS ONE OF THREE OR FOUR ADVISORS SHAIKH ZAYID LISTENS TO THE MOST. SUWAIDI EXPECTS TO ACCOMPANY SHAIKH ZAYID ON HIS 2-MONTH SUMMER TRYP AND THEREFORE WILL HAVE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK ON RULER IF HE CHOOSES TO DO SO.
STERNER

NOTE BY OC/T: # AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 25X(6)
NLNS 01-23/18 DOS 2-26-02
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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00540 240145Z

70
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
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O 231714Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1366
INFO COMIDEASTFOR

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0540

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 : GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETENTION COMIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN - "LEGAL ASPECTS"

REF : MANAMA 538

'74 JUL 24 PM 4:46
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SANITIZED 25X(6)

1. IN GIVING OFFICIAL NOTICE OF GOB CONDITIONAL DECISION TO PERMIT MIDEASTFORCE TO REMAIN HERE, FONMIN

[redacted]

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PAGE 03 MANAMA 00540 240145Z

MENT FROM 12 MONTHS NOTICE TO 6 MONTHS, FONMIN SUGGESTED "WORKING GROUP" LAWYERS COULD ALSO SUGGEST HOW TO HANDLE EFFECTING THAT CHANGE, PERHAPS WITHOUT ACTUALLY AMEMDING TEST OF AGREEMENT. HE BY NO MEANS SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS "CONDITION" WAS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. HE SAID GOB OF COURSE HOPED TERMINATION WOULD NEVER AGAIN HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED BUT "THIS IS AFTER ALL THE MIDDLE EAST". SHOULD IT UNHAPPILY BE NECESSARY IN FUTURE FOR EITHER SIDE TO TERMINATE AGREE-

MENT GOB WANTED "CLEAN BREAK", SIX MONTHS WOULD BE AMPLE TIME FOR U.S.

NAVY TO CLEAR OUT, AND GOB NEVER AGAIN WANTED TO BE IN POSITION OF EXPLAINING WAY IT CONSTRAINED FROM GETTING GUESTS OUT OF COUNTRY FOR UP TO ONE YEAR AFTER IT ASKED THEM TO LEAVE.

7. RECOMMENDATION: I THINK WE SHOULD MOVE WITH GREATEST SPEED POSSIBLE TO GET THESE "LEGAL QUESTIONS" WORKED OUT, AND THAT GOB WISH TO CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH USG LEGAL EXPERTS PRESENT MUST BE HONORED. I CAN NOT STRESS TO STRONGLY HOWEVER THAT ANY U.S. LAWYERS COMING OUT, STATE OR DOD, MUST UNDERSTAND FOLLOWING: [redacted]

SANITIZED 25X(6)

8. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST ON POSSIBILITY SENDING U.S. LEGAL TEAM, ITS COMPOSITION, AND ETA.

9. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.
TWINAM

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'74 JUL 18 PM 7:54

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/19 DOSltr 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 3-25-02

PAGE 01 STATE 155527

43
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:GQLUMSDEN JR.:SM
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATERTO'
PM/ISO - MR. STODDARD (INFO)
DOD/ISA (NESA) -CDR. SICK (INFO)
NEA/ARP- MR. DICKMAN
S/S - SEFRY

---------- 035347

O R 181546Z JUL 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 155527

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, BA, DU, US
SUBJECT: RETAINING MIDDLE EAST FORCE IN BAHRAIN

REF: MANAMA 0519

1. GIVEN GOK'S WELL KNOWN ANTI-MIDEASTFOR VIEWS, WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH NOW TO ATTEMPT ENGAGING KUWAITIS ON RETENTION PROBLEM. EVEN IF OUR MAXIMUM EXPECTATION WAS TO INDUCE THEM TO STAY OUT OF THIS AFFAIR WE FEAR OUR APPROACH WOULD RUN RISK OF BEING MIS-INTERPRETED BY GOK AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS AT BEST OR INTERFERENCE IN GOK-BAHRAINI RELATIONS AT WORST.

2. OUR CURRENT READING OF KUWAIT'S RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN ALSO LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR EXPECTATIONS THAT EITHER OF THESE COUNTRIES MIGHT PERSUADE GOK TO

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PAGE 02 STATE 155527

ADOPT MORE CONSTRUCTIVE STANCE ON MIDEASTFOR. HOWEVER, WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS ADDRESSEE POSTS MIGHT WISH TO MAKE ON THIS SCORE. KISSINGER

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WHITE HOUSE
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'74 JUL 17 PM 7:12

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/20 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KMT NARA, Date 3-25-02

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00519 171426Z

50
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
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O 171239Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1349
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0519

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETAINING MIDDLE EAST FORCE IN BAHRAIN

REF : MANAMA 0514

1. JULY 17 I HAD FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH IRANIAN AMBASSADOR HIS JULY 16 MEETING WITH AMIR ON MIDDLE EAST FORCE FORCE.
AMIR HAD APPEARED UNCERTAIN WHAT IRANIAN POSITION MIGHT BE AND HENCE SEEMED ESPECIALLY RELIEVED AND APPRECIATIVE THAT SHAH SUPPORTING HIS OWN DESIRE TO SEE NAVY REMAIN. FROM AMIR'S REMARKS IT CLEAR TO IRANIAN THAT SAUDI MESSAGE OF SUPPORT IS GETTING THROUGH.

2. ACCORDING TO IRANIAN, AMIR SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED FOREIGN MINISTER SHEIKH MUHAMMAD BIN MUBARAK AS AMONG THOSE GOB MINISTERS STILL OPPOSING
NAVY'S CONTINUED PRESENCE, AND, AS REPORTED REFTEL, AMIR SAID HE TIRED
OF CABINET'S DEBATING THIS ISSUE AND READY TO MAKE DECISION HIMSELF.
(COMMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NEW HERE, AND AMIR SOMETIMES DISPLAYS NOSTALGIA FOR A SIMPLER, LESS VEXING WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS.
I WOULD GUESS ODDS HIS ACTUALLY ORDERING CABINET TO DECIDE TO LET NAVY STAY ARE ONLY FIFTY/FIFTY.)

3. WITH IRANIAN(PROTECT), AMIR MADE MUCH OF FACT THAT KUWAIT

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00519 171426Z

CONTINUING TO URGE GOB TO STICK BY OCTOBER 75 DECISION TO TERMINATE AGREEMENT. ACCORDING IRANIAN, AMIR SAID KUWAITIS NOW TALK OF PAYING BAHRAIN "FIVE TIMES" WHAT U.S. NAVY WOULD HAVE, AS COMPENSATION FOR NAVY'S GOING. (COMMENT: FIGURE SEEMS TO GROW EVERYTIME AMIR TELLS THIS STORY). FROM AMIR'S REMARKS IRANIAN GOT IMPRESSION THAT WHILE AMIR AND PRIME MINISTER UNIMPRESSED AND IRRITATED BY THIS KUWAITI ADVICE, OTHER MINISTERS, NOTABLY FOREIGN MINISTER, MIGHT BE TAKING NOTE OF IT. (AMIR SAID HE WOULD BE SENDING PRIME MINISTER TO KUWAIT IN NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS BROAD RANGE OF KUWAITI/BAHRAINI RELATIONS, ABOUT WHICH HE LESS THAN HAPPY AT MOMENT.)

4. I WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED IF ANYONE, INCLUDING USG, COULD GET GOK TO SUPPORT ACTIVELY BAHRAINI DECISION TO PERMIT MIDEASTFORCE TO REMAIN HERE. WONDER, HOWEVER, IF WE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER PROS AND CONS OF APPROACHING GOK ON THIS SUBJECT, WITH MAXIMUM EXPECTATION OF INDUCING THEM TO STAY OUT OF IT. I SUSPECT GOK WOULD BE FLATTERED BY SUCH APPROACH AND THAT IT MIGHT THEREFORE REDOUND TO OUR BENEFIT IN OVERALL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT. WHETHER ON OTHER HAND IT MIGHT INTENSIFY
RATHER THAN MUFFLE KUWAITI INTERFERENCE IN MIDDLE EAST FORCE ISSUE IS QUESTION ADDRESSEES IN FAR BETTER POSITION TO JUDGE THAN I.

5. I HAVE APPOINTMENT FOR COURTESY CALL ON AMIR FRIDAY MORNING, JULY 19, THE DAY BEFORE HIS REPORTED DEPARTURE FOR LONDON.

6. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO JIDDA AND TEHRAN FOR INFO.
TWINAM

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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00538 232328Z

70
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
096500

O P 231450Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1364
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON UK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
COMIDEASTFOR

'74 JUL 24 AM 8:24
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0538

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 per 25X(6)
NLN501-23/21 DOS 2-26-02
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3-26-02

EXDIS

KUWAIT PASS DOHA, MUSCAT

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETENTION MIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN

1. FOREIGN MINISTER, WHEN I CALLED ON HIM TODAY, INFORMED ME "OFFICIALLY" THAT GOB HAS DETERMINED IT WILL RESCIND NOTICE OF TERMINATION STATIONING AGREEMENT AND THAT MIDDLE EAST FORCE MAY CONTINUE TO REMAIN STATIONED IN BAHRAIN. HE EMPHASIZED THIS HAD BEEN DIFFICULT DECISION IN WHICH ALL CABINET TOOK PART AND WAS TAKEN NOT WITHIN NARROW CONTEXT OF STATIONING AGREEMENT AND U.S. NAVY PRESENCE BUT IN WIDER VIEW OF BAHRAIN'S DESIRE FOR BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH U.S. AND HOPE FOR EVOLVING U.S. ROLE IN BAHRAIN AND GULF GENERALLY OVER NEXT GENERATION.

2. FONMIN STRESSED THIS MUST REMAIN "CONFIDENTIAL" UNDERSTANDING UNTIL CERTAIN PROBLEMS WORKED OUT: 1) MODALITIES - EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL NOTES IN WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGE TERMINATION NOTICE AND EXPRESS INTEREST IN GOB RECONSIDERATION IN VIEW CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN MIDDLE EAST, AND GOB REPLY INDICATING IT HAS

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RECONSIDERED AND IN EFFECT WITHDRAWS NOTICE, SUBJECT TO RESOLUTION CERTAIN RELATED PROBLEMS, 2) "LEGAL QUESTIONS" - [redacted] PLUS GOB DESIRE TO SEE TERMINATION PROVISION OF AGREEMENT SHORTENED FROM ONE YEAR TO SIX MONTHS, 3) "ECONIMIC QUESTIONS" - BENEFITS, FOCUSED LARGELY ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AS EVIDENCE STRONGER FUTURE U.S.-BAHRAIN RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH DECISION TO PERMIT NAVY TO REMAIN IS BUT AN ASRECT. THIS COULD INCLUDE RENTAL FEES DIRECTLY RELATED TO NAVY PRESENCE BUT MORE IMPORTANT A U.S."TECHNICAL ASSISTACE" ROLE WHICH MUST NOT BE OSTENSIBLY TIED TO NAVY PRESENCE. ALSO QUESTION OF MIDEASTFORCE USE OF PIER SPACE AT MINA SULMAN.

3. FONMIN EMPHASIZED AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT AT PRESENT STAGE GOB DECISION MUST BE HANDLED IN CLOSEST CONFIDENTIALITY. HE SAID "LEGAL QUESTIONS" MUST BE WORKED OUT FIRST, WITH GREAT URGENCY, AND THEN WE MUST SORT OUT "ECONOMIC QUESTIONS". HE IS LOOKING TOWARD HAVING THIS BUSINESS ALL TIED UP BY END OF AUGUST, LEAVING SEPTEMBER FOR GOB EFFORT TO LOBBY TO CONVINCE OWN PEOPLE AND NEIGHBORING STATES THAT ITS DECISION IS IN BEST LONG TERM INTERESTS OF BAHRAIN, GULF, AND ARAB WORLD GENERALLY.

4. SEPTELS, LIMITED TO ADDEES WITH DIRECT INTEREST IN DETAILS, WILL EXPAND ON WHAT GOB WANTS AND HOW IT SEES NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOPING.

5. COMMENT: FROM FONMIN'S REMARKS IN HOUR LONG DISCUSSION IT MOST OBVIOUS PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S RECENT EFFORTS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE HAVE BEEN DECISIVE FACTOR IN TURNING GOB AROUND. ALTHOUGH FOREIGN MINISTER CAREFUL NOT TO ACKNOWLEDGE IT TO ME, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT APPROACHES BY IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE ALSO PLAYED MOST HELPFUL ROLE IN MOVING GOB TO THIS DIFFICULT DECISION. IN VIEW OF EXTREME GOB SENSITIVITY ABOUT KEEPING DECISION CONFIDENTIAL AT THIS STAGE MUST REQUEST THAT ANY WELL DESERVED WORD OF APPRECIATION TO GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA STRESS THAT GOB NOT YET READY TO HAVE ITS DECISION KNOWN TO THIRD PARTIES, AT LEAST NOT THROUGH U.S. CHANNELS.

6. DEPT PASS DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.

TWTNAM

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 DOS ltr. 2-26-02
NLNS 01-23/22 per 3.4(b)(6)
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00540 232358Z

73
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
---------- 096677

O 231714Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1366
INFO COMIDEASTFOR

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0540

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 : GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETENTION COMIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN - "LEGAL ASPECTS"

REF : MANAMA 538

1. IN GIVING OFFICIAL NOTICE OF GOB CONDITIONAL DECISION TO PERMIT MIDEASTFORCE TO REMAIN HERE, FONMIN STRESSED

[redacted]

'74 JUL 24 AM 8:24
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00540 232358Z

[redacted]

5. WE THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF AMENDING SUBSTANCE OF JURISDICTION ARRANGEMENTS WITHOUT RAISING FURTHER PUBLICITY, ESPECIALLY DISCUSSION IN U.S. CONGRESS AND PRESS, ABOUT AGREEMENT AND NAVY'S STATUS HERE. WERE THERE WAYS TO MEET GOB DESIRE WITHOUT ACTUALLY AMENDING TEXT OF PARAGRAPH 11 OF AGREEMENT? FONMIN SAID THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ISSUE BUT ONE THAT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL WE SEE WHERE "WORKING GROUP" DISCUSSIONS ARE COMING OUT SUBSTANTIVELY.

6. ON MATTER OF SHORTENING TERMINATION (PARA 14) PROVISION IN AGREEMENT FROM 12 MONTHS NOTICE TO 6 MONTHS, FONMIN SUGGESTED "WORKING GROUP" LAWYERS COULD ALSO SUGGEST HOW TO HANDLE EFFECTING THAT

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PAGE 03 MANAMA 00540 2323582

CHANGE, PERHAPS WITHOUT ACTUALLY AMENDING TEXT OF AGREEMENT. HE BY NO MEANS SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS "CONDITION" WAS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. HE SAID GOB OF COURSE HOPED TERMINATION WOULD NEVER AGAIN HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED BUT "THIS IS AFTER ALL THE MIDDLE EAST". SHOULD IT UNHAPPILY BE NECESSARY IN FUTURE FOR EITHER SIDE TO TERMINATE AGREEMENT GOB WANTED "CLEAN BREAK", SIX MONTHS WOULD BE AMPLE TIME FOR U.S. NAVY TO CLEAR OUT, AND GOB NEVER AGAIN WANTED TO BE IN POSITION OF EXPLAINING AS IT CONSTRAINED FROM GETTING GUESTS OUT OF COUNTRY FOR UP TO ONE YEAR AFTER IT ASKED THEM TO LEAVE.

7. RECOMMENDATION: I THINK WE SHOULD MOVE WITH GREATEST SPEED POSSIBLE TO GET THESE "LEGAL QUESTIONS" WORKED OUT, AND THAT GOB WISH TO CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH USG LEGAL EXPERTS PRESENT MUST BE HONORED. I CAN NOT STRESS TO STRONGLY HOWEVER THAT ANY U.S. LAWYERS COMING OUT, STATE OR DOD, MUST UNDERSTAND FOLLOWING:

[redacted]

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8. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST ON POSSIBILITY SENDING U.S. LEGAL TEAM, ITS COMPOSITION, AND ETA.

9. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.
TWINAM

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NLNS 01-23/23 DOS ltr. 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 3-25-02

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00543 232329Z

66
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
---------- 096494

O 231718Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1368
INFO COMIDEASTFOR

'74 JUL 24 AM 8:24
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0543

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, BA, US
SUBJ: RETENTION COMIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN -- "ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS -- BENEFITS

REF : MANAMA 538

1. WHEN FONMIN DISCUSSED "ECONOMIC BENEFITS" CONDITIONS FOR NAVY'S REMAINING HE WAS PURPOSELY VAGUE ON RENT, SAYING GOB "REALLY HATED TO CHARGE ANYTHING AT ALL" IN VIEW OF RELATIONSHIP CONTEMPLATED WITH USG BUT AT SAME TIME REALIZED NAVY'S STATUS HERE MUST BE ARRANGED IN SELF-CONTAINED "COMMERCIAL" LEASE WHICH WOULD SHOW FAIR RENTAL FOR SERVICES/LAND PROVIDED AND NOT IN ANY WAY IMPLY "TREATY-LIKE" OR OPEN ENDED U.S. COMMITMENTS. ASIDE FROM RENT, NAVY PRESENCE WHERE MUST BE "SEPARATED COMPLETELY" FROM U.S. ECONOMIC COOPERATION WHICH GOB HOPED WOULD EVOLVE. (COMMENT: I CAME AWAY WITH IMPRESSION REVISED RENT REQUEST WILL STILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN PRESENT RATE.)

2. WHEN FONMIN TURNED TO OTHER "ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS" I TRIED TO PIN HIM DOWN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BUT HE INDICATED GOB REALLY WANTS USG TO COME UP WITH IDEAS FOR PROVIDING EVIDENCE OF CONCERN FOR BAHRAINI DEVELOPMENT. HE SKETCHED FOLLOWING THOUGHTS: BAHRAIN MUST HAVE EVIDENCE OF U.S. INTEREST AND FRIENDSHIP AND THIS WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATED IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AREA. GOB WANTS TO START "NEW ERA" IN RELATIONS WITH US IN WHICH USG PLAYS A ROLE IN ASSISTING DEVELOPMENT OF AREA. BAHRAIN DOES NOT RPT

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00543 232329Z

NOT WANT "MONEY" OR "AID", AS SUCH. A FEW ADVISORS IN AREAS TO BE IDENTIFIED IN TIME ARE THE MAIN NEED. THE SORT OF CLEAR CUT "NO STRINGS" REIMBURSABLE PROGRAMS WHICH SAUDIS HAVE USED FROM TIME TO TIME ARE IDEAL, EXCEPT THAT GOB WILL NEED CONCESSIONAL TERMS IN VIEW ITS LIMITED RESOURCES, HIGH COST OF AMERICAN EXPERTISE, AND NEED FOR EVIDENCE OF U.S. COOPERATION AND GOOD WILL. HELP WITH DEVELOPING COAST GUARD MIGHT ALSO BE APPRECIATED. FONMIN CONTINUED THAT HE AWARE THERE ARE PRESENTLY LEGAL AND BUDGETARY LIMITS ON WHAT USG COULD DO FOR "NON-AID" COUNTRIES, BUT IN VIEW OF ENORMOUS US INTERESTS IN GULF HE WONDERED IF TIME HAD NOT COME FOR IMAGINATIVE NEW CONCEPT OF U.S. TECHINCAL ASSISTANCE HERE.

3. FONMIN REQUESTED I REPORT THESE THOUGHTS TO WASHINGTON AND THAT USG CONSIDER WHAT IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO. IN LONG GENERAL DISCUSSION THIS POINT IT BECAME CLEAR GOB WOULD BE PARTICULARLY PLEASED IF ITS DECISION TO KEEP MIDEASTFORCE HERE BECAME SYMBOL OF NEW U.S. ROLE THROUGHTOUT GULF, NOT IN SECURITY FIELD BUT IN TRULY EFFECTIVE PROGRAM FOR TECHNICAL HELP FOR FULLY INDEPENDENT NATIONS.

4. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR, TWINAM

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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00542 232302Z

70
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
---------- 096307

O 231716Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1367
INFO COMIDEASTFOR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'74 JUL 24 AM 8:24

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0542

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 : GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETENTION COMIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN - "ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS" -- PIER SPACE

REF : MANAMA 538

1. FOREIGN MINISTER MENTION TWO "ECONOMIC CONDITIONS" FOR CONTINUED NAVY PRESENCE. ONE WAS PRACTICAL: FLAGSHIP LA SALLE TAKES UP TOO MUCH PIER TIME AT MINA SULMAN. THIS HAD BECOME MATTER "PUBLIC COMPLAINT". SOME ARRANGEMENT MUST BE WORKED OUT TO FREE PIER SPACE MORE FREQUENTLY. PERHAPS LA SALLE (AND OTHER MIDEASTFOR VESSELS) COULD SPEND PORTION OF IN-PORT TIME AT PIER AND THEN ANCHOR OUT. THIS WAS IMPORTANT PRACTICAL QUESTION, AND ONCE "LEGAL QUESTIONS" WORKED OUT GOB WANTS TO DISCUSS HOW TO ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM AND WOULD APPRECIATE U.S. SUGGESTIONS AT THAT TIME.

2. I PROMISED FONMIN I WOULD REPORT THIS "CONDITION".

3. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.
TWTNAM

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/24 DOSltr 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 3-25-02

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NLNS 01-23/25 DOS ltr. 2-26-02
By Km/o NARA, Date 3-25-02

~~SECRET~~ 1098

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00539 232313Z

66
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
096404

O 231712Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1365
INFO COMIDEASTFOR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'74 JUL 24 AM 8:24

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0539

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 : GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, BA, US
SUBJECT : RETENTION COMIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN

REF : MANAMA 0538

1. REFTEL REPORTS GOB DECISION THAT MIDEASTFOR CAN REMAIN STATION IN BAHRAIN AND NOTES MODALITIES GOB SUGGESTS FOR BACKING OFF TERMINATION NOTICE.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER EMPHASIZED TO ME THAT GOB HAS BEEN EMBARRASSED (CONFUSED IS THE REAL WORD, AND IT WAS A MOST CLEVER PLOY) BY FACT USG HAS NEVER RESPONDED FORMALLY OR IN WRITING TO OCTOBER 1973 TERMINATION NOTICE. THEREFORE GOB WANTS US TO ACKNOWLEDGE NOTICE AND ASK RECONSIDERATION. THUS PERMITTING GOB TO "RECONSIDER" AND DECIDE TO RESCIND NOTICE. (COMMENT: SHOULD STRESS THAT GOB REPLY MAY ATTACH "LEGAL" AND "ECONOMIC" CONDITIONS NOTED REFTEL AND DISCUSSED MORE FULLY FOLLOWING MESSAGES OR MAY EVEN BE DELAYED UNTIL THOSE IRONED OUT TO GOB SATISFACTION.)

3. ACCORDINGLY REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S PERMISSION TO SEND FOLLOWING "CONFIDENTIAL" NOTE TO FOREIGN MINISTER: QUOTE (AFTER COMPLIMENTARY OPENING) HAS HONOR TO REFER YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LETTER OF 20 OCTOBER 1973 NOTIFYING THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OF THE DESIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT EFFECTED DECEMBER 23, 1971 BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00539 232313Z

AMERICA AND BAHRAIN ON DEPLOYMENT IN BAHRAIN OF THE UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST FORCE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT. IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PROMPTED YOUR EXCELLENCY'S NOTIFICATION HAVE CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE OCTOBER 1973 AND THAT THEREFORE THE GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN MIGHT BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER THE DECISION INDICATED IN YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 20. SINCE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE RETENTION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY'S MIDDLE EAST FORCE, OPERATING IN THE AREA AND STATIONED IN BAHRAIN, TO BE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS, AND OF THE GULF REGION GENERALLY, MY GOVERNMENT REQUESTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN RECONSIDER THE TERMINATION NOTICE GIVEN IN YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 20, 1973. (COMPLIMENTARY CLOSE) UNQUOTE.

4. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.
TWINAM

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/26 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By Kolb NARA, Date 3-25-02

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00965 230538Z

17/41
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 086547

R 220730Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1834
INFO USINT ALGEIRS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONGEN DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY MANAMA

'74 JUL 23 PM 12:37
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ABU DHABI 0965

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTION PARA 2)

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD; KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT AND DOHA

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, TC
SUBJ: UAE POLICY ON OIL PRICES

1. I TOOK OCCASION OF CONVERSATION AT LUNCH WITH UAE FON MIN SUWIAID JULY 21 TO MENTION OUR CONCERN ABOUT OIL PRICES. I GENERALLY FOLLOWED STATE 152797 WHICH STRIKES ME AS EXCELLENT BASIS FOR PRESENTATION.

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00965 230538Z

2. SUWAIDI HAD BEEN EXPLAINING, WITH SOME PRIDE, WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE UAE POLICY OF MODERATION AND RESTRAINT IN GULF AFFAIRS. "WE HAVE TRIED TO FOLLOW THE POLICY THAT LONG-TERM STABILITY IN THIS AREA IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN SPECIFIC PIECES OF TERRITORY." I SAID THIS WAS A THEME THAT INVITED EXTENSION INTO WORLD ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. WE WERE ALL LINKED IN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY. ALL OF US COLLECTIVELY STOOD TO LOSE MUCH MORE THROUGH DISLOCATIONS TO WORLD ECONOMY THAN ANY OF US MIGHT GAIN THROUGH TRYING TO FORCE MOMENTARY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. FULL EFFECTS OF SHOCK CAUSED BY QUADRUPLING OF WORLD OIL PRICES ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO APPEAR, AND THEY WERE WORRISOME. WE BELIEVED THAT AT PRESENT LEVELS OIL PRICES WERE TOO HIGH, AND THAT THEY WERE CAUSING SEVERE STRAINS TO WORLD ECONOMY. WE HOPED UAE WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO ALLOW PRICE OF OIL TO ADJUST TO MORE REALISTIC LEVELS.

3. SUWAIDI SAID HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH THIS VIEW. HE ASKED ABOUT SAUDI POSITION. I SAID SAUDIS WANTED LOWER OIL PRICES, BUT THEY WERE FINDING THEMSELVES OUTNUMBERED IN OPEC. SUWAIDI SAID HE THOUGHT UAE SHOULD COOPERATE WITH SAUDI ARABIA ON OIL POLICY. I SAID I WELCOMED THIS VIEW BUT HAD RECEIVED IMPRESSION FROM MINPET OTAIBA THAT HE HAD SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POSITION. SUWAIDI SAID, QUOTE I WILL SPEAK WITH SHAIKH ZAYID ABOUT IT. END QUOTE.

4. COMMENT: OIL POLICY IS GENERALLY PROVINCE OF MINPET AND ADNOC RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT OIL OF COURSE AFFECTS MUCH THAT SUWAIDI, AS FON MIN, IS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. BY MOST ACCOUNTS HERE SUWAIDI IS ONE OF THREE OR FOUR ADVISORS SHAIKH ZAYID LISTENS TO THE MOST. SUWAIDI EXPECTS TO ACCOMPANY SHAIKH ZAYID ON HIS 2-MONTH SUMMER TRIP AND THEREFORE WILL HAVE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK ON RULER IF HE CHOOSES TO DO SO.
STERNER

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLJS 01-23/27 DOS ltr 12-26-02
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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00527 201422Z

50
ACTION SS-50

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
---------- 065173

O P 201110Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1356
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY LONDON UK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN PRIORITY
COMIDEASTFOR

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0527

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETAINING MIDDLE EAST FORCE IN BAHRAIN

REF : MANAMA 525

1. SEEING AMIR OFF AT AIRPORT THIS MORNING DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SHIRAWI ASKED ME IF I HAD BEEN GIVEN THE DECISION ON THE NAVY. WHEN I SAID NOT YET HE MOVED AWAY IN SOME CONFUSION. SUBSEQUENTLY I TOOK FOREIGN SERVICE INSPECTORS TO CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER AND THEN SHIRAWI. FOREIGN MINISTER, CLEARLY IMPLYING HE WAS REFERRING TO NAVY QUESTION, SAID HE WOULD CALL ME IN A "DAY OR TWO". THEN SHIRAWI TOLD INSPECTORS GOB WOULD BE DECIDING MID-EASTFOR ISSUE IN NEXT DAY OR TWO. (COMMENT: WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE HAPPENED IS THAT AMIR LEFT INSTRUCTIONS WITH CABINET TO MAKE FORMAL DECISION IN FAVOR OF US NAVY'S REMAINING SUBJECT TO RESOLVING THOSE PROBLEMS (INCLUDING JURISDICTION, RENT, AND HOW TO FINESSE TERMINATION NOTICE) WHICH ARE OF CONCERN TO GOB. ALTHOUGH CABINET IS SCHEDULED TO MEET JULY 20, IT MAY TAKE GOB SEVERAL DAYS TO WORK OUT ITS BARGAINING POSITION.)

2. SHIRAWI TOOK OCCASION OF BRIEFING INSPECTORS TO GIVE A PEEP

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00527 2014222

SHOW OF GOB POSITION. IN ADDITION TO QUESTION OF JURISDICTION HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN RENT WILL BE EXPECTED.

3. SHIRAWI THEN WENT ON TO POINT OUT, WHILE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NAVY'S USE OF FACILITIES SHOULD BE SELF CONTAINED IN COMMERCIAL RENTAL PACKAGE, GOB DECISION FOR BAHRAIN TO REMAIN HOME PORT FOR US NAVY OBVIOUSLY CREATES A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN US AND BAHRAIN. IN RECOGNITION OF THIS, IT IS IMPORTANT USG MAKE SOME SIGNIFICANT ONGOING GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT, SPECIFICALLY IN TERMS OF PROVIDING AMERICAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS ON A CONCESSIONAL BASIS. HE STRESSED THAT THIS SHOULD BE A "SECURE" ARRANGEMENT NOT SUBJECT TO VICISSITUDES OF POLITICAL CHANGES OR US BUDGETARY SLASHES. WHAT HE IS LOOKING FOR IS ASSURANCE THAT USG WILL RECRUIT, PROVIDE, AND STAND BEHIND PERFORMANCE OF SMALL NUMBER OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS WHICH GOB WOULD REQUEST FROM TIME TO TIME, WITH GOB MAKING AT LEAST A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION TO COST BUT USG PICKING UP MOST OF THE TAB FOR THEIR SERVICES.

4. COMMENT: BELIEVE OUR MEETING REQUEST FOR SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENT SUCH AS SHIRAWI SKETCHED, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT NOT, AND PROPERLY SHOULD NOT, BE TIED DIRECTLY TO CONTINUATION MIDEASTFOR, WILL BE IN FACT A CONDITION FOR NAVY'S REMAINING HERE. DOUBT GOB THINKING ON DETAILS HAS CRYSTALIZED BUT SUSPECT THEY MAY BE LOOKING FOR SOME SORT OF FORMAL AGREEMENT. AMIR COMMENTED TO ME SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT HE NEEDS SOME VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF US CONCERN FOR BAHRAINI TECHNICAL PROGRESS "THAT I CAN SHOW MY PEOPLE WHO WONDER WHERE THE AMERICANS ARE IF THEY ARE OUR FRIENDS."
I AM WELL AWARE OF STATUTORY AND BUDGETARY PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MEETING SUCH BAHRAINI REQUEST, BUT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN ASSISTANCE POLICY TOWARD THE GULF AND WORKING OUT THE MODALITIES SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE INGENUITY OF MAN, IF WE INDEED WANT THE NAVY TO REMAIN.

5. DEPT PASS DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.
TWINAM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00913 110718Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 099765

R 110700Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1793
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
OECD PARIS 0205
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0913

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/29 DOSltr 2-26-02
By KWS NARA, Date 3-25-02

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG TC
SUBJ: WHICH OIL MINISTER DO YOU LISTEN TO?

REF: TEHRAN 5509

DURING MEETING WITH UAE MINPET OTAIBA JULY 8 I SAID IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING IRAN HAD NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN IN FOREFRONT OF THOSE URGING FURTHER PRICE INCREASES AT QUITO AND HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN WORKING OUT "MODERATE" COMPROMISE OF 2PERCENT ROYALTY HIKE. OTAIBA SNORTED DERISIVELY. HE SAID AMOUZEGAR HAD LED THE FIGHT FOR PRICE INCREASES ALL THE WAY. ALTHOUGH UAE HAD GENERALLY FAVORED PRICE RISE, IT WAS IN FACT HIMSELF, SAID OTAIBA, WHO HAD SUGGESTED COMPROMISE IN FORM OF MODEST INCREASE IN ROYALTY

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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00470 021420Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLN5 01-23/30 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 3-25-02

47
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
---------- 109294

O 021100Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1317
INFO COMIDEASTFOR IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DOD/ISA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT IMMEDIATE

'74 JUL 3 AM 10:25
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0470

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 : GDS
TAGS : PFOR, MARR, BA
SUBJECT : STATUS MIDDLE EAST FORCE

SUMMARY: WE HAVE ENCOURAGING BUT STRICTLY UNOFFICIAL INDICATIONS GOB PREPARING TO MAKE FAVORABLE DECISION ON CONTINUED MIDEASTFOR PRESENCE, SUBJECT TO WORKING OUR NEW ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL MAKE NAVY PRESENCE PALATABLE TO BAHRAINI OPINION, INCLUDING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IN ANTICIPATION GOB APPROACH WE NEED AUTHORITY TO ENTER DISCUSSIONS ON STATIONING AGREEMENT AND LEASE ARRANGEMENTS IN FORTHCOMMING MANNER. INDICATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED MIDEASTFOR PRESENCE FROM KEY AREA GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA, BUT ALSO IRAN AND EGYPT WOULD HELPFUL. END OF SUMMARY.

1. AS WE ENTER LAST FEW MONTHS BEFORE DEADLINE FOR TERMINATION STATIONING AGREEMENT, CMEF ADMIRAL HANKS AND I (AND OUR STAFFS) APPEAR TO BE ABOUT THE ONLY WESTERNERS IN THIS SMALL COMMUNITY WHO ARE NOT CHATTING AWAY WITH BAHRAINIS ABOUT FUTURE STATUS MIDEASTFOR. IN LAST SEVERAL DAYS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM VARIETY SOURCES INDICATIONS GOB MIGHT BE PREPARING TO MAKE DECISION FAVORABLE

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00470 021420Z

TO US.

2. FSO JOHN GATCH, FIRST AMERICAN CHARGE IN BAHRAIN, IS CURRENTLY HERE ON PERSONAL VISIT. AS ADDRESSEES WILL RECALL, GATCH NEGOTIATED STATIONING AGREEMENT WITH GOB. AS IS CUSTOM HERE HE HAS MADE COURTESY CALLS ON FOREIGN MINISTER AND SUBSEQUENTLY ON AMIR. PRIME MINISTER, CROWN PRINCE/DEFENSE MINISTER, AND FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO PRESENT AT LATTER MEETING. (BECAUSE OF LIKELIHOOD OF MIDEASTFOR QUESTION BEING RAISED WITH HIM CMEF ADMIRAL HANKS, WHO IS GATCH'S HOST, AND I REFRAINED FROM ACCOMPANYING HIM ON THESE CALLS.)

3. DURING FIRST CALL FOREIGN MINISTER RAISED MIDEASTFOR PROBLEM, POINTING OUT GOB'S AWKWARD POSITION SINCE USG HAS NEVER FORMALLY RESPONDED TO TERMINATION NOTICE. FOREIGN MINISTER STRESSED THAT IF NAVY IS TO STAY GOB NEEDS (1) SOME SIGN OF SUPPORT FROM NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA, BUT ALSO HOPEFULLY IRAN AND (2) "NEW IDEAS" ON SUCH MATTERS AS LEGAL JURISDICTION OVER NAVY PERSONNEL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY BERTHING AT MINA SULMAN PIER, WHICH MUST BE WORKED OUT IN ORDER FOR CONTINUING PRESENCE US NAVY HERE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. (COMMENT: THERE APPEARS HONEST DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN GOB AS TO WHETHER CONSTITUTION REQUIRES SUBMITTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUED MIDEASTFOR PRESENCE TO ASSEMBLY FOR APPROVAL, BUT IN ANY EVENT THERE IS CLEAR RECOGNITION THAT ASSEMBLY WILL AT ITS OWN INTTIATIVE MAKE GOVERNMENT ANSWEABLE FOR CONTINUED NAVY PRESENCE. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOTE THAT ASSEMBLY NOT EXPECTED OT RECONVENE BEFORE OCTOBER 19, SO AS PRACTICAL MATTER OCTOBER DEADLINE FOR TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ALREADY APPEARS TO BE SLIPPING.)

4. DURING GATCH'S SECOND CALL AMIR AND PRIME MINISTER ASKED GATCH'S ADVICE ABOUT NAVY PROBLEM, STATING EMPHATICALLY THAT GOB INTENDS FOR MIDEASTFOR TO REMAIN IN BAHRAIN. PRIME MINISTER EMPHASIZED JURISDICTION PROVISION (ARTICLE 11 OF STATIONING AGREEMENT) AND USE OF PIER SPACE AT MINA SULMAN ARE MAJOR ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IF NAVY IS TO STAY. HE EXPLAINED THAT ON ASSUMPTION USG WILLING TO WORK OUT ACCEPTABLE NEW ARRANGEMENTS, GOB PLANNING TO TAKE FORMAL CABINET DECISION "SOON" IN FAVOR OF CONTINUED NAVAL PRESENCE HERE AND WILL NOTIFY USG THROUGH AMBASSADOR IMMEDIATELY. IN ANTICIPATION BEGINNING DISCUSSIONS AT ONCE ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES. ACCORDING TO GATCH, IN THIS LATTER MEETING FOREIGN MINISTER RAISED NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WHICH PRIME MINISTER KNOCKED DOWN (I.E. WHAT TO

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PAGE 03 MANAMA 00470 021420Z

DO ABOUT CHECK FOR ANNUAL RENT WHICH MIDEASTFOR HAD JUST PRESENTED TO GOB; PRIME MINISTER SAID "CASH IT", INDICATING ANY ADJUSTMENTS TO AMOUNT CAN BE MADE LATER. FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO RAISED PROBLEM OF SELLING CONTINUED NAVAL PRESENCE TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THIS WAS GOB'S PROBLEM AND THAT IF SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN GOB AND USG, GOB COULD HANDLE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.)

5. I MUST E33XMPHASIZE, AS GOB IS WELL AWARE, THAT BAHRAINI LEADERS' REMARKS TO GATCH, AS ALL OTHER SIGNALS WE HAVE RECEIVED, HAVE NO OFFICIAL STATUS WHATSOEVER. GOB CAN, OF COURSE, CHANGE COURSE AT ANY MOMENT AND IN FACT HAS MADE NO FORMAL DECISION AS TO HOW IT WANTS TO DEAL WITH NAVY PROBLEM. NEVERTHELESS, THESE ARE MOST ENCOURAGING SIGNS AND WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO REACT IN FORTHCOMING MANNER SHOULD GOB CONTACT US WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: ON BASIS THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, I RECOMMEND THAT I NOT RAISE MIDEASTFOR QUESTION WITH AMIR, PRIME MINISTER; OR FOREIGN MINISTER FOR NEXT TWO WEEKS BUT WAIT FOR THEM TO CONTACT ME. (NEXT SCHEDULED CABINET MEETING IS JULY 6 BUT SEVERAL KEY MINISTERS AWAY FOR NEXT WEEK OR SO.) SHOULD THEY INFORM ME GOB HAS DECIDED TO CONSIDER NAVY'S CONTINUATION HERE FAVORABLY IF CERTAIN ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT, I WOULD LIKE AUTHORIZATION TO AGREE ON SPOT TO ENTER DESCUSSIONS ON JURISDICTION QUESTION (ARTICLE 11 OF STATIONING AGREEMENT) AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS SPELLED OUT IN SEPARATE LEASE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING USE OF PIER SPACE AND RENT. CMEF ADMIRAL HANKS AND I WOULD THEN FOLLOW UP AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE WITH MEETING WITH APPROPRIATE GOB OFFICIALS TO ASCERTAIN MORE PRECISELY WHAT CHANGES GOB WANTS.

7. OUTSIDE HELP. AS YET WE HAVE NO INDICATION SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAS WEIGHED IN WITH GOB IN SUPPORT OF NAVY'S REMAINING. FOREIGN MINISTER MENTIONED TO GATCH GOB NEEDS "VISIBLE" EVIDENCE OF SAUDI SUPPORT SUCH AS VISIT SIMILAR TO THAT MADE BY SAQQAF WHEN SAG CAUTIONED BAHRAIN AGAINST PERMITTING SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION HERE. IN FOLLOWING UP WITH PRINCE FAHAD ON RESULTS HIS PROMISED OVERTURE TO GOB, I URGE WE CONSIDER ASKING TANGIBLE SIGN OF SAUDI SUPPORT SUCH AS VISIT BY SAQQAF OR OTHER KEY SAG OFFICIAL. OBVIOUSLY QUIET WORD OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM IRAN WOULD BE HELPFUL AT THIS TIME. IN ADDITION, I WONDER IF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT BE PERSUADED TO INDICATE TO GOB THAT IT WOULD WELCOME

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PAGE 04 MANAMA 00470 021420Z

CONTINUED US NAVY PRESENCE IN GULF, OPERATING FROM BAHRAIN.
WHILE I REALIZE USG HAS MORE PRESSING MATTERS TO DISCUSS IN CAIRO,
POSSIBLY WE COULD ASK APPROPRIATE EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL TO MAKE POINT
IN OUR SUPPORT WITH GOB FOREIGN MINISTER SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN
MUBARAK AL-KHALIFA WHO WILL BE IN CAIRO JULY 2-5, PRESUMABLY IN
CONNECTION WITH ARAB DEFENSE COUNCEL MEETING.
TWINAM

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/31 DOS ltr 2.26.02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00495 111738Z

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
088581

O R 111535Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1331
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA
COMIDEASTFOR

'74 JUL 11 PM 7:26
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA0495

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETAINING MIDDLE EAST FORCE IN BAHRAIN

REF: TEHRAN 5694

1. WE HERE ARE GRATEFUL FOR AMBASSADOR HELM'S EFFORTS WITH GOI AND APPRAENTLY HELPFUL IRANIAN REACTION.

2. AS TO ADVICE EMBASSY TEHRAN MIGHT GIVE IRANIAN MFA, WE TOO ARE PUZZLED AT ALAM'S REFERENCE TO FOREIGN MINISTER'S STUDYING "AGREEMENT" FOR CLAUSE THAT WOULD "ALLOW FOR DEVIATION". IF HE IS REFERRING TO OUR STATIONING AGREEMENT WITH BAHRAIN, THERE IS CERTAINLY NO "LOOPHOLE" IN THAT ESSENTIALLY ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT WHICH IS PERTINENT TO ANY APPROACH GOI MIGHT MAKE TO GOB. WHAT GOB IS LOOKING FOR FROM IRAN, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, IS SIMPLE INDICATION
THAT GOI WOULD LOOK WITH FAVOR ON BAHRAIN'S DECISION TO PERMIT MIDEASTFORCE TO REMAIN. OF COURSE, GOB LEADERS WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO CITE THIS IRANIAN POSITION IN PERSUADING BAHRAINIS OF DESIRABILITY KEEPING NAVY HERE, PROBABLY NOT IN PUBLIC DEBATE BUT RATHER IN PRIVATE

TALKS WITH LEADERS IN BAHRAINI COMMUNITY. (PRIME MINISTER HAS TOLD

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00495 111738Z

ME PRIVATELY THAT GOB IS LOBBYING TO CONVINCE PUBLIC THAT BAHRAIN
TN CONDUCT ITS FOREIGN POLICY MUST TAKE WISHES OF IRAN AND SAUDI
ARABIA INTO ACCOUNT).

3. AS TO POINTS WHICH EMBASSY MIGHT SUGGEST GOI MAKE WITH GOB:
1) OUR 416 SUGGESTED SOME TALKING POINTS WE MIGHT USE WITH GOB; AMONG
THEM POINTS A THROUGH F OF PARAGRAPH 2 MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE ONES, SUIT-

ABLY MODIFIED, FOR GOI TO MAKE TO GOB, WITH DEPT'S CONCURRENCE;
2) BASIC
POINT TO BE MADE HERE, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE WITH AMIR AND
PRIME
MINSITER, IS ALAM'S REPLY NOTED PARA 3 TEHRAN REPTEL, "THAT IT WOULD
BE
"TERRIBLE" FOR US NAVY TO LEAVE PERSIAN GULF AT THIS TIME WHEN SOVIETS

WERE AUGMENTING THEIR PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES."

4. AMIR HAS TOLD ME HE MAY BRING MIDEASTFOR ISSUE BEFORE CABINET
AS EARLY AS JULY 13, BUT BELIEVE THAT WORD OF GOI SUPPORT WOULD STILL
BE
MOST HELPFUL, EVEN IF DELIVERED AFTER THAT DATE.

5. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS FOLLOWING TO: DOD/ISA, CINCUSNAVEUR,
USCINCEUR,
CNO WASHDC,
TWINAM

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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00475 031426Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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'74 JUL 4 AM 8:31

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

O P 031305Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1318
INFO COMIDEASTFOR
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DOD/ISA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0475

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/32 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By Kmb NARA, Date 4-1-02

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : PFOR, MARR, BA
SUBJECT : MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

REF : MANAMA 0470

1. ON JULY 3, I HAD FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE FORMAL CALL ON PRIME MINISTER SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN SULMAN. THIS WAS FIRST TIME I HAD SEEN HIM ALONE. AFTER BRIEF EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES THE PRIME MINISTER LAUNCHED INTO 40 MINUTE MONOLOGUE FIRST ON BAHRAINI POLITICAL SCENE, EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE IN FABRIC OF BAHRAINI SOCIETY, WORRIED OPTIMISM ABOUT BAHRAIN'S CAPABILITY OF DIGESTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, AND FIRMNESS IN HIS RESOLVE TO "LOCK UP" OR ISOLATE THOSE "20 OR 30" BAHRAINIST WHO MIGHT NOT BE PREPARED TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM. HE THEN WENT ON AT LENGTH TO DISCUSS US/BAHRAINI RELATIONS STRESSING IMPORTANCE GOB ATTACHES TO IMPROVING AND EXPANDING ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE EXPLAINED APOLOGETICALLY AND AT LENGTH EMOTIONAL SITUATION WHICH HAD CAUSED GOB TO NOTIFY USG OF TERMINATION OF MIDEASTFOR STATIONING AGREEMENT. THE PRIME

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MINISTER STATED STRONGLY THAT HAD HE BEEN PRESENT IN BAHRAIN LAST OCTOBER THE TERMINATION NOTICE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENT. HE SAID THE GOB NOW IS AT WORK EXPLAINING TO BAHRAINI OPINION THAT NAVY'S PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN IS BUT ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF BAHRAINI HOSPITABILITY TO AMERICANS GENERALLY. THAT THIS IS KEY ELEMENT IN FURTHER IMPROVING QUALITY OF US/BAHRAIN RELATIONS, THAT MIDEASTFOR IS SIMPLY IN BAHRAIN AS A GUEST. HE ADDED THAT GOVERNMENT LEADERS ARE MAKING IT CLEAR TO BAHRAINI PEOPLE THAT USG HAS NO DESIGNS ON BAHRAIN WHATSOEVER, AND INTEND TO "KNOCK SOME SENSE" INTO THE HEADS "OF THOSE WHO HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING THE PICTURE.

2. THIS MONOLUGE BY NO MEANS REFLECTS FORMAL GOB DECISION TO RESCIND TERMINATION NOTICE, BUT INFERENCE IS INESCAPABLE THAT PRIME MINISTER IS GOING TO GREAT PAINS TO TELL US THAT, AT LEAST TO EXTENT HE AND AMIR CONTROL GOVERNMENT POLICY, THE BASIC POLITICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER US NAVY REMAINS HAS BEEN RESOLVED FAVORABLY AND THAT THAT ISSUE IS BEHIND US.

3. PRIME MINISTER WENT ON TO EXPRESS GREAT PLEASURE THAT USG IS INTERESTED IN FURTHERING ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH BAHRAIN AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WE WOULD LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER THIS AIM.

4. PRIME MINISTER ASKED ME PARTICULARLY TO CONVEY TO ALL THOSE CONCERNED IN US HIS DEEPEST APPRECIATION FOR KINDNESSES EXTENDED TO HIM IN THE US DURING ILLNESS AND DEATH OF HIS SON.
TWINAM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 MANAMA 00501 131330Z

47
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
---------- 111602

O P 1311382 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1335
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN PRIORITY
COMIDEASTFOR

'74 JUL 15 AM 8:26

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T MANAMA~~ 0501

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FOR UNDERSECRETARY SISCO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/33 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KWO NARA, Date 4-1-02

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA
SUBJECT : RETAINING MIDDLE EAST FORCE IN BAHRAIN

REF : STATE 151198

1. CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER JULY 13 TO SAY I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM AMIR AND PRIME MINISTER THEY CAN BE CONFIDENT USG WILL BE FORTHCOMING WITH RESPECT TO TWO POINTS AMIR MENTIONED JULY 10 AS OF SPECIAL CONCERN (MANAMA 491). FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED GREAT PLEASURE AND PROMISED TO CONVEY THIS MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO AMIR AND PRIME MINISTER. ADDED THAT FIRST "POLITICAL DECISION" HAD TO BE MADE. (CABINET MET EARLIER TODAY BUT, IF MIDEASTFOR SITUATION WAS IN FACT DISCUSSED, APPARENTLY NO FINAL DECISION WAS TAKEN. NEXT REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETING JULY 16.) INFORMED FOREIGN MINISTER I UNDERSTOOD GOB POLITICAL DECISION WAS FIRST STEP BUT THAT I WAS WAITING AT HIS CALL TO DISCUSS THOSE PROBLEMS WHICH AMIR HAD RAISED WITH ME.

2. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS STATE REFTEL AND BELIEVE OUR INDICATION OF FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THESE PROBLEMS WILL FACILITATE, BUT NOT DETERMINE, FAVORABLE GOB POLITICAL DECISION ON NAVY'S

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00501 131330Z

REMAINING.

3. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR HERE HAS INSTRUCTIONS PARA 3 TEHRAN 5715 AND I BRIEFED HIM THIS MORNING ON GENERAL SITUATION MIDEASTFORCE QUESTION.

4. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS FOLLOWING TO: DOD/ISA, CINCUSNAVEUR, USCINCEUR, CNO WASHINGTON DC.
PWTNAM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 1386

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00491 110204Z

61/53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
---------- 079458

O 100935Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1328
INFO COMIDEASTFOR
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DOD/ISA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 DOS ltr 2-26-02
NLNS 01-23/34 pg. 3.4(b)(6)
By KMB NARA, Date 4-2-02

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0491

EXDIS
-------C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ---TEXT
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : PFOR, MARR, BA
SUBJECT : MIDDLE EAST FORCE - MEETING WITH AMIR

REF : MANAMA 475

1. JULY 10 I CALLED ON AMIR TO PRESENT LETTER FROM SPEAKER ALBERT CONGRATULATING HIM ON ESTABLISHMENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HERE.

2. OBVIOUSLY PLEASED, AMIR BEGAN TO TALK ABOUT U.S.-BAHRAIN FRIENDSHIP AND HOW MUCH BAHRAIN WELCOMES AMERICAN HERE, ADDING "INCLUDING THE NAVY".

3. I EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION TO HEAR THIS. AMIR SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD JOHN GATCH HE INTENDED FOR NAVY TO REMAIN AND WANTED ME TO KNOW THIS TOO. I SAID THIS NEWS WOULD BE GREETED WITH RELIEF IN WASHINGTON SINCE USG WAS GROWING QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT NAVY'S STATUS HERE, PARTICULARLY SINCE NAVY WIVES AND CHILDREN ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT WHAT PLANS TO MAKE.

4. AMIR SAID "YOU MAY INFORM YOUR GOVERNMENT THE NAVY IS REMAINING IN BAHRAIN AND SO IS THE BAHRAIN SCHOOL". HE ADDED THAT SOME MINISTERS ARE STILL UNDECIDED BUT THAT HE

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00491 110204Z

WAS GOING TO MAKE THE DECISION IN THIS CASE. AMIR SAID THIS MUST BE SETTLED QUICKLY, THOUGHT HE WOULD CALL THE CABINET TOGETHER JULY 13, AND LET US KNOW WHAT FORMAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

5. HE THEN STRESSED THERE ARE TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS CONCERNING NAVY'S CONTINUATION HERE: (1) [redacted]

(2) BAHRAIN MUST BE ABLE TO SHOW MORE FINANCIAL BENEFITS FROM NAVY'S PRESENCE. HE ADDED THAT I SHOULD KNOW PRIVATELY THAT KUWAITIS HAD OFFERED TO GIVE BAHRAIN "TWICE" THE RENT THAT NAVY IS PAYING IF BAHRAIN WOULD NOT KEEP NAVY HERE, AND THAT THIS STILL RANKLES. I TOLD AMIR I WAS AT CALL OF GOB TO DISCUSS WHATEVER ALTERATIONS NEED TO BE MADE TO EXISITING ARRANGEMENTS IN ORDER FOR MIDDLE EAST FORCE TO REMAIN. AMIR SAID HE WANTED TO SETTLE MATTER QUICKLY, WELL BEFORE RETURN OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN OCTOBER.

6. I MUST CAUTION ADDRESSEES THAT AMIR WAS ALONE WITHOUT RESTRAINING INFLUENCE OF PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT NO FORMAL GOB DECISION HAS BEEN MADE, AND THAT THERE IS SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN MINDS OF GOB WHETHER GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE THIS DECISION, OR RESCIND TERMINATION NOTICE, OR ADJUST TERMS AGREEMENT OR LEASE WITHOUT AT LEAST CONSULTING, AND POSSIBLY SEEKING APPROVAL OF, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. I MUST ALSO POINT OUT THAT AS OF THIS MOMENT WE ARE UNDER PROPER FORMAL NOTIFICATION THAT STATIONING AGREEMENT IS TO TERMINATE IN OCTOBER AND IF WE ARE UNABLE TO SATISFY GOB ON JURISDICTION IT IS NOT BEYOND REALM OF POSSIBILITY THAT AFTER OCTOBER WE WILL HAVE NAVY HERE BUT NO AGREEMENT AT ALL.

7. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS ABOVE MESSAGE TO JIDDA, TEHRAN, CAIRO.

TWINAM

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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WH LOG

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

O 191115Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1220
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0343

CONTROL: 6 0 9 0 Q
MAY 19, 1974
9:57 AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, BA
SUBJECT: AMIR OF BAHRAIN'S REPLY TO SECRETARY'S LETTER

REF: SECTO 0338

HIS HIGHNESS SHEIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL-KHALIFA, THE AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN HAS ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE PASSED TO THE SECRETARY.
QUOTE
DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE,
I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE WITH THE ADVICE THAT YOU WOULD BE UNABLE TO VISIT BAHRAIN IN THE COURSE OF YOUR PRESENT TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WHILE I REGRET THAT WE SHALL NOT SEE YOU IN BAHRAIN, I APPRECIATE YOUR CONSIDERATION IN INTENDING TO VISIT THIS COUNTRY AND QUITE UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANT ISSUES WITH WHICH YOU ARE CONCERNED AT PRESENT.
MAY I NOW CONFIRM MY INVITATION FOR YOU TO VISIT BAHRAIN AND I HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR A VISIT TO BE ARRANGED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOU AT THAT TIME AND I TRUST YOU REMAIN IN GOOD HEALTH IN THE MEANWHILE.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY OF STATE, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGH CONSIDERATIONS.
ISA BIN SULMAN AL-KHALIFA
UNQUOTE
STARRETT

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/37 DOS ltr 2-26-02
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Department of State TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'74 JUN 18 AM 8:47

~~SECRET~~ 6269

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E.O. 12958 Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/38 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By Kmb NARA, Date 4-1-02

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00416 01 OF 02 171928Z

42
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 054939

P 171400Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 1275
INFO COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
CNO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DOD/ISA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 MANAMA 0416

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : PFOR, MARR, BA
SUBJECT : STATUS MIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN

REFS : MANAMA 0397
STATE 128441

1. DEATH OF PRIME MINISTER'S SON APPEARS TO HAVE VIRTUALLY PARALYZED GOB'S OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES, AND MY SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WITH GOB, THROWING OFF SCHEDULE TACTICS OUTLINED MANAMA REFTEL FOR SETTING STAGE FOR FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, AND POSSIBLE FORMAL DEMARCHE, ON MIDEASTFOR STATUS. HOPEFULLY WE WILL BE BACK IN SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS BY JUNE 19, BUT THIS TRAGIC OCCURRENCE HAS COST US VALUABLE TIME. (AT SAME TIME RETURN OF PRIME MINISTER MAY STRENGTHEN OUR SIDE'S HAND. IN ADDITION RECURRING LABOR PROBLEMS (SEPTEL) HAVE MADE LAST FEW DAYS INOPPORTUNE TIME TO SEEK GOB DECISION ON MIDEASTFOR.)

2. WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND AT THIS TIME POINTS WHICH APPEAR TO BE MOST USEFUL IN BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL APPROACHES TO GOB ON THIS PROBLEM:
A. CONTINUED PRESENCE MIDEASTFOR IN GULF SERVES INTERESTS BAHRAIN

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00416 01 OF 02 171928Z

AND OTHER GULF STATES IN AREA STABILITY. IT SYMBOLIZES, IN PEACEFUL UNPROVOCATIVE AND REPRESENTATIONAL MANNER, CONTINUED US INTEREST IN AREA.

B. BECAUSE MIDEASTFOR IS SMALL, LARGELY SYMBOLIC PRESENCE, AND HAS BEEN OPERATING IN AREA FROM BAHRAIN FOR A QUARTER CENTURY, IT DOES NOT REPRESENT USG EFFORT TO INTERVENE IN GULF AFFAIRS NOR DOES IT ATTRACT OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS TO GULF AS MIGHT A MORE SIGNIFICANT US NAVAL PRESENCE IN AREA. IT DOES, HOWEVER, TEND TO BALANCE INCREASINGLY FREQUENT SOVIET NAVAL ENTRIES INTO GULF, AND TO WITHDRAW MIDEASTFOR WOULD GIVE APPEARANCE US ABANDONING GULF TO SOVIETS.

C. GIVEN ONGOING PROSPECT SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN, GOB CAN ASSUME THAT SIGNIFICANT US NAVAL FORCES WILL FREQUENT INDIAN OCEAN AREA. PRESENCE OF FAMILIAR UNPROVOCATIVE MIDEASTFOR IN GULF, HOWEVER, TENDS PRECLUDE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL US NAVAL FORCES TO ENTER GULF AND BY DOING SO POSSIBLY ATTRACTING SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE OTHER OUTSIDE NAVAL FORCES.

D. IT IS THEREFORE IN INTEREST US POLICY IN GULF, AND IN INTEREST GOB AND OTHER GULF STATES, FOR MIDEASTFOR TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN GULF.

E. FACT THAT MIDEASTFOR OPERATES FROM BAHRAIN SYMBOLIZES IN WESTERN BUSINESS COMMUNITY THAT BAHRAIN REMAINS THE PROGRESSIVE, ORDERLY, AND HOSPITABLE COMMERCIAL CENTER OF GULF. GIVEN US POLICY OF MAINTAINING MIDEASTFOR IN AREA, ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUED USE OF FACILITIES IN BAHRAIN WOULD OBVIOUSLY INVOLVE EFFORT BY USG TO SEEK HOSPITALITY ELSEWHERE IN GULF. WERE THIS TO BE NECESSARY, WHILE IT WOULD IN NO WAY LESSEN DESIRE OF USG TO STRENGTHEN COMMERCIAL AND OTHER COOPERATION WITH BAHRAIN, WE WOULD HAVE NO CONTROL OVER INFERENCE WESTERN BUSINESS INTERESTS MIGHT DRAW THAT TRADITIONAL CENTRAL ROLE OF BAHRAIN IN GULF HAD SOMEHOW CHANGED.

F. CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE OF BAHRAIN'S HOSPITALITY TOWARD MIDEASTFOR IS PRESENTING SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS TO US NAVY AND HAS BECOME MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO USG.

G. USG THEREFORE FEELS TIME HAS COME FOR GOB TO DECIDE IN ITS OWN INTEREST THAT STATIONING AGREEMENT WILL BE MAINTAINED AND NECESSARY FACILITIES IN BAHRAIN WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE TO MIDEASTFOR. ONCE THIS BASIC DECISION HAS BEEN REACHED, USG IS OF COURSE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY ASPECTS OF STATIONING AGREEMENTAND THOSE TERMS OF LEASING ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE CAUSING PROBLEMS FOR GOB.

3. I WOULD ANTICIPATE ABOVE POINTS COULD BE BASIS FOR AIDE-MEMOIRE OR DIPLOMATIC NOTE SHOULD IT APPEAR DESIRABLE IN COMING D'S TO MAKE FORMAL DEMARCHE TO GOB. IN MAKING SUCH DEMARCHE, OR IN PRIOR OR

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PAGE 03 MANAMA 00416 01 OF 02 171928Z

ALTERNATIVE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS INFORMALLY:

A. WE ARE AT MOMENT WHEN US EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE HAVE, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF SUPPORT FROM ARAB STATES, ACHIEVED REMARKABLE INIZCAL SUCCESS. ONE RESULT HAS BEEN SPECTACULAR IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN USG AND CERTAIN ARAB STATES AND REMOVAL OF CERTAIN ACTIONS SUCH AS OIL EMBARGO WHICH WERE TAKEN AGAINST USG AMID PASSIONS OF OCTOBER WAR. GESTURES BY ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF FRIENDSHIP TOWARD USG AT THIS TIME ARE IMPORTANT TO CONTINUING MOMENTUM AND MAINTAINING ATMOSPHERE WHICH WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN LONG AND DIFFICULT ROAD TOWARD LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

B. USG REALIZES THAT IN CONSIDERING FUTURE STATUS OF MIDEASTFOR GOB MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY BUT ALSO DOMESTIC SITUATION IN BAHRAIN. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT FUTURE STATUS MIDEASTFOR HERE BE DETERMINED BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OR ANY OTHER BODY IN BAHRAIN OTHER THAN CABINET WHICH MADE IN MARKEDLY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES TENTUCIVE DECISION TO TERMINATE AGREEMENT. IN CONSIDERING THIS SERIOUS ISSUE GOB WILL OF COURSE BE AWARE OF RELATIONSHIP OF ITS APPROACH TO MIDEASTFOR STATUS TO QUESTION OF HOW TO DEAL WITH OTHER CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING CLIMATE FOR GROWTH OF WESTERN COMMERCIAL COOPERATION WITH BAHRAIN.

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~~SECRET~~ 6277

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00416 02 OF 02 171758Z

42
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 054217

P 171400Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 1276
INFO COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORION TY
CNO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DOD/ISA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 MANAMA 0416
EXDIS
C. WE BELIEVE GOB SHARES THE INTEREST OF USG AND WESTERN COMMUNITY IN BAHRAIN IN CONTINUATION OF BAHRAIN SCHOOL AND WE INTEND TO MOVE FORWARD, WITH ESSENTIAL US NAVY SUPPORT, WITH PLANS FOR SUCCESSFUL SCHOOL OPERATION IN COMING YEAR.
TWTNAM

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'74 MAY 5 PM 1:11

~~SECRET~~ 3724

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E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/39 DOSltr. 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00524 040750Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 034511

R 040505Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1526
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY
USMTM DHAHRAN
USCINCEUR

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0524

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR,MASS, YE, US, TC
SUBJ: US ARM SALES TO YAR

REF: A. STATE 088917
B. SANAA 0842

1. FROM THIS LIMITED VANTAGE POINT AND ADMITTEDLY BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH DETAILS OF FMS TRANSACTIONS, WE SEE REAL PROBLEM AHEAD IN TRYING TO CONCLUDE ARMS SALE TO YARG WITHIN RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF VALIDITY LETTERS OF OFFER, CONSIDERING THAT VITAL YARG/ABU DHABI CONSULTATION MUST STILL TAKE PLACE. IF EXTENSION OF JUNE 10 EXPIRATION DATE ON L/OS NOT POSSIBLE, RECOMMEND THAT YARG DESPATCH HIGH LEVEL SPECIAL REP, PREFERABLY MIL OFFICER, TO ABU DHABI IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF L/OS'S TO NEGOTIATE FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS WITH ADG.

2. WE NOTE REFTEL B THAT PRIMIN MAKI PLANNING VISIT AD IN MID MAY, AT WHICH TIME WE ASSUME HE WILL WISH GET FINAL STAMP OF APPROVAL FROM ZAYID FOR FUNDING OF ARMS FROM US. IF JUNE 10 DATE IS TO BE MET, DETAILS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BY YARG IN ADVANCE WITH FORMIN SUWAIDI AND MINYFIN SO RELEVANT DOCS COULD BE READIED FOR SIGNATURE WHEN MAKI ARRIVES.

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00524 040750Z

3. HAD THOUGHT EMB MIGHT FACILITATE FINALIZATION OF TRANSACTION BY BEING AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE ADG WITH COPIES OF L/OS. HOWEVER, COPIES NOT RECEIVED OUR LATEST POUCH AND NEXT POUCH NOT UNTIL MAY 15. TO EXPEDITE PROCESS, THEREFORE, DEPT MIGHT WISH CABLE POST PERTINENT DATA CONTAINED L/OS. WE WOULD THEN TURN INFO OVER TO ADG WITH CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT WE HAVE NO DESIRE GET INVOLVED IN DETAILS OF THEIR FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IN VIEW OF DEADLINE, WE ONLY ACTING AS MESSENGER FOR YARG, WHO SENDING SPECIAL REP. ABOVE OFFERED ONLY AS SUGGESTION IF MEETING JUNE 10 DEADLINE CRITICAL ELEMENT FOR YARG OR USG.
GRTFFIN

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~~SECRET~~ 9683

'74 APR 15 PM 4:53

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00444 151201Z

43/13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 071915

R 150855Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1468
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
SECDEF WASHDC

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0444

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT - PARA 3 LINE 8)

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, TC, JO, US
SUBJECT: ARMS FOR YEMEN

REF: SANAA 0707

1. DURING MY MTG APRIL 13 WITH FORMIN SUWAIDI, I MENTIONED TO HIM CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMB CRAWFORD AND MUHAMMAD NU'MAN REPORTED REFTEL. SUWAIDI CONFIRMED NU'MAN'S STATEMENT THAT UAE FORMIN REMAINS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO ABU DHABI BECOMING INVOLVED IN FINANCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN, SUWAIDI PREFERS INSTEAD THAT UAE/AD CHANNEL ITS AID INTO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS TO RAISE STANDARD OF LIVING OF PEOPLE, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS OWN VIEWS FORMIN REITERATED WHAT HE TOLD NU'MAN RECENTLY AND EMB LAST SUMMER, NAMZTY THAT SHEIKH ZAYID GAVE HIS WORD TO HELP YEMEN MILITARILY AND HIS PLEDGE WOULD BE HONORED.

2. INFORMED SUWAIDI THAT AS RESULT OF HIS MTG WITH NU'MAN, IT MY UNDERSTANDING THAT FIRM LETTER OF OFFER FOR ITEMS TO BE SUPPLIED BY USG BEING READIED IN WASH FOR SUBMISSION TO YARG. DID NOT MENTION

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NLN501-23/40 DOS ltr, 2-26-02
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FORM DS-1652

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00444 151201Z

TO SUWAIDI YARG'S EFFORTS PIN DOWN COSTS OF JORDAN MILITARY TRAINING ASYISTANCE. SUWAIDI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD ASKED NU'MAN FOR DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF COSTS AS HE PERSONALLY COMPLETELY IN DARK WHEN IT COMES TO DETAILS ABOUT MILITARY TRANSACTIONS.

3. COMMENT: WHEN LETTER OF OFFER SUBMITTED TO YARG AND NU'MAN TIES DOWN COST FIGURES FROM JORDANIANS, ASSUME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER THAT YAR WOULD PROVIDE ZAYID, THROUGH SUWAIDI, WITH DETAILED COST PACKAGE OF WEAPONRY AND SERVICES IT WISHES ABU DHABI TO FINANCE.W WOUGR RECOMMEND THAT NU'MAN HIMSELF OR TRUSTED LIFUTENANT HAD CARRIED LIST TO ABU DHABI FOR NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN ENTRUSTING IT TO DELAYS AND VAGUARIES OF YARG DIPLOMATIC MAIL EXCHANGES. ALTHOUGH YEMENI AMB QUBATI PERSONALLY WELL LIKED HERE, OUR IMPRESSION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT HE IS OUT OF MAIN STREAM OF YARG POLICY-MAKING AND UAEG KNOWS IT. FOR THAT REASON, IF SUBMISSION OF SHOPPING LIST ENTRUSTED TO QUBATI DOUBT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PERSIST IN EFFORTS NECESSARY TO PRESS SUWAIDI TO (A) TAKE THE TIME FROM HIS UNBELIEVEABLY BUSY SCHEDULE TO FOCUS ON ARMS MATTER FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH YEMENI AMB AND (B) EXPEDITE PRESENTING PACKAGE TO ZAYID FOR FINAL APPROVAL. BELIEVE ON BASIS OUR OWN EXPERIENCE THAT ZAYID AND SUWAIDI ARE MORE LIKELY TO ACT DECISIVELY ON FUNDING OF PACKAGE IF NU'MAN OR OTHER SENIOR YARG OFFICIAL WERE TO COME PERSONALLY. FYI-SUGGEST YOU INFORM NU'MAN THAT OFFICIAL ZAYID LIKELY CONSULT BEFORE MAKING ANY FINAL DECISION IS MUHAMMAD HABBROUSH, UAE MIN OF STATE FOR FINANCIAL AFFAIRS AND MOST TRUSTED MEMBER OF ABU DHABI INNER CIRCLE WHEN IT COMES TO MONEY MATTERS.
GRIFFIN

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'74 MAR 4 AM 9.02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5104

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00113 031543Z

45
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 101690

R 031425Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1086
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MANAMA 0113

EXDIS

FOR ANDERSON FROM CHARGE

E.O. 11652 : N/A
TAGS : OREP, BA
SUBJECT : CODEL BRAY

REF : STATE 38861

1) HOPE THAT CONGRESSMAN BRAY WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT BAHRAIN AFTER TRIP TO IRAN. WOULD APPRECIATE EXACT DATES OF VISIT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2) DEPT MAY WISH TO REPEAT REFTEL TO AMEMB KUWAIT FOR AMBASSADOR STOLTZFUS.
KILLGORE

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NLNS 01-23/41 DOS ltr 2.26.02
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23

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'74 MAR 4 AM 9:02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5103

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00111 031600Z

45
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
---------- 101721

P R 031415Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BWHRAINN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1084
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWATI

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MANAMA 00111

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 : N/A
TAGS : PFOR, MARR, BA
SUBJECT : SUPPLIES OF REFINED PRODUCTS TO MIDEASTFOR

REF H : MANAMA 0088

1. DESPITE OIL EMBARGO AND CUT (NOW RESTORED) OF SAUDI CRUDE TO BAPCO REFINERY GOB HAS CONTICUED TO PERMIT BAPCO, THROUGHOUT MID-EAST CRISIS, TO SUPPLY FUEL AND LUBRICANTS TO VESSELS ASSIGNED TO MIDEASTFOR. THE USS LA SALLE IS REFUELED AT SITRA PIER ONCE SINCE NOTICE ON TERMINATION OF STATIONING AGREEMENT RECEIVED LAST OCTOBER 20; ALL SUBSEQUENT REFUELINGS OF LASALLE AND ROTATIONAL DESTROYERS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AT MINA SULMAN BY BARGE.

2. ALTHOUGH REPORTS OF THESE SUPPLIES HAVE APPEARED IN PRESS (E.G. LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH AND MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST), GOB HAS NOT, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, BEEN QUESTIONED

ABOUT THIS PROCEDURE BY OTHER ARAB STATES. IF PRESSED, WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE AVOIDED, GOB'S ANSWER IS LIKELY TO BE THAT REFUELING, WHILE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE STATIONING AGREEMENT, IS PART OF THE "ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS" AND IS ALSO SUBJECT TO THE ONE YEAR NOTICE.
KILLGORE

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23

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00083 281238Z

50/14
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 109517

O P 280655Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUESJCS /SE CDEF IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1248

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0083

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

SECDEF FOR ISA

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, TC, JO, US
SUBJ: ABU DHABI PAYMENT FOR JORDAN ARMS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/43 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

1. RECEIVED URGENT CALL JAN 27 FROM JOHN BUTTER, DIRECTOR OF FINANCE, ABU DHABI GOVT CONCERNING MODALITIES OF PAYMENT FOR ARMS ABU DHABI AGREED TO PURCHASE FROM US FOR JORDAN. BUTTER ADVISED THAT HE IN RECEIPT OF COPY LETTER DATED JAN 18 FROM UAE AMB TAJIR IN LONDON ADDRESSED TO US DEPT OF ARMY CONFIRMING ARRANGEMENTS FOR PAYMENT OF 42 MILLION DOLLAR 9-1(-&3. COPY OF TAJIR LETTER ALSO SENT TO GOJ.

2. LETTER WAS ADDRESSED TO DEPT OF ARMY, OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008. LETTER STATED THAT PAYMENTS TO USG WOULD BE MADE IN FIVE (5) INSTALLMENTS, THE FIRST ONE DUE IMMEDIATELY AND THE OTHERS AT INTERVALS OF 18, 21, 24, AND 27 MONTHS RESPECTIVELY.
AMOUNT OF EACH PAYMENT WOULD BE DOL 8,465,585.80. LETTER FURTHER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00083 281238Z

STATED THAT PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH RIGGS NATL BANK, WASHINGTON, D.C. TO PROJECT CONTROL OFFICER, NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT, U.S. ARMY INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICAL CENTER, NEW CUMBERLAND, PENNSYLVANIA. (ZIP CODE ILLEGIBLE)

3. BUTTER ADVISED THAT HE PREPARED MAKE FIRST PAYMENT FEB 1ST IF THAT DATE ACCEPTABLE TO USG. HE HAS REQUESTED EMB TO CONFIRM ON MOST URGENT BASIS, (A) IF IMMEDIATE PAYMENT REQUIRED AND IF SO, IS FEB 1 ACCEPTABLE TO USG? ON OTHER HAND IF USG WILLING TO WAIT UNTIL MARCH 1ST OR LATER FOR FIRST PAYMENT, BUTTER WOULD PREFER TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ADDITIONAL PERIOD OF INTEREST ON HIS DOLLAR INVESTMENTS; (B) BUTTER WISHES RECONFIRM THAT PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE TO NEW CUMBERLAND DEPOT THROUGH RIGGS NATL BANK. PLS ADVISE SPECIFICALLY HOW CHECK OR DRAFT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.
GRIFFIN

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~~SECRET~~

0632/10/04E

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 398

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01684 01 OF 02 291116Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 117959

R 290830Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1196
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'73 DEC 29 PM 1:12

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 1684

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR

EO 11652: XGDS,
TAGS: MASS, YE, TC, JO, US
SUBJ: YEMENI ARMS PACKAGE

REFS: A. ABU DHABI 1641
B. SANAA 2391
C. SANAA 2422

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/44 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KWS NARA, Date 4-1-02

SUMMARY: ON INSTRUCTION FROM PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR NU'MAN, YEMENI AMB QUBATI CALLED AT EMB FOR DETAILED BRIEFING ABOUT ARMS PACKAGE FROM US, WHICH ABU DHABI HAS AGREED TO FUND. QUBATI APPARENTLY NOT KEPT ADEQUATELY INFORMED BY HIS GOVT RE ARMS PACKAGE, WHICH NOT ONLY SOURCE OF EMBARRASSMENT, BUT HAS LIMITED HIS ABILITY EFFECTIVELY DISCUSS SUBJECT LOCALLY. PROVIDED YEMENI AMB FULL BRIEFING AND ALSO SUGGESTED HE CONSIDER RAISING SUBJECT OF ABU DHABI FINANCIAL COMMITMENT DIRECTLY WITH FM SUWAIDI AND SHAIKH ZAYID BEFORE RETURNING TO SANAA FOR CONSULTATION. QUBATI MAY PROPOSE TO ZAYID AND YARG EARLY DESPATCH OF HIGH-LEVEL YEMENI DELEGATION TO FINALIZE DETAILS OF TRANSACTION. EMB BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL YARG KEEP ITS AMB BETTER INFORMED IN FUTURE. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION, NEW JORDANIAN AMB INFORMED CHARGE'

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01684 01 OF 02 291116Z

THAT GOJ ALSO EXPERIENCING SOME RELUCTANCE ON PART AD/UAEG TO FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FUNDING ARMS FOR YEMEN. HOWEVER, GOJ PRESSING FOR EARLY PAYMENT OF DOLS 3.8 MILL BILL PRESENTED TO ABU DHABI FOR SHIPMENT SALADINS TO YEMEN AS PART OF PACKAGE. END SUMMARY.

1. YEMENI AMB QUBATI CALLED ON ME DEC 22 FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF YEMENI ARMS PACKAGE. QUBATI BEGAN DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT HE HAS NEVER BEEN PROPERLY INFORMED ON SUBJECT BY HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. HE ADVISED THAT IN PAST FEW WEEKS HE RECEIVED TWO (OR MORE) SECRET CABLES FROM PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR AHMAD NU'MAN REQUESTING AMB TO OBTAIN REAFFIRMATION WILLINGNESS ABU DHABI COMMITMENT TO PAY FOR ARMS YARG WISHES ORDER FROM USG. LATEST CABLE, WHICH ARRIVED ABOUT DEC 17, ALSO INSTRUCTED YEMENI AMB TO CONTACT EMB FOR BRIEFING ON DETAILS OF ARMS PACKAGE.

2. REVIEWING HISTORY OF THIS SUBJECT, QUBATI STATED THAT

ORIGINAL COMMITMENT GIVEN BY ZAYID ON HIS VISIT LAST YEAR TO YEMEN AND SUBSEQUENTLY REAFFIRMED TO PM AL-HIJRI, HAD DEALT WITH ACQUISITION OF SALADIN ARMORED CARS FROM JORDAN AND CERTAIN CONSTRUCTION AND ROAD BUILDING EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY YEMENI ARMY. QUBATI REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT NEITHER IN HIS TALKS WITH ADG/UAEG OFFICIALS NOR IN DISCUSSIONS HE HAS HAD WITHIN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT, HAS IT EVER BEEN SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT YARG WAS SEEKING ARMS PACKAGE FROM USG TO BE FINANCED BY ABU DHABI. REFERRING TO HIS EXTENDED VISIT TO YEMEN DURING SUMMER 1973, QUBATI DENIED THAT ANY TOP YARG OFFICIAL, I.E. PRI MIN AL-HIJRI, DPTY PM NU'MAN, OR MILITARY COMMANDER IRYANI SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED WITH HIM DETAILS OF ARMS PACKAGE. YARG OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO REFER IN THEIR TALKS WITH HIM TO "TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT" TO BE FINANCED BY ABU DHABI FROM EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS. MOREOVER, SINCE HIS RETURN TO ABU DHABI, QUBATI SAID HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE FROM CROWN PRINCE SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYID AND MINISTER OF STATE MOHAMMAD HABBROUSH WHETHER THEY UNDERSTOOD SHAIKH ZAYID HAD ALSO AGREED TO FUND UNSPECIFIED ARMS PACKAGE FROM US. BOTH ABU DHABI OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT. QUBATI HAD SEPARATE DISCUSSION PAST 10 DAYS WITH UNDER SEC AD MINY DEF SHAIKH

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01684 01 OF 02 291116Z

FAISAL AL-QASSIMI, WHO ALSO WAS VAGUE ABOUT SUBJECT REFERRING ONLY TO "TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT" WHICH ABU DHABI WOULD BUY FOR YEMEN. QUBATI SAID THIS EQUIPMENT INCLUDED TWO ROAD SCRAPERS, ONE OR MORE STEAM-SHOVELS, TRACTORS FOR PLOUGHING, 100 TRUCKS AND 50 JEEP-TYPE VEHICLES.

3. TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THOROUGHLY FOR QUBATI BACK-GROUND OF THIS EMBASSY'S INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS PACKAGE EMPHASIZING THAT USG DETERMINED FROM BEGINNING NOT TO BECOME EN-MESHED IN ESSENTIALLY BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN UAEG AND YARG, WITH GOJ LIKEWISE PLAYING KEY ROLE. HOWEVER, BEFORE PROCESSING PROCUREMENT REQUEST FOR VARIOUS ITEMS, USG HAD TO BE CERTAIN THAT PAYMENT FORTHCOMING. WHILE IT TRUE THAT ZAYID HAD TOLD US EXPLICITLY IN LATE JULY THAT HE WOULD PAY (ABU DHABI 1088), FACT THAT PROMISED CONTACTS BETWEEN ABU DHABI/UAE AND YARG FAILED MATERIALIZE, AS WELL AS PRESIDENT'S KNOWN PIQUE WITH US OVER ME CRISIS, WERE VALID REASONS FOR SEEKING REAFFIRMATION OF ZAYID'S WILLINGNESS TO FUND ARMS PACKAGE. REVIEWED IN BEST HALTING ARABIC I COULD MUSTER SERIES OF CABLES SENT BY CHARGE! HOWELL ON THIS SUBJECT DURING LATE SUMMER. QUBATI MOST INTERESTED TO LEARN THAT LIST OF ITEMS REQUIRED BY YARG TRANSMITTED BY IT TO UNDER SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GHUBASH ON AUGUST 11 AND THAT TOTAL COST OF PACKAGE PROVIDED FOR MIN SUWAIDI ON AUGUST 30. QUBATI CLAIMS NEVER TO HAVE SEEN SHOPPING LIST, ARABIC COPY OF WHICH WE GAVE HIM, NOR TO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OFFICIALLY ABOUT COST.

4. AFTER RECEIVING FIRST COMMUNICATION FROM NU'MAN DEC 12, QUBATI HAS BEEN TRYING TO SEE FM SUWAIDI, BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS. (SUWAIDI UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE OF INVOLVEMENT IN DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO REORGANIZATION OF UAEG). QUBATI AGREES, HOWEVER, WITH OUR ASSESSMENT THAT SUWAIDI FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED TO UAE PROVIDING ANY ARMS ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN. DESPITE OPPOSITION, SUWAIDI ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ZAYID DUTY BOUND BY BEDU CODE TO HONOR COMMITMENT TO SISTER ARAB STATE.

5. QUBATI THEREFORE, ASKED MY ADVICE HOW HE SHOULD HANDLE SITUATION NOW WITH GOVT GIVEN FACT THAT HIS PRIOR DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALWAYS DEALT WITH ACQUISITION TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 ABU DH 01684 01 OF 02 291116Z

NOT ARMS TO BE BOUGHT FROM US. SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING TACTICAL SCENARIO TO QUBATI. HE SHOULD SEEK MEETING FIRST WITH SUWAIDI TO BE FOLLOWED BY PRIVATE OR JOINT MEETING WITH SHAIKH ZAYID. TOLD QUBATI HE SHOULD GET RIGHT TO POINT IN DISCUSSION; HE SHOULD INQUIRE ABOUT STATUS FINANCING COMMITMENT REFERRING IF NECESSARY, TO PRIOR CONVERSATIONS THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN AMERICAN EMBASSY AND PRESIDENT AND OTHER UAE OFFICIALS. SINCE ARMS LIST AND COST FIGURES PASSED TO UAEG OVER FOUR MONTHS AGO, TOLD QUBATI I FELT HE SHOULD HAVE NO HESITA ON TO ASK IF ABU DHABI NOW INTENDS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS. QUBATI INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED HE SHOULD RETURN TO SANAA ON URGENT BASIS TO RECEIVE NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS, BUT HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR HIM TO SEE SUWAIDI AND ZAYID FIRST. ALSO SUGGESTED THAT WHEN HE SEES ZAYID, HE STRESS NEED FOR IMMEDIATE DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FINALIZS DETAILS OF THIS TRANSACTION. AT THIS JUNCTURE WITH UAEG NEWLY REORGANIZED, TOLD QUBATI IN MY OPINION MOST EFFECTIVE CONTACT WOULD BE DESPATCH BY YARG

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 393

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01684 02 OF 02 291108Z

14
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 117922

R 290830Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1197
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ABU DHABI 1684

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR

TO ABU DHABI OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL/MILITARY TEAM FOR DISCUSSIONS. QUBATI AGREED THIS WAS IDEA WORTH EXPLORING WITH ZAYID. (DOUBT HE WILL PROPOSE MISSION W/O INSTRUCTIONS FROM SANAA). HE PROMISED TO KEEP EMBSSY FULLY IN PICTURE ON RESULTS HIS CONVERSATIONS. SINCE QUBATI HAS MENTIONED TO ME DIFFICULTIES HE HAS COMMUNICATING WITH SANAA, TOLD AMB EMB WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO TRANSMITTING ANY OF HIS CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES THIS SUBJECT TO YARG IF THIS WOULD HELP SPEED THINGS ALONG.

6. FOR SANAA: SUGGEST EMB BRING SUBSTANCE OF THIS MSG TO NU'MAN'S ATTENTION, WHEN HE RETURNS FROM HOLIDAY (REFTEL C). SINCE QUBATI OBVIOUSLY CONFUSED AND EMBARRASSED OVER FAILURE OF HIS OWN GOVERNMENT TO KEEP HIM ADEQUATELY INFORMED, BELIEVE YARG SHOULD CONSIDER AUTHORIZING QUBATI TO RETURN TO SANAA AT EARLY DATE FOR CONSULTATION. EMB MIGHT ALSO ADVISE NU'MAN AND COS IRYANI THAT WE BELIEVE IT MOST ESSENTIAL YARG LEVEL WITH THEIR AMB IN ABU DHABI, IF THEY WISH HIM TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE AND EFFECTIVE ROLE IN FINALIZING PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS. IF HE NOT PROPERLY INFORMED, KNOW FROM OWN EXPERIENCE ZAYID AND HIS GOVT WILL NOT DEAL SERIOUSLY. AT SAME TIME, EMB MIGHT EXPLORE WITH YARG POSSIBILITY OF THEIR SENDING DELEGATION TO SEE ZAYID. APPROPRIATE TIMING MIGHT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01684 02 OF 02 291108Z

BE DURING EID AL-ADHA AS IT LIKELY ZAYID WILL GO ABROAD AFTER EID.

7. RE PARA FOUR REFTEL B, WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW IF AMB SUWAIDI HAS EVER RECEIVED POSITIVE REPLY RE COMMITMENT. AS NOTED PREVIOUSLY, WE CONTINUE TO DOUBT THAT UAEG'S AMB CAN BE CONSIDERED EFFECTIVE AND RELIABLE SPOKESMAN FOR HIS GOVT IN SUCH SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH NEW JORDANIAN AMB BATAYNEH (OUR FIRST ON THIS SUBJECT), WAS INFORMED THAT GOJ IN RECENT CONTACTS HAS NOTICED SIMILAR EVASIVENESS AND EVEN RELUCTANCE ON PART ABU DHABI OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS ARMS FOR YEMEN. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF FAISAL AL-QASSIMI, BUT BATAYNEH EXPLAINED THAT FAISAL, WHO EXCLUDED FROM NEW UAE GOVT, MAY BE REFLECTING RELUCTANCE DISCUSS POLICY MATTER ON WHICH HE NO LONGER SO KNOWLEDGEABLE. CONTEXT IN WHICH BATAYNEH RAISED SUBJECT YEMEN ARMS WAS RENEWED REQUEST TO AD FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR 30 SALADINS SHIPPED BY GOJ TO YEMEN. AMB HAS SUBMITTED TOTAL BILL OF DOLS 3.8 MILL FOR SEPARATE SHIPMENTS OF 15 SALADINS EACH INCL SPARES, WHICH FAISAL HAS ASSURED HIM WILL BE SETTLED IN DUE COURSE.
GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01641 160907Z

13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 015609

R 160655Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1168
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
NIESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0357

'73 DEC 17 AM 8:15
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1641

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/45 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KWB NARA, Date 4-1-02

EXDIS

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS YE, SA TC US
SUBJ: ARMS FOR YEMEN

1. AT RECENT ENCOUNTER WITH YEMENI AMB QUBATI, CHARGE MENTIONED TO HIM REPORT FROM OUR EMB IN SANAA ABOUT DESIRE OF YAR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TO MOVE AHEAD ON ABU DHABI-FINANCED ARMS PROCUREMENT DEAL WITH US. INQUIRED OF QUBATI IF HE AWARE PRESENT STATE OF FINANCING COMMITMENT.

2. QUBATI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YEMENI MILITARY ACTIVELY CLAMORING FOR MODERN ARMS, BUT HE GAVE ME DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT YARG NOT PRESSING ZAYID FOR FUNDS AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF AREA SITUATION, AND ESPECIALLY, HIGH STATE OF HIS IRRITATION WITH US. QUBATI SAID HE FELT DEAL AS FAR AS ABU DHABI CONCERNED, SHELVED FOR TIME BEING AS ZAYID UNWILLING HAVE IT BE KNOWN THAT HE PURCHASING US ARMS FOR ARAB COUNTRY, WHICH WANTS THEM FOR DEFENSE AGAINST HOSTILE ARAB STATE. FURTHERMORE, YAR RECOGNIZES THAT COMMITMENTS TO ARAB COMBATANTS HAVE STRAINED AD'S RESERVES. ALSO GAINED IMPRESSION FROM QUBATI'S UNCHARACTERISTIC QUESTIONING OF RATIONALE BEHIND US POLICY SEVERELY LIMITING SALE OF ARMS TO ARAB STATES, THAT ZAYID MAY HAVE SOUNDED OFF TO YEMENI AMB OVER DIFFICULTY AD HAS HAD IN OBTAINING CERTAIN MILITARY HARDWARE ITEMS FROM US OVER

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01641 160907Z

PAST YEAR AND HALF. ON OTHER HAND, QUBATI MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN REFLECTING FRUSTRATION OF YARG OVER ITS FAILURE TO CONVINCE US OF NEED FOR LARGER OR MORE SOPHISTICATED ARMS PACKAGE.

3. DO NOT INTEND TO RAISE MATTER OF US FINANCING OF ARMS FOR YEMEN WITH UAEG OR ZAYID UNLESS SO INSTRUCTED. WITH PRESENT DIPL CLIMATE ON CHILLY SIDE, BELIEVE BEST POLICY FOR US IS NOT GET DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER LEAVING ANY CONTACTS STRICTLY TO PARTIES CONCERNED.
GRIFFIN

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5/10/2090

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

'73 DEC 10 AM 8:11

~~SECRET~~ 2.4

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/46 DOS ltr, 2.26.02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01614 090[illegible]Z

10
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
[illegible] 078880

R 090915Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1150
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECDEF
US TREASURY DEPT WASH DC
CSA WASH DC
USCINCEUR

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1614

EXDIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MASS, JO, TC
SUBJ: APCS FOR JORDAN

REF: A. AMMAN 6488
B. LONDON 14364
C. SECDEF MSG 050208Z DEC 73

1. WE HAVE VERIFIED THAT AMB TAJIR ARRIVED DUBAI DE FOR STAY APPROX ONE WEEK PRESUMABLY IN CONNECTION URGENT CONSULTATIONS NOW TAKING PLACE CONCERNING IMMINENT REORGANIZATION OF UAE GOVT.

2. REQUEST DEPT ADVISE IF EMB SHOULD CONTACT TAJIR, AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REFTEL B, TO ASCERTAIN HIS DESIRES ABOUT VENUE FOR TALKS ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS AND OTHER MODALITIES OF PURCHASE APCS. IDEA OF TAJIR GOING TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS HAS CONSIDERABLE MERIT AS TAJIR IS BUSINESSMAN WHO PREFERS DEALING DIRECTLY WITH DECISION MAKERS. WHILE EMB FORESEES NO PROBLEM IN WASH VENUE FOR DISCUSSIONS, SHAIKH ZAYID MAY FEEL THAT POLITICAL CLIMATE STILL TOO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01614 0909 Z

UNSETTLED FOR SENIOR UAE OFFICIAL TRAVEL TO US FOR NE-
GOTIATIONS ABOUT ARMS BEING PURCHASED FOR JORDAN. MORE-
OVER, DESPATCH OF TAJIR ON SECRET TRIP TO US COULD INCUR
DISPLEASURE OF SHAIKH RASHID OF DUBAI, WHO OVER PAST
YEAR HAS DEMONSTRATED SENSITIVITY TO CCZY RELATIONSHIP
THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN HIS ADVISOR AND UAE PRESIDENT.
ZAYID AT THIS TIME WOULD WISH AVOID ANY ACTION APT TO
WORSEN HIS RELATIONS WITH RASHID, AS PRESIDENT IS
MAKING MAJOR EFFORT TO HARMONIZE RELATIONS WITH ALL RULERS,
ESPECIALLY RASHID, IN ORDER TO PUSH THROUGH HIS PLAN FOR
REORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. ONE OF ARCHITECTS
OF REORGANIZATION SCHEME IS TAJIR, AND ZAYID DEPENDS ON
HIM FOR PERSUASION OF USUALLY RELUCTANT DUBAI RULER.

3. IT NOT SURPRISING THAT ZAYID NOW INTENDS TO FINANCE
APCS FROM OWN TREASURY. REASON FOR THIS MAY BE ECONOMIC--
AD TREASURY STRETCHED A BIT THIN AT MOMENT DUE TO COMMITMENTS
OTHER ARAB COMBATANTS, AS WELL AS POLITICAL--HUSSEIN'S
RELUCTANCE GET FULLY INVOLVED IN WAR AND HIS DECISION NOT
ATTEND SUMMIT HAVE NOT BEEN WELL RECEIVED HERE. NEW ARMS
PURCHASED FROM US FOR JORDAN IN ACT UNLIKELY TO WIN ZAYID
ANY POINTS INTERNALLY. FOR ONE OR BOTH THESE REASONS,
ZAYID MAY HAVE CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT BEST WAY HANDLE
TRANSACTION IS THROUGH PRIVY PURSE, WHERE SECRECY CAN
BE MORE EASILY MAINTAINED.
GRIFFIN

[redacted]

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 495

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00719 141253Z

02

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 122557

R 141005Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0956
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN
COMIDEASTFOR
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENGLAND

'73 NOV 14 PM 4:19
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0719

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : PFOR, MARR
SUBJECT : AMIR WISHES CLOSEST US-BAHRAIN RELATIONS

REF : MANAMA 698

1. SUMMARY: DESPITE MIDDLE EAST WAR AMIR WISHES U.S. AND BAHRAIN TO CONTINUE SAME CLOSE RELATIONS AS IN PAST. HIS COMMENTS SUGGEST HE IS DETERMINED TO REVERSE GOB DEPARTURE NOTICE TO MIDEASTFOR AT UNSPECIFIED FUTURE TIME. END SUMMARY.

2. WHEN CHARGE CALLED ON AMIR NOV 13, SHAIKH ISA SAID HE WANTED, AS BEFORE OCTOBER WAR, CLOSEST RELATIONS WITH U.S. HE SAID HE WAS MOST UNHAPPY ABOUT GOB CANCELING U.S. NAVY STATIONING AGREEMENT AND WISHED USG TO KNOW EVENTS AT THAT TIME OORCED THIS ACTION. HE SPOKE SOMEWHAT SCORNFULLY OF FEARS AND EXCITEMENT WHICH GRIPPED SOME OF MINISTERS AT MEETING WHEN DECISION WAS MADE. PROMINENT AMONG HIS TARGETS WAS FONMIN SHAIKH MUHAMMAD.

3. AMIR ALSO EXPRESSED CONTEMPT FOR IRAQIS WHOM HE SAID THREATENED TO BOMB BAHRAIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IF LATTER WAS USED BY THOSE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

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NENS 01-23/49 905 Dg 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00719 141253Z

AIDING ISRAEL. REGARDING BRIEF STREET DEMONSTRATION DURING WAR, HE POINTED OUT TO IRAQI AMBASSADOR THAT SLOGANS MARCHERS WERE USING CAME FROM IRAQ. AMBASSADOR VEHEMENTLY DEVIED ANY BAD INTENTIONS. AMIR OBSERVED TO CHARGE THAT HE DID NOT CARE WHAT OTHERS THOUGHT. HE WOULD SAY AND DO WHAT HE THOUGHT BEST FOR BAHRAIN'S INTERESTS.

4. IN AMIR'S MIND GOB NOTICE TO NAVY IS BY NO MEANS FINAL. HE INDICATED WITHOUT ELABORATION THAT PROBLEM WOULD BE WORKED OUT AND NAVY COULD CONTINUE HERE AS BEFORE. TO TRY TO DRAW HIM OUT MORE, CHARGE SAID DOD-SUPPORTED BAHRAIN SCHOOL WOULD ALMOST SURELY HAVE TO CLOSE WHEN NAVY DEPARTED AND SOME HARD DECISIONS ON NEW ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE SOON. AMIR REPLIED SIMPLY THAT SCHOOL SHOULD BE TOLD TO CONTINUE AS IT HAS BEEN. MAKE NO CHANGES.

5. AMIR'S COMMENTS AND THOSE OF HIS BROTHER PRIMIN SHAIKH KHALIFA (REFTEL) SUGGEST THEY ARE DETERMINED TO REVERSE GOB NOTICE TO NAVY. THEY SEEM CONFIDENT OF BEING ABLE TO MANAGE ANY INTERNAL OPPONENTS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO MIGHT GAIN SEATS IN BAHRAIN'S FIRST ELECTED PARLIAMENT IN DECEMBER, AND SEEM TO BE WAITING AND HOPING FOR HELPFUL DEVELOPMENTS IN ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS BEFORE SHOWING THEIR HAND.
STEIN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 616

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00685 031002Z

2

15
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
---------- 023172

P 021645Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO AMCONSUL BOMBAY INDIA PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0933

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MANAMA 0685

EXDIS
E.O. 11652 : GDS
TAGS : ACOM, OTRA (MEHL, NELLO)
SUBJECT : TDY ASSIGNMENT NELLO MEHL

REF : BOMBAY 2120

WE ARE USUALLY ABLE OBTAIN SAUDI VISA IN ONE WORKING MORNING.

ONWARD RESERVATION ON REQUEST AFTERNOON NOV. FOUR. EMB. TEL. 8331.

STARRETT

73 NOV 30 PM 12:37
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/48 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMS NARA, Date 4-3-02

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~~SECRET~~ 696

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00667 161152Z

2/3

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
---------- 116418

O 161040Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6920
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0667

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : AEMR
SUBJECT : E AND E PLANNING

REF : STATE 204191

1. WE SEE NO RPT NO REASON FOR OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT WARNING AMCITS AGAINST TRAVEL TO BAHRAIN. SUCH WARNING WOULD INDICATE TO GOB AND AMERICAN RESIDENTS THAT SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED WHEN, IN FACT, THIS IS NOT TRUE.

2. DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE IT PRUDENT TO ENCOURAGE TOURISTS AND RESIDENT FAMILIES TO LEAVE. AT ANY RATE, SMALLNESS OF ISLAND AND EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL RUMOR MILL WOULD MAKE DISCRETE ANNOUNCEMENT IMPOSSIBLE.

3. SEE NO RPT NO REASON TO INITIATE ANY EVACUATION AT THIS TIME.

4. CONTINUE TO ESTIMATE 400 PRIVATE AMERICANS AND 25 TRANSIENTS WOULD REQUEST EVACUATION. STARRETT

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/49 DOS ltr. 2-26-02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'73 DEC 3 AM 8:16

~~SECRET~~ 848

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01581 020922Z

14
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
---------- 008429

R 020815Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1133
INFO /USINT ALGIERS 0018
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
/USINT CAIRO 0058
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1581 SECTION 1 OF 2

EXDIS

EO 11652: EX GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TC XF
SUBJ: OTAIBA BRIEFS CHARGE ON ZAYID'S TRIP

SUMMARY
ABU DHABI MINISTER OF PETROLEUM OTAIBA HAS PROVIDED CHARGE WITH BEHIND THE SCENES BRIEFING OF SHAIKH ZAYID'S BRIEF VISITS TO DAMASCUS AND CAIRO AND OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ALGIERS SUMMIT CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY UNPUBLISHED OIL DECISIONS. OTAIBA REVEALED THAT DUE TO HIGH COST OF SUPPORTING COMBATANTS' WAR EFFORTS, ARAB LEADERS HAVE DECIDED HOLD OIL EXPORT REDUCTION AT PRESENT LEVEL OF TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT, THUS IN EFFECT ABANDONING PLANNED DECEMBER AND SUBSEQUENT MONTHLY CUTS OF FIVE PERCENT. AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY ALSO REACHED TO REMOVE US FROM UNFRIENDLY CATEGORY OF STATES IF FORTHCOMING PEACE CONFERENCE SUCCEEDS IN ESTABLISHING DEFINITE TIME-TABLE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWALAND FOR IMPLEMENTATION OTHER

PROVISIONS OF SC RESOLUTION 242. THEREAFTER, US WOULD BE TREATED AS NEUTRAL, I.E. LIKE MOST EC COUNTRIES, WITH RESPECT TO OIL EXPORTS.

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01581 020922Z

SHAIKH ZAYID AND UAE DELEGATION FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY MODERATION, HONESTY, AND CANDOR OF SYRIAN PRES ASAD IN HIS ANALYSIS OF AREA SITUATION AND LOSSES SUSTAINED BY SYRIANS DURING WAR. UAE DEL FOUND SYRIAN SPIRIT AND MORALE HIGH, AND ALTHOUGH ASAD AND ARMY APPEAR READY

FOR ANOTHER ROUND SHOULD CEASEFIRE NOT HOLD, SARG LEADERSHIP SEEMS COMMITTED TO SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. MOST PRESSING SYRIAN NEED

AS COMMUNICATED TO ZAYID IS REPLACEMENT OF DESTROYED GENERATING EQUIPMENT. ZAYID HAS INSTRUCTED UAE EMB LONDON TO EXPEDITE ORDERS FOR STOCK ITEM TURBINES FROM EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS.

OTAIBA INDICATED THAT UAEG AS RESULT BRIEFINGS IN CAIRO, INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS OF EGYPTIAN EXPLANATIONS ABOUT CONDUCT OF WAR. IN CONTRAST TO SYRIAN BRIEFINGS, EGYPTIANS TENDED TO BE VAGUE AND TRY COVER UP MAGNITUDE OF DEFEAT ON WEST BANK. SADAT AND HIS MILITARY ADVISORS FINALLY FORCED TO ADMIT THAT EGYPT HAD MADE NUMBER SERIOUS MILITARY MISTAKES DURING WAR. THROUGHOUT VISIT EGYPTIANS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF SOVIETS FOR FAILURE SUPPLY SUFFICIENT WAR MATERIALS ESPECIALLY AIRCRAFT. LACK OF PLANES AND LOSSES AIRCRAFT IN BATTLE, INCL THOSE DESTROYED BY OWN SAM 6 MISSLES, CITED BY EGYPTIANS AS MAJOR CAUSE OF DEFEAT. ZAYID AND UAE DEL APPARENTLY TURNED OFF BY EGYPTIAN REQUEST FOR VIRTUAL BLANK CHECK FROM ABU DHABI FOR NEW ARMS PURCHASES, EVERYTHING FROM PAJAMAS TO MISSILES, ACCORDING OTAIBA. ZAYID HAS COMMITTED ABOUT DOLS 200 MILL TO COMBATANTS MOST OF WHICH TO BE USED FOR NON-MILITARY ITEMS. SADAT SURPRISED ZAYID AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS BY ADMITTING THAT HE HAD NO GUARANTEE FROM KISSINGER THAT ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW TO OCT 22 CEASEFIRE LINE. SADAT STATED HE PLANNING FOR BOTH WAR AND PEACE AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY CLAIMS IT HAS 50,000 TROOPS READY TRY PUSH ISRAELI ACROSS CANAL. THEY CONFIDENT IT CAN BE DONE AND THEY READY TAKE WHATEVER LOSSES REQUIRED.

1. ON EVENING NOV 29 CHARGE ACCOMPANIED WORLD AIRWAYS BOARD CHAIRMAN, EDWARD DALY, ON VISIT TO HOME OF ABU DHABI MINPET MANA OTAIBA. FOLLOWING HOUR LONG MEETING AT WHICH DALY BRIEFED MINISTER ON HIS FIRM'S CAPABILITIES AND DISCUSSED NUMBER POSSIBLE BUSINESS VENOURES, OTAIBA ASKED ME TO STAY BEHIND FOR PRIVATE CHAT. EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01581 0209202

NLT RPT NOT ACTING UPON INSTRUCTIONS OF SHAIKH ZAYID, OTAIBA SAID HE WISHED AS GOOD FRIEND TO SUMMARIZE FOR ME RESULTS UAE PRESIDENT'S VISITS TO DAMASCUS, CAIRO AND ATTENDANCE AT ARAB SUMMIT MEETING, SINCE HE UNCERTAIN EMB WOULD GET AS FULL A PICTURE, ESPECIALLY ON OIL POLICY, FROM OTHER PARTICIPANTS. AS REPORTED, OTAIBA WAS MEMBER OF UAE DELEGATION. SUMMARY OF OTAIBA'S BRIEFING FOLLOWS:

2. SYRIAN VISIT: A. OTAIBA SAID PRESIDENT ASAD MADE EXTREMELY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON ZAYID AND HIS ENTOURAGE, MUCH BETTER IN FACT THAN DID EGYPTIANS. UAE DELEGATION FOUND SYRIANS' MORALE AND SPIRIT VERY HIGH. ALTHOUGH SYRIANS ADMITTED CASUALTY AND DAMAGE LOSSES DURING WAR WERE CONSIDERABLE, THEY ACTING IN NO WAY LIKE DEFEATED NATION. ASAD FREELY ADMITTED ISRAELIS SEIZED ADDITIONAL GOLAN TERRITORY, BUT HE AND OTHER SYRIAN LEADERS PROUD OF WAY ARMY FOUGHT. ISRAELIS KNEW THEY HAD BEEN IN BATTLE WITH WORTHY OPPONENT, AND HAD SUFFERED RELATIVELY HEAVY LOSSES. UAE DEL FORMED IMPRESSION THAT SARG DOES NOT CONSIDER TACTICAL SITUATION ON GOLAN FRONT CRITICAL, AND SYRIANS RECOGNIZE THAT CEASE-FIRE SITUATION ON EGYPTIAN FRONT DEMANDS PRIORITY ARAB ATTENTION. B. MOST PRESSING NEED OF SYRIANS IS IMMEDIATE REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT OF POWER FACILITIES AND REFINERY DESTROYED BY ISRAELIS. OTAIBA CONFIRMED EARLIER REPORTS THAT SHAIKH ZAYID HAS AGREED PROVIDE SYRIA WITH NUMBER OF TURBINE UNITS FOR IMMEDIATE INSTALLATION, PROCUREMENT OF WHICH FROM EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS BEING HANDLED BY UAE EMB LONDON. GENERATORS BEING PURCHASED FROM FIRMS ABLE SUPPLY THEM FROM AVAILABLE STOCKS. ASAD TOLD ZAYID THAT SOVIETS HAVE RESUPPLIED MUCH OF WAR LOSSES, BUT SYRIAN MILITARY STILL LACKING MANY CRITICAL ITEMS, NOTABLY PLANES, TANKS AND ANTI-TANK MISSLES. DESPITE SYRIAN DEFEAT, ASAD WON HIGH MARKS FROM UAE DEL FOR NOT INSISTING ON ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. SYRIAN PRESIDENT REPORTEDLY TOLD ZAYID THAT HE REALIZED ABU DHABI HAS BEEN MOST GENEROUS, AND AS FAR AS ANY ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE CONCERNED, SARG APPRECIATIVE FOR WHATEVER AMOUNT ZAYID FEELS HE CAN AFFORD. IMPORTANT

THING AS FAR AS ZAYID CONCERNED IS SYRIA MADE NO NEW SPECIFIC DEMANDS. WHILE SARG LEADERS STRESSED THAT SYRIA READY FOR ANOTHER ROUND SHOULD CEASE-FIRE BREAK DOWN, ASAD THROUGHOUT ZAYID'S VISIT AND AT SUMMIT ACTED WITH MODERATION, AND UAE REPS CONVINCED HE

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04 ABU DH 01581 0209202

ERE IN SEEKING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IT ALSO INTERESTING THAT
OLD UAEG HE SATISFIED USG WORKING HARD FOR LASTING SETTLEMENT.

EGYPTIAN VISIT: A. FROM OTAIBA'S REMARKS, IT APPEARS
D AND HIS DEL FOUND EGYPTIANS PREOCCUPIED WITH PRO-
OF CEASE-FIRE AND PREPARATION FOR SUMMIT, AND THERE-
, DURING THEIR CAIRO STAY, HI-LEVEL TALKS NOT AS EXTENSIVE
AEG HAD HOPED. CONSTANT THEME OF MY BRIEFING WAS UAEG
ING INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS OF EGYPTIAN EXPLANATIONS ABOUT
DUCT OF WAR EFFORT. DURING VISIT TO GENERAL STAFF WAR ROOM,
E REPS ASKED MANY SEARCHING QUESTIONS ABOUT POOR EGYPTIAN
OWING IN WAR WITH MAIN FOCUS OF INTEREST BEING ON ISRAELIS
EP PENETRATION OF WEST BANK. EGYPTIAN RESPONSES TENDED TO
AGUE, BUT THEY DID ADMIT TO MAKING NUMBER OF SERIOUS
TARY MISTAKES. OTAIBA SAID UAE REPS PRESSED FOR EXPLANATION HOW
ELIS COULD HAVE EXPANDED MODEST BRIDGEHEAD OF OCT 22 TO
ANCY VIRTUALLY ENTIRE SUEZ CITY AREA FOLLOWING CEASE-FIRE.
OUSLY EMBARRASSED, EGYPTIANS TRIED TO ANSWER BY
NG VERY SUBSTANTIAL LOSSED IDF SUSTAINED IN CANAL
SING EFFORT (WHICH UAEG TENDS TO DOUBT); HOWEVER, THEY FORCED
ND TO ADMIT ISRAELIS AFTER OCT 22 HAD SUCCEEDED IN OVERRUNNING
MBER OF "MILITARILY WEAK POINTS." B. THROUGHOUT ZAYID'S
IT EGYPTIANS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF SOVIETS CLAIMING THAT NEITHER
OR TO OR DURING WAR DID RUSSIANS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT AIR-
EGYPTIANS IN THEIR BRIEFINGS EMPHASIZED THAT AIR LOSSES
DETERMINING FACTOR IN TURNING TIDE OF BATTLE IN
ELIS FAVOR; THIS CONNECTION EGYPTIANS ADMITTED
OF ABOUT 50 THEIR OWN AIRCRAFT TO SAM 6 MISSLES.
WERE BITTER ABOUT THOSE LOSSES BLAMING FAULTY
IAN COMMO EQUIPMENT. COMMENTED TO OTAIBA I FOUND THIS PITCH
ARIANCE WITH INFO WE HAD RECEIVED, NAMELY THAT BULK OF
PTIAN AF UNCOMMITTED DURING WAR. C. IN CONTRAST TO SYRIAN RESERVE

OUT MONEY, EGYPTIANS LEFT BAD TASTE WITH UAEG BY ASKING VIRTUALLY
BLANK CHECK TO REPLACE WAR LOSSES. OTAIBA REFLECTED
SONAL DISGUST THAT EGYPT HAD ASKED ZAYID TO MAKE
-ENDED COMMITMENT QUOTE FOR EVERYTHING FROM PAJAMAS
ISSILES UNQUOTE. ZAYID REPORTEDLY COUNTERED BY STRESSING
HE PREFERS CHANNEL ABU DHABI ASSISTANCE BASICALLY
NON-MILITARY WARES, BUT IS WILLING CONTRIBUTE TO CER-
SSENTIAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS. HOWEVER, ZAYID MADE

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05 ABU DH 01581 [illegible]

T CONVINCINGLY TO BOTH ASAD AND SADAT THAT ABU DHABI
NCIAL RESOURCES COMPARISON THOSE SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT STILL
TED, AND HE DOES NOT INTEND TO COMPETE IN UNEQUAL PROCUREMENT
EST WITH US MILITARY RESUPPLY EFFORT FOR ISRAEL. REPLYING TO
ION ABOUT EXTENT OF ABU DHABI AID TO COMBATANTS, OTAIBA CONFIRMED

PUBLISHED FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 200 MILL (100 MILL
A AND 100 MILL EGYPT) THUSFAR COMMITTED, OF WHICH ABOUT 80 PERCENT

G ALLOCATED BY ABU DHABI FOR NON-MILITARY ITEMS. IN BOTH ARAB
TALS ZAYID ALSO MADE POINT THAT ARAB OIL EMBARGO WAS PUT INTO
CT AS DIRECT HELP FOR COMBATANTS, AND IT IS UP TO THEM TO
SE WHETHER THE USE OF THIS WEAPON SHOULD BE INCREASED OR
ASED, BUT IT ESSENTIAL COMBATANTS UNDERSTAND THAT ANY
HER REDUCTION IN EXPORTS WILL ONLY COMPOUND DIFFICULTY
AYING FOR ADDITIONAL WAR REQUIREMENTS. D. SADAT APPARENTLY
ISED ZAYID, AND POSSIBLY OTHER ARAB LEADERS, BY DENYING THAT HE
ANY FIRM GUARANTEE FROM SEC KISSINGER RELATING TO ISRAELI
DRAWAL TO THE OCT 22 POSITION. SADAT TOLD ZAYID FRANKLY

USG HAD PROMISED IT WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO BRING ABOUT
HDRAWAL AND TO PROMOTE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT THAT WILL GIVE THEM
, IF NOT ALL, THEIR ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS. SADAT
SED THAT HE IS MAKING PLANS FOR EITHER WAR OR PEACE, DEPENDING
ON OF EVENTS. SADAT UNDERSCORED NEED FOR IMMEDIATE PROGRESS
EACE

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GE 01 ABU DH 01581 0209332

4
CTION SS-30

FO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
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0208512 DEC 73
M AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
O SECSTATE WASHDC 1134
NFO USINT ALGIERS
MEMBASSY AMMAN
MEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
MEMBASSY JIDDA
MEMBASSY KUWAIT
MEMBASSY LONDON

~~E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI1581 FINAL SECTION OF 2
XDIS
FFORTS, SINCE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IS PRESSURING HIM TO RESUME
STILITIES. UAE REPS INFORMED BY EGYPTIAN OFFICERS THAT
0,000 TROOPS NOW STRONGLY POSITIONED SURROUNDING ISRAELI BRIDGEHEAD
ND GENERAL STAFF IS CONFIDENT EGYPTIAN FORCES CAN PUSH
SRAELIS ACROSS THE CANAL, REGARDLESS OF COST.

ALGIERS SUMMIT: A. OIL POLICY: OTAIBA SAID THAT USE
F OIL AS WEAPON WAS DISCUSSED AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH.
N ADDITION TO DECISIONS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY, HE REVEALED ARAB
EADERS TOOK FOLLOWING SECRET DECISIONS (NOTE: MEES OF NOV 23
ENTIONS UNPUBLISHED RECOMMENDATIONS OF OAPEC IN VIENNA MTG WHICH
RE TO HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO SUMMIT).
A) BECAUSE OF HIGH COST OF SUPPORTING WAR, ARAB LEADERS DECIDED KEEP
XPORT REDUCTION AT LEVEL 25 PERCENT. OTAIBA CATEGORIC IN SAYING
UMMIT AGREED TO ABANDON DEC FIVE PERCENT CUT AND ALL/PLANNED SUB-
EQUENT 5 PERCENT MONTHLY CUTS.
B) RE TOTAL EMBARGO ON EXPORTS TO US, ARAB LEADERS AGREED IF
ORTHCOMING PEACE CONFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT SUCCEEDS IN
STABLISHING DEFINITE TIME-TABLE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND FOR IM-
LEMENTATION OTHER PROVISIONS OF SC RESOLUTION 242, THEN THE US WILL BE

EMOVED IMMEDIATELY FROM UNFRIENDLY CATEGORY. THEREAFTER, USG WOULD
E TREATED WITH RESPECT TO EXPORTS THE SAME AS MOST EC COUNTRIES,

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01581 020903Z

E. AS A NEUTRAL. OTAIBA HINTED THAT FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE US ACTIONS TOWARD ARABS MIGHT EVEN BRING PRESSURE FOR PLACING US IN RANKS OF FRIENDS EXEMPTED FROM BAN.

(B) PALESTINIAN QUESTION: OTAIBA REVEALED THAT JORDANIAN POSITION ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT PEACE CONFERENCE, AS EXPOUNDED BY FORMER PRIMIN TALHOUNI, WAS ROUNDLY REJECTED BY ARAB LEADERS, WHO AGREED TO DESIGNATE THE PLO AS ONLY SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE. OTAIBA VERY CRITICAL OF KING HUSSAIN FOR NOT ATTENDING SUMMIT HIMSELF AS THIS PLAYED RIGHT INTO HANDS OF FEDAYEEN. AT CONFERENCE GOJ ARGUED THAT IT SHOULD BE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIANS IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR RECOVERY OF WEST BANK. ONCE THAT AREA RETURNED TO ARAB CONTROL, GOJ SAID PALESTINIANS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE OWN POLITICAL FUTURE. ACCORDING OTAIBA, IN HIS PRE-SUMMIT ABU DHABI MEETING WITH HUSSAIN, ZAYID HAD TOLD KING HE REJECTED HIS POSITION OUTRIGHT BECAUSE IT TENDED TO OBFUSCATE CORE ISSUE OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, NAMELY QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. ZAYID, WHO PURSUED SAME LINE AT SUMMIT, QUESTIONED WHY HUSSAIN SHOULD WANT TO HAVE WEST BANK BACK EVEN FOR INTERIM PERIOD WHEN PALESTINIANS HAD DONE NOTHING BUT CAUSE KING TROUBLE FOR PAST 25 YEARS. ZAYID ARGUED THAT PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE ALLOWED HAVE THEIR OWN STATE EITHER SEPARATELY OR IN SOME KIND OF UNION WITH ISRAEL, JORDAN OR WITH BOTH STATES. OTAIBA SAID SUMMIT DECISION IN EFFECT CONSTITUTED ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ORIGINAL 1947 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF SEPARATE ARAB STATES IN PALESTINE.

(C) BANK FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: DURING DISCUSSION ABOUT ESTABLISHMENT OF BANK UAEG STRONGLY SUPPORTED CONCEPT AND ARGUED FOR MUCH GREATER INITIAL FINANCIAL SUBSCRIPTION (DOLS 300 MILL), THAN AMOUNT ULTIMATELY APPROVED BY CONFERENCE, DOLS 150 MILL. PURPOSE OF BANK IS TO SHOW ARAB STATES' GRATITUDE TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHO BROKE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AND TO COMPENSATE THEM AT LEAST IN PART FOR ANY LOSS OF ISRAELI FOREIGN AID.

(D) ARAB FOREIGN MIN TO EXPLAIN POLICY: OTAIBA MENTIONED THAT CONFERENCE DELEGATED FOREIGN MINISTERS TO TOUR EUROPE, FAR EAST, AND US TO EXPLAIN ARAB POSITION AND DECISIONS OF SUMMIT. OTAIBA THOUGHT UAE FOR MIN SUWAIDI WOULD LIKELY DRAW BASIGNMENT TO JAPAN IN VIEW OF SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES THAT

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CE 03 ABU DH 01581 0209332

VE DEVELOPED RECENTLY BETWEEN THAT COUNTRY AND UAE. HE UN-
RTAIN WHO SELECTED TO GO TO US, BUT GUESSED SAUDI
SAQQAT WOULD BE PART OF DELEGATION.
FFIN

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01444 211559Z

40
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 044463

O P 211505Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1048
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY
COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1444

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR TC OM QA SA
SUBJ: US-UK E&E AGREEMENT FOR SELECTED GULF STATES AND EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA

REF: (A) KUWAIT 3821; (B) LONDON 12239; (C) STATE 208676

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT REFTELS B AND C, CHARGE AND EMBOFF HAD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL UK EMBASSY. PRIDHAM OF BRITISH EMBASSY SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REQUESTED GUIDANCE FROM FCO RE APPLICABILITY OF US-UK AGREEMENT AND UNDERTOOK PRESS LONDON FOR RESPONSE TO HIS EARLIER CABLE. WE JOINTLY REVIEWED UP-DATED AGREEMENT AND PARTICULARLY PARA 7 RPT 7. THERE WAS COMMON AGREEMENT THAT, ASSUMING WORD "IMPLEMENT" RPT "IMPLEMENT" WERE READ BROADLY ENOUGH, PARA 7 RENDERS REMAINDER OF DOCUMENT MEANINGLESS IN MANY CONCEIVABLE REAL-WORLD SITUATIONS. LIKEWISE, WE BELIEVE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE CONCURS WITH EMBASSY FEELING THAT PERIOD OF POTENTIAL EVAC NOT OPPORTUNE TIME TO DRAW UP PLANS FOR EVAC.

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24

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01444 211559Z

2. DESPITE REDUCTION OF UK PRESENCE IN UAE AND REMAINDER OF GULF, BRITISH RETAIN SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES WHICH US SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH LOCAL DIRECTOR CIVIL AVIATION AND HARBOR MASTER ARE UK CITIZENS AND BRITISH PERSONNEL IN LOCAL ARMED FORCES PROVIDE BRITISH EMBASSY WITH DIRECT PIPELINE INTO SECURITY SITUATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING. IN ADDITION, EVEN ASSUMING US DECISION TO PROVIDE CHARTERED AIRCRAFT FOR EVAC, NO RPT NO US CARRIER HAS LANDING RIGHTS IN UAE AND POLITICAL SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE TO POINT WHERE NO SUCH RIGHTS WOULD BE GRANTED TO US AIRCRAFT. CONSEQUENTLY, WHETHER WE ADHERE TO BROAD INTERPRETATION OF US-UK AGREEMENT OR CONSIDER IT IRRELEVANT, THIS POST WOULD PROBABLY NEED SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE FROM BRITISH TO CONDUCT FULL-SCALE EVAC, SHOULD SUCH MEASURE BECOME NECESSARY. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS PERTAINS EVEN MORE IN DUBAI WHERE USG HAS APPROX 800 RPT 800 CITIZENS AND NO OFFICIAL PRESENCE.

3. AS INDICATION OF ONE ADVANTAGE BRITISH EMBASSY ENJOYS, PRIDHAM INFORMED US THAT AS OF 20 RPT 20 OCTOBER, ARMORED CAR REGIMENT AND INFANTRY UNITS OF ABU DHABI DEFENSE FORCE (ADDF) PLACED ON ONE HOUR ALERT TO PROTECT US CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AS NEEDED. THIS MOVE WAS TAKEN AT REQUEST OF POLICE WHO STRETCHED VERY THIN AND INCLUDED DESPATCH OF ADDF FORCES AS WELL TO PROTECT OIL INSTALLATIONS IN DESEGE AND OFFSHORE.

4. EMBASSY CONTINUES BELIVE, AS DO OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES, THAT CLEAR AND DEBILITATING GAP IN US-UK AGREEMENT REPRESENTED BY PARA 7 RPT 7 SHOULD EITHER BE PLUGGED BY MUTUAL ACCORD OR ENTIRE DOCUMENT CONSIDERED CASUALTY OF CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS.
GRIFFIN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 504

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01423 181051Z

2

11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 009061

R 170730Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1036
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1423

EXDIS

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA. 1.)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TC
SUBJECT: ZAYID REPORTEDLY SEEKING 200 MILL DOLLAR LOAN
FOR ASSISTING SYRIA AND EGYPT

1. FNCB MGR ABU DHABI (PROTECT) INFORMED CHARGE IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT PIAOGUSHAIKH ZAYID'S RETURN OCT 15 FROM LONDON, HE APPROACHED MORGAN GRENDFELL MERCHANT BANK TO REQUEST 200 MILL DOLLAR LOAN FOR "FINANCING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES PROJECT IN ARAB WORLD". MORGAN HAS INTERPRETED THIS SWEEPING REQUEST TO MEAN ZAYID SEEKING BANK FINANCING URGENTLY TO COVER COSTS OF CONTRIBUTION HE INTENDS MAKE FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR DAMAGE IN EGYPT AND SYRIA, PRINICPALLY LATTER.

2. MORGAN GRENFELL APPARENTLY READY PROVIDE DOLS 100 MILL, BUT UNABLE FROM OWN RESOURCES TO HANDLE LOAN OF MAGNITUDE REQUESTED BY ZAYID. MORGAN, THEREFORE, HAS APPROACHED FNCB LONDON FOR ASSITANCE IN RAISING OTHER ONE HUNDRED MILL DOLS. LOCAL MGR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FNCB HOME OFFICE, WHICH OF LATE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING ABU DHABI TO UTILIZE BANK'S LOAN FUNDS FOR FINANCING ITS MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, AGREEABLE IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATING WITH MORGAN IN LOAN PACKAGE PROVIDED FNCB ABLE ATTRACT SOME ADDITIONAL PARTNERS.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/52 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMD NARA, Date 4/1/02

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01423 181051Z

FNCB WOULD LIKE PARTNERS PUT UP DOLS 50 MILL WITH FNCB'S DIRECT SHARE ALSO AMOUNTING TO DOLS 50 MILL. MAJOR PROBLEM FOR FNCB IN APPROVING RLAN REQUEST IS FACT FUNDS WOULD BE EARMARKED EITHER FOR UNSPECIFIED PROJECTS, OR CONCEIVABLY MIGHT BE DIVERTED TO MILITARY PURCHASES, WHICH CONTRARY TO FNCB'S LOAN POLICY. THEREFORE, BEFORE SUBMITTING LOAN TO SENIOR OFFICIALS FOR APPROVAL, HOME OFFICE HAS INSTRUCTED BANKS REGIONAL VP IN BAHRAIN (GRANT) TO TRAVEL ABU DHABI SOONEST FOR MTG WITH ZAYID. GRANT REPORTEDLY WILL BE AUTHORIZED SOUND ZAYID OUT ON FEASIBILITY TIEING FNCB'S SHARE OF LOAN (I.E. 100 MILL DOLS) TO CERTAIN EXISTING OR PLANNED DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS WITHIN COUNTRY OR ABROAD, AS PART ABU DHABI'S ONGOING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, FOR WHICH ABU DHABI WAS PLANNING PAY CASH OR NEGOTIATING LOANS THROUGH OTHER BANKS. MGR ESTIMATES THERE ARE ABOUT 600 MILL DOLS IN MAJOR PROJECTS OR EQUIPMENT PURCHASES FALLING IN THAT CATEGORY. IF LOAN COULD BE TIED SPECIFIC PROJECTS FOR WHICH THERE MAY BE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SOME SORT, FNCB WOULD FIND REQUEST EASIER TO APPROVE.

4. EMB INTENDS CLOSELY MONITOR THIS SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. ADDRESSEES REQUESTED EXERCISE UTMOST CAUTION IN NOT REVEALING SUBSTANCE THIS MESSAGE TO FNCB OR OTHER BANKING SOURCES.
GRIFFIN

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~~SECRET~~ 114

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01424 171035Z

44 2
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 CIAE-00 USSS-00 INRE-00

NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 126728

O 170930Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHED IMMEDIATE 1037
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE
CINCEUR IMMEDIATE
JCS IMMEDIATE
FRUEADWW/NSC IMMEDIATE
COMIDEASTFOR IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1424

EXDIS

LONDON FOR LEMBRAKIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, TC
SUBJ: E&E PLANNING

REF: A. STATE 204191
B. STATE 204192

1. A. SITUATION REMAINS CALM IN UAE, AND, AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THERE HAS BEEN NO OVERT HOSTILE REACTION DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER AMERICAN INTERESTS OR CITIZENS AS RESULT US MILITARY RE-SUPPLY EFFORT IN BEHALF ISRAEL OR ALLEGED REPORTS OF DIRECT US PARTICIPATION IN FIGHTING. ARADS OF ALL PERSUASIONS ARE PLAINLY UNHAPPY OVER USG DECISION TO MOUNT MAJOR RE-SUPPLY EFFORT, BUT BELIEVE THEY ARE TAKING CUES FROM LESS VOLATILE HOSTS IN EXPRESSING DIS-PLEASURE GENERALLY IN FRIENDLY RESTRAINED MANNER. DESPITE ABSENCE OVERT HOSTILITY, THERE IS UNMISTAKABLE AIR OF

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NLNS 01-23/53 DOS 2/26/02
By SKWO NARA, Date 4/1/02

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01424 171035Z

TENSION PERVADING AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND BELIEVE MOST OF OUR CITIZENS FOLLOWING ADVISE OF EMBASSY IN MAINTAINING LOW PROFILE AND KEEPING CLOSE TO HOMES AND BUSINESSES.

B. WE ARE SATISFIED THAT FEDERAL AND LOCAL GVTS ARE ALERTED TO POTENTIAL FOR OUTBREAK OF ANTI-AMERICAN HOSTILITY AND HAVE TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY STEPS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY PROTECTION FOR OUR PERSONNEL. WHILE WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WILL INCREASE TO UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL IN UAE, MUST CAUTION THAT TOO LITTLE TIME HAS YET PASSED TO ASSESS HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT ARAB UNHAPPINESS WITH US POLICY WILL BE REFLECTED TOWARD OUR RESIDENT PRESENCE.

C. UNLESS SECURITY OR POLITICAL SITUATION SHOULD WORSEN, DO NOT BELIEVE USG AT THITTIME NEED MAKE BLANKET ANNOUNCEMENT WARNING US CITIZENS FROM TRAVELING TO UAE. SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE MISREAD BY HOST GOVT AS UNFRIENDLY ACT AND INDICATION THAT USG QUESTIONS ITS CAPABILITY MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY. ON OTHER HAND, IN VIEW OF EXTREMELY VOLATILE SITUATION PREVAILING IN ENTIRE ARAB WORLD AND POSSIBILITY WAR SITUATION COULD WORSEN BEFORE IT IMPROVES, WE WOULD FAVOR STATEMENT ADVISING AMERICAN CITIZENS TO DEFER ANY PLANNED TRAVEL TO LOWER GULF (INCL UAE) UNLESS DICTATED BY OVERRIDING OR URGENT BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS. IN CONTACTS WITH US FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS DEPT COULD AMPLIFY ANNOUNCEMENT BY URGING THAT TOURIST AND DEPENDENT TRAVEL BE DELAYED UNTIL GENERAL SITUATION IN AREA IMPROVES. AMCITS TRAVELLING TO UAE SHOULD ALSO BE URGED CONTACT EMBASSY IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL TO REGISTER THEIR PRESENCE AND TRAVEL PLANS.

D. HOWEVER, SHOULD DEPT DECIDE MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT WARNING US CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL TO GULF AREA, RECOMMEND THAT POST BE INFORMED OF DECISION IN ADVANCE SO WE CAN EXPLAIN RATIONALE TO UAEG.

2. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SEE NO NEED TO ENCOURAGE RESIDENT AMCITS TO BEGIN LEAVING UAE ON REGULARLY SCHEDULED AIRCRAFT.

3. UNLESS THERE IS WORSENING OF POLITICAL OR SECURITY SITUATION, WE SEE NO NEED TO INITIATE EVACUATION, LIMITED OR OTHERWISE. WISH TO REMIND DEPT THAT EVAC

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01424 171035Z

OF AMCITS IN UAE (AS WELL AS QATAR AND OMAN) IS COVERED BY JOINT AGREEMENT WITH UK, UNDER TERMS OF WHICH BRITS ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTUAL MODALITIES OF E&E PLANNING IN CONSULTATION WITH AMB AND/OR HIS DESIGNATED REP. WE HAVE MAINTAINED VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH BRITISH EMB SINCE ONSET OF CRISIS AND AMB MCCARTHY AND HIS DEPUTY RESPONSIBLE FOR E&E PLANNING INTERPRET JOINT AGREEMENT AS MEANING THAT HMG WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVAC US CITIZENS EVEN WHEN IT MAY BE UNNECESSARY, AS IN CURRENT CRISIS, FOR EVAC OF RESIDENT BRITISH CITIZENS FROM UAE. ULTIMATE DECISION REGARDING EVAC US CITRLENS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE MADE BYKEMB STOLTZFUS ON BASIS RE-COMMENDATION CHARGE AND CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL HMG REP, BUT ONCE THAT DECISION TAKEN BRITS PREPARED IMMEDIATEL TO IMPLEMENT JOINT
AGREEMENT. IF TIME PERMITS, ACTUAL EVAC
WOULD INVOLVE USE OF REGULARLY SCHEDULED OR CHARTERED CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT PRESUMABLY BOAC, WHICH MAINTAINS VIR-TUALLY DAILY SERVICE TO UAE. IN EXTREMIS SITUATION, BRITISH E&E PLAN FOR LOWER GULF STATES WOULD EMPLOY MILITARY AIR-CRAFT OPERATING OUT OF CYPRUS, WHICH ALSO DESIGNATED AS SAFEHAVEN RPT SAFEHAVEN FOR ALL BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSONNEL EVCUATED FROM UAE, QATAR AND OMAN. IF MIL AIRCRAFT MUST BE USED, PLAN ALSO ENVISAGES USE OF MASIRA ISLAND IN GULF OF OMAN AS STAGING AREA.

4. A. AT REQUEST QIS#EMB, BRITISH EMB IS QUERYING LONDON TO ASCERTAIN THAT FO AND MOD FULLY SUPPORT LOCAL INTER-PRETATION THAT UNDER JOINT AGREEMENT HMG RESPONSIBLE FOR EVACUATING AMCITS IN LOWER GULF STATES IN SITUATION WHEN EVAC OF BRIT CITIZENS NOT CONTEMPLATED. ASSUMING LOCAL INTERPRETATION ENDORSED BY LONDON, BRIT EMB MESSAGE WILL ALERT PLANNING AUTHORITIES TO POSSIBLE NEED ON URGENT BASIS OF CHARTERED AIRCRAFT TO EVAC US CITIZENS FROM UAE, QATER AND OMAN.

B. GIVEN EXISTENCE OF JOINT E&E AGREEMENT, EX-TREMELY HELPFUL ATTITUDE OF
TCAL#BRITISH OFFICIALS
AND OUR JUDGMENT THAT BRITS STILL HAVE EFFECTIVE CA-PABILITY FOR ORGANIZING AND MOUNTING EVAC FROM THIS AREA, EMB BELIEVES THAT AS FAR AS UAE CONCERNED, WE SHOULD

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 ABU DH 01424 171035Z

CONTINUE RELY ON BRITS FOR EVACUATING OUR CITIZENS, ASHOULD THAT DECISION BE TAKEN BY AMBASSADOR.

5. A. CONTINUE ESTIMATE MAXIMUM NUMBER PRIVATE AMCITS WHO WOULD REQUEST BE EVACUATED AT ABOUT 1100. EMBASSY CONTINUES UPDATE IST INFO ON WHEREABOUTS AMCITS AND CONSUL CURRENTLY IN BIBAI FOR THIS PURPOSE.
B. WE AWARE OF TWB TOURISTDAND, AT ANY GIVEN TIME, THERE BETWEEN FIVE AND TEN, GENERALLY VISITING RESIDENTS.
GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: (#) AS RECEIVED. SERVICE ON REQUEST.

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01423 170925Z

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 126297

R 170927Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1036
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1423

EXDIS

NOFORN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TC
SUBJECT: ZAYID REPORTEDLY SEEKING 200 MILL DOLLAR LOAN
FOR ASSISTING SYRIA AND EGYPT

1. FEG#
MGR ABU DHABI (PROTECT) INFORMED CHARGE IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT PRIOR SHAIKH ZAYID'S RETURN OCT 15 FROM LONDON, HE APPROACHED MORGAN GRENDFELL MERCHANT BANK TO REQUEST 200 MILL DOLLAR LOAN FOR "FINANCING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES PROJECT IN ARAB WORLD". MORGAN HAS INTERPRETED THIS SWEEPING REQUEST TO MEAN ZAYID SEEKING BANK FINANCING URGENTLY TO COVER COSTS OF CONTRIBUTION HE INTENDS MAKE FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR DAMAGE IN EGYPT AND SYRIA, PRINICPALLY LATTER.

2. MORGAN GRENFELL APPARENTLY READY PROVIDE DOLS 100 MILL, BUT UNABLE FROM OWN RESOURCES TO HANDLE LOAN OF MAGNITUDE REQUESTED BY ZAYID. MORGAN, THEREFORE, HAS APPROACHED FNCB LONDON FOR ASSITANME IN RAISING OTHER KFE HUNDRED MILL DOLS. LOCAL MGR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FNCB HOME OFSICE, WHICH OF LATE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING ABU DHABI TO UTILIZE BANK'S LOAN FUNDS FOR FINANCING ITS MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, AGREEABLE IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATING WITH MORGAN IN LOAN PACKAGE PROVIDED FNCB ABLE ATTRACT SOME ADDITIONAL PAR CERS. FNCB WOULD LIKE PARTNERS PUT UP DOLS 50 MILL WITH FNCB'S DIRECT SHARE ALSO AMOUNTING TO DOLSMOTP MILL. MAJOR PROBLEM FOR FNCB IN

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/54 DOS ltr 2/26/02
RWS NARA, Date 4/2/02

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01423 170925Z

APPROVING LOAN REQUEST IS FACT FUNDS WOULD BE EARMARKED EITHER FOR UNSPECIFIED PROJECTS, OR CONCEIVABLY MIGHT BE DIVERTED TO MILITARY PURCHASES, WHICH CONTRARY TO FNCB'S LOAN POLICY. THEREFORE, BEFORE SUBMITTING LOAN TO SENIOR OFFICIALS FOR APPROVAL, HOME OFFICE HAS INSTRUCTED BANKS REGIONAL VP IN BAHRAIN (GRANT) TO TRAVEL ABU DHABI STHNEST#FOR MTG WITH ZAYID. GRANT REPORTEDLY WILL BE AUTHORIZED SOUND ZAYID OUT ON FEASIBILITY TIEING FNCB'S SHARE OF LOAN (I.E. 100 MILL DOLS) TO CERTAIN EXISTING OR PLANNED DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS WITHIN COUNTRY OR ABROAD, AS PART ABU DHABI'S ONGOING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, FOR WHICH ABU DHABI WAS PLANNING PAY CASHFOR NEGOTIATING LOANS THROUGH OTHER BANKS. MGR ESTIMATES THERE ARE ABOUT 600 MILL DOLS IN MAJOR PROJECTN OR EQUIPMENT PURCHASES FALLING IN THAT CATEGORY. IF LOAN COULD BE TIED SPECIFIC PROJECTS FOR WHICH THERE MAY BE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SOME SORT, FNCB WOULD FIND REQUEST EASIER TO APPROVE.

4. EMB INTENDS CLOSELY MONITOR THIS SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. ADDRESSEES REQUESTED EXERCISE UTMOST CAUTION IN NOT REVEALING SUBSTANCE THIS MESSAGE TO FNCB OR OTHER BANKING SOURCES.
GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: ABU DHABI 1423. #AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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'73 OCT 16 AM 8:34

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01419 151343Z

3

50
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 105824

R 151316Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1034
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ABU DHABI 1419

EXDIS
FROM QUINLAN MUSCAT

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MU AEMR
IQWBJ: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. ONLY INDICATION ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT OF WHICH EMBASSY AWARE WAS ALLEGED PLAN BY PALESTINIAN TEACHER TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATION PRIMARY AND MIDDLE-SCHOOL CHOLDREN, WHICH WAS VETOED IMMEDIATELY BY MINISTER EDUCATION. THE NINETY SOME AMERICAN CITIZENS OF MUSCAT CAPITAL AREA, INCLUDING 210 PCV'S, ARE CARRYING ON AS USUAL AND HAVE REPORTED NO INCIDENTS.

2. GOVERNMENT OMAN HAS OFFERED SEND MEDICAL TEAMS CAIRO AND DAMASCUS LEVIED 25 PERCENT TAX ON GOVERNMENT SALARIES TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT ARAB CAUSE, AND WE ANTICIPATE OMAN WILL FOLLOW ARAB PUBLIC POSITIONS GENERALLY. HOWEVER, IN VIEW RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER PALESTINIANS AND HISTORICAL LACK EMOTIONAL/POLITICAL AFFINITY BETWEEN OMANI'S AND MIDDLE EAST ARABS, BELIEVE THAT BOTH OMAN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC MAY BE REGARDED AS LEAST VOLATILE IN EASTERN ARABIA.

3. BRITISH EMBASSY, WHICH RESPONSIBLE AMCIT EVACUATION FROM OMAN, HAS RECENTLY UPDATED AN EXTENSIVE WARNING AND EVACUATION PLAN. WE WILL CONTINUE COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH BRITISH, BUT SEE

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/55 DOS Ltr 2/26/02
By KWS NARA, Date 4/2/02

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01419 151343Z

NO REASON AT THIS TIME RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL ACTION.

4. INTERNAL SECURITY PLANSHAVE BEEN REVIEWED. VAULT AREA NOW PREPARED AS SAFE HAVEN FOR ALL AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS. ALL BUT TEN PERCENT CLASSIFIED FILES (HALF-HOUR DESTRUCTION TIME) HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.
GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER STANDING INSTRUCTIONS S/S-O.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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'73 OCT 11 PM 1:30

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 DHAHRA 00802 110725Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W

071451

O 110730Z OCT 73
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3569
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ DHAHRAN 0802

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, SA
SUBJ: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. THE CONSULATE GENERAL HAS RECEIVED NO REPORTS OF DISTURBANCES IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE. WE ARE AWARE OF NO THREATS OR ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST AMCITS. WE HAVE NOT BEEN INFORMED BY SAG OR OTHER SOURCES
OF ANY IMMINENT DANGER TO THE SECURITY OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY. THE ARAMCO LABOR FORCE HAS NOT MADE ANY VISIBLE INDICATIONS OF UNREST. STUDENTS AT THE COLLEGE OF PETROLEUM AND MINERALS SEEM TO BE ATTENDING CLASSES ON A NORMAL BASIS. HOWEVER, IF IT APPEARS THAT THE USG IS PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH SIGNIFICANT MILITARY SUPPLIES, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE A DEMONSTRATION BY CPM STUDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CONSULATE GENERAL, AS

OCCURRED DURING THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAEL WAR.

2. DHAHRAN RECOMMENDS NO ADDITIONAL ACTIONS REGARDING E & E PLANNING AT PRESENT.
MARTIN

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/56 DOS ltr. 2/26/02
By KWS NARA, Date 4/2/02

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 542

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01405 110844Z

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W

O 110600Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1027
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1405

EXDIS

FROM CHARGE HOWELL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, TC
SUBJ: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. REFTEL REQUESTS ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY SITUATIONS RE AMERICAN CITIZENS AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN RE E&E PLANNING.

2. AS OF 0500Z, LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION HAS NOT RPT NOT DETERIORATED SUBSTANTIALLY AS REGARDS AMCITS. CANNOT DISCOUNT APPEARANCE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM, WHICH ALREADY LATENT, ON PART INDIVIDUALS OR EVEN SMALL GROUPS, BUT GENERAL POPULATION FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY WITH SOME SATISFACTION AT APPARENT SUCCESSES OF ARAB FORCES. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED ONE TELEPHONE BOMB THREAT WHICH IS PROBABLY TO BE EXPECTED. LOCAL AUTHORITIES RESPONDED QUICKLY TO STRENGTHEN GUARD ON CHANCERY AND RESIDENCES AND MAIN PROBLEM NOW IS TO DEVISE MEANS BY WHICH RESIDENTS EMBASSY BUILDING CAN PASS GUARDS TO ENTER OWN APARTMENTS. STILL BELIEVE WE CAN RELY ON BEST EFFORTS LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHOULD SITUATION DETERIORATE. ALSO FEEL ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WILL MANIFEST ITSELF AGAINST CHANCERY AND/OR EMBASSY PERSONNEL BEFORE IT AFFECTS AMCITS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT 11 PM 1:23
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NLNS 01-23/57 DOS ltr 2/26/02
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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01405 110844Z

2. MUST STATE, HOWEVER, THAT LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS OF NEXT FEW DAYS WILL, IN MY VIEW, DEPEND AS MUCH ON ACTIONS OF USG AS ON SITUATION ALONG FRONT LINES. IN THIS REGARD, CAN FORESEE DETERIORATION OF LOCAL SITUATION IF (A) SIXTH FLEET MOVES INTO EASTERN MEDITERRANTAN (CONTRARY TO LATEST OFFICIAL REPORTS WE HAVE, HERALD TRIBUNE REPORTS UNITS HAVE MOVED TO CRETE; (B) USG ADOPTS CONDEMNATORY OR BLATANTLY PRO-ISRAELI POLITICAL POSTURE IN UN OR ELSEWHERE OF (C) USG ENGAGES IN RESUPPLY OF ISRAELIS WHILE WAR CONTINUES.

3. LIKEWISE SUBSTANTIAL REVERSES FOR ARABS ON BATTLEFIELD, PARTICULARLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH (C) ABOVE COULD QUICKLY CREATE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION LOCALLY. IT ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT FRAGILE FABRIC OF CIVILIZATION TENDING TOWARD IMMUNITY OF NON-COMBATANTS HAS ALREADY BEEN SUNDERED IN THIS WAR. WHILE CONCEDING THAT ISRAELIS HAVE UNCOUBTEDLY ALSO TAKEN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, MOST PUBLICIZED INCIDENTS OF CIVILIAN FATALITIES ARE THOSE IN DAMASCUS AND HOMS FAR BEHIND FRONT. AT SAME TIME USG CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS BRING FIGHTING TO END AND ESTABLISH BASIS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION, WOULD HOPE WE COULD CLEARLY DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WHEREWITHALL TO DO SO. WITH EMOTIONS IN ARAB WORLD RUNNING HIGH, AM CONVINCED NOTHING WOULD ENDANGER AMCITS SO MUCH AS ARAB CONVICTION US IN COLLUSION WITH ISRAELIS IN ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS.

4. RE ADDITIONAL MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN FOR E&E PLANNING, REQUEST DAPT. KEEP THIS AND OTHER POSTS FULLY INFORMED DEVELOPMENTS AND/OR INTENTIONS UNDER POINTS (A), (B), AND (C), PARA 2. WE NOT RECEIVING TIMELY SITREPS AND THEREFORE RELYING ON BBC. THIS WILL ALLOW ME AT LEAST SOME LEAD TIME IN ASSESSING LOCAL E&E MEASURES WHICH SHOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT. WISH EMPHASIZE LOCAL ARAB POPULATION REACTS RATHER THAN ACTS IN PRESENT CRISIS AND EMBASSY ROLE SHOULD BE TO REACT SOMEWHAT QUICKER THAN LOCAL POPULATION. THIS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH STEADY FLOW OF ACCURATE INFO.

5. ALSO REQUEST DEPT. DESIGNATE, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY, SAFEHAVEN FOR AMCITS IN UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. WISH EMPHSIZE THIS REQUEST NOT RPT NOT PROMPTED BY LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS OR ANTICIPATION OF EVACUATION. INDEED, BECAUSE CRISIS COULD BE DRAWN OUT AND FACT THAT MANY AMCITS IN

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01405 110844Z

AREA OVERSEAS FOR FIRST TIME AND THEREFORE MORE EXCITABLE THAN VETERANS, HAVE NOT RPT NOT ISSUED WARNING TO STANDFAST. NEVERTHELESS, WITH MEAGRE ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES AT MY DISPOSAL, AM CONVINCED I MUST MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE PREPARATION IN ADVANCE FOR ALL EVENTUALITIES.
HOWELL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OCT 11 PM 1:25

2

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00661 110910Z

21 11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

CCO-00 /026 W
---------- 072209

O 110846Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0915
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0661
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : AEMR, BA
SUBJECT : SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF : SATE 201367

1. SITUATION REMAINS CALM. LOCAL POPULATION KEENLY INTERESTED IN PROGRESS OF WAR; BUT NO SIGNS OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT EVIDENT.

2. WE EXPECT AT LEAST 12 HOURS ADVANCE NOTICE OF ANY DEMONSTRATION. WE WILL DEFER OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH GOBIYE INCREASED PROTECTION FOR US INSTALLATIONS UNTIL SITUATION WARRANTS.

3. WE HAVE NOTED SLIGHT INCREASE IN CALLS AND VISITS TO EMB BY AMCITS (INCL TRANSIENTS) ASKING FOR INFO ON MID-EAST AND LOCAL SITUATION. AMERICAN COMMUNITY RELAXED, FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY.
STARRETT

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER SSO-MR.SARROS

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NLNS 01-23/58 DOS ltr 2-26-02
By KWB NARA, Date 4-1-02

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TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
7:29 28 PM 3:57

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01349 280537Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
085905

R 280400Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0996
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1349

EXDIS

KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/59 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KWB NARA, Date 4-1-02

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, TC, MU
SUBJ: ABU DHABI DEFENSE FORCE (ADDF) TROOPS FOR OMAN

REF: ABU DHABI 1271

1. BRITISH EMBOFF PRIDHAM (PROTECT) PRIVIDED SEPT. 27 ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF ADDF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FOR OMAN. HE SAID BRITISH EMB. FULLY INFORMED OF PLANS SINCE ONE SECONDED U.K. OFFICER WILL ACCOMPANY FORCE AND HMG THEREFORE REQUIRED APPROVE HIS SERVICE OUTSIDE UAE TERRITORY.

2. TWO ADDF SQUADRONS OF SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 300 RPT 300 MEN WILL PROCEED TO SOHAR IN NORTHERN OMAN, PROBABLY WITHIN NEXT WEEK. THEY WILL RELIEVE THE OMAN GENDARMERIE CURRENTLY IN NORTH FOR SERVICE IN DHOFAR. ADDF COMMITMENT IS THEORETICALLY FOR THREE RPT THREE MONTHS AND PRIDHAM SAID SHEIKH FAISAL AL-QASSIMI, ABU DHABI UNDERSEC OF DEFENSE, TOLD BRITISH EMBASSY THAT NO ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR BRITISH OFFICERS FORESEEN. UNDERSEC WAS NOT RPT NOT ASKED WHETHER THREE-MONTH PERIOD MIGHT BE EXTENDED BUT

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01349 2805372

BRITISH EMBASSY SEEMS FEEL THIS NOT LIKELY SINCE IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL FOR ADDF TO REMAIN ONLY MILITARY FORCE IN NORTHERN OMAN ON MORE THAN A TEMPORARY BASIS.

4. ON RELATED SUBJECT OF SALADINS FOR OMAN, PRIDHAM SAID OMANI UNDERSEC DEFENSE HAD ASKED FOR SALADINS FROM ABU DHABI GOVT., BUT ABU DHABI MINYDEF REPLIED THAT IT UNABLE SUPPLY SALADINS. SHEIKH KHALIFA, MINDEF, DID HOWEVER AGREE PLACE ADDF WORKSHOPS AND SPARES AT DISPOSAL OMAN FOR MAINTENANCE OF SALADINS. OMANI REQUEST FOR SALADINS WAS MADE AT SAME TIME AS REQUEST FOR ADDF FORCES.
HOWELL

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~~SECRET~~ 573

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01298 190834Z

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
---------- 001795

R 190750Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0962
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBSSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USCINCEUR
SEC DEF WASHDC
DA WASHDC

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1298

EXDIS

SECDEF FOR ISA AND DSAA

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, US, TC
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YAR

REF: SANAA 1833

1. REFTEL ARRIVED SHORTLY AFTER SEPT. 17 MEETING WITH MFA UNDERSEC GHUBASH, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM LONDON. GHUBASH SAID HE HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE GET FORMIN AND ZAYID FOCUS ON ISSUE PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE BUT FELT ZAYID'S ATTITUDE REMAINS "POSITIVE" TO FINANCING.

2. GHUBASH SAID HE STILL WORKING ON MATTER AND WILL CONFER WITH HABBROUSH WHO SLATED GO TO LONDON SEPT 20 FOR CONSULTATIONS AND SEEK SET UP MANNER IN WHICH HABBROUSH CAN LET HIM KNOW WHEN ZAYID'S APPROVAL OBTAINED.

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01298 190834Z

3. UNDERSTAND FROM GHUBASH ALSO THAT ZAYID HAD SOME PRIVATE CONTACTS WITH YAR REPS WHILE AT NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN ALGIERS. LATEST WORD IS THAT ZAYID DUE BACK IN ABU DHABI O/A SEPTEMBER 20 RPT 20.

4. AS ASIDE, TIMING OF DELIVERIES NOT A MATTER IN WHICH THIS EMBASSY DIRECTLY INVOLVED, BUT BELIEVE TIME MAY COME WHEN ZAYID WILL WANT TO KNOW WHY EMBASSY WAS SO PERSISTANT ON QUESTION INVOLVING DELIVERIES UP TO YEAR AND ONE-HALF FROM NOW. RESPONSE WILL BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY APPARENT FACT THAT ONLY USG, AND NOT YAR, PUSHING HARD FOR HIS COMMITMENT.
HOWELL

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SEP 13 PM 12:32

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

~~SECRET~~ 662

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01271 130718Z

16
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISC-00 /026 W
---------- 079895

R 130403Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0949
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1271

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NLNS 01-23/61 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By ____ NARA, Date 4-1-02

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, TC, MU
SUBJ: ABU DHABI DEFENSE FORCE (ADDF) TROOPS FOR OMAN

KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT

REF: LONDON 9490; LONDON 10273

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FIRST INDICATION LOCALLY OF DISPATCH OF ADDF UNITS TO OMAN IN NEAR FUTURE. RELIABLE AMERICAN IN DUBAI REPORTS THAT HE RECENTLY INFORMED BY ADDF OFFICER ENCOUNTERED IN KOR FAKKAN (ON UAE EAST COAST) THAT 300 RPT 300 TROOPS FROM ADDF SLATED FOR SERVICE IN NORTHERN PART OMAN. ADDF FORCES READY RE-

LEASE OMANI TROOPS FOR TRANSFER TO DHOFAR.

2. WHEN SOURCE MENTIONED CONVERSATION TO BRITISH SECOND SECRETARY STATIONED DUBAI, INFO WAS CONFIRMED. THERE WAS NO RPT NO INDICATION OF TIMING FOR INTRODUCTION THESE UNITS INTO OMAN.

3. COMMENT: FACT THAT DISPATCH ADDF TROOPS NOW BEING

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01271 130718Z

DISCUSSED LOCALLY MAKES IT ONLY MATTER OF TIME BEFORE OPERATION BECOMES PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ADDF TROOPS HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN NORTHERN EMIRATES SINCE JUNE 1972 AS RESIDUE OF FORCE SENT KEEP PEACE BETWEEN TRIBESMEN FROM SHARJAH AND FUJAIRA. SINCE PLANS FOR MOVEMENT TO OMAN KNOWN TO SOME OFFICERS AT LEAST IN THIS REGION, IT HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT PORTION THESE DETACHED FORCES TAPPED FOR OMAN ASSIGNMENT AND THAT OPERATIONAL ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED.

HOWELL

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43 SEP 4 PM 12:24

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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2/3

~~SECRET~~ 175

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01236 040903Z

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 040845Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0929
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1236

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NLNS 01-23/62 DOS ltr 2/26/02
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EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF FOR ISA, DSAA, AND DA, AND USCINCEUR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, TC
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YAR

REF: ABU DHABI 1216; ABU DHABI 1224

1. HAD OPPORTUNITY TALK BRIEFLY SEPT 4 WITH MINSTATE HABROUSH WHO MORE OR LESS HOLDING FORT IN ABU DHABI. HABROUSH SAID HE AND SHEIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYID, CROWN PRINCE AND ABU DHABI PM AND MINDEF, FAMILIAR WITH MATTER. BROUGHT HABROUSH UP TO DATE ON CONTACTS AND SAID USG WAITING FOR ZAYID'S APPROVAL OF FUNDING. ASKED IF THERE WAY OBTAIN APPROVAL PRIOR ZAYID'S RETURN FROM LONDON LATER THIS MONTH.

2. HABROUSH SAID HE THOUGHT THIS POSSIBLE. ZAYID HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE FOCUS ON MATTER IN TWO DAYS PRIOR

HIS SEPT 1 DEPARTURE BECAUSE SHEIKH RASHID OF DUBAI AND SHEIKH SULTAN OF SHARJAH HAD BEEN IN ABU DHABI FOR

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01236 040903Z

CONSULTATIONS. PRESUME THEY DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, RECENT SERIOUS FLARE-UP ALONG DUBAI/SHARJAH BORDER.

3. HABROUSH UNDERTOOK SEEK ZAYID'S RESPONSE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MATTER BEING CLOSELY HELD AND, IF NECESSARY, WILL TALK WITH ZAYID IN LONDON WHEN HABROUSH TRAVELS THERE FOR CONSULTATIONS IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

4. STILL NO WORD RE RETURN OF YAR AMB.
HOWELL

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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'73 AUG 32 PM 2:35

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01224 010943Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
117646

O R 010927Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO /SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0920
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1224

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, US, IC
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YAR

DEPT PASS SECDEF OSD ISA, DSAA, AND DA AND USCINCEUR

REF: ABU DHABI 1216

1. REGRET ZAYID AND SUWAIDI DEPARTED 0645Z SEPT 1 WITHOUT RPT WITHOUT PROVIDING APPROVAL FUND ARMS. BOTH HAD BEEN INCOMMUNICADO SINCE MY MEETING WITH SUWAIDI AUG 30. I PHONED UNDERSEC GHUBASH EARLY MORN SEPT 1 TO SOLICIT RESPONSE AND DISCOVERED HE HAD NOT RPT NOT SEEN SUWAIDI SINCE AUG 30 EITHER. GHUBASH UNDERTOOK ATTEMPT OBTAIN RESPONSE FOR ME DURING AIRPORT MOB SCENE ATTENDING DEPARTURE OF ZAYID AND PARTY, BUT WAS UNABLE DO SO.

2. PRIMARY HOPE NOW IS THAT GHUBASH, WHO TRAVELLING WITH ZAYID AND AWARE EMBASSY INTEREST IN TIMELY APPROVAL, WILL MANAGE RELAY MESSAGE TO ME HERE. THERE ALSO POSSIBILITY, THOUGH I CONSIDER IT SLIM, THAT HABROUSH BRIEFED

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NLNS 01-23/63 DOS ltr 2/26/02
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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01224 010943Z

ON ZAYID'S VIEWS AND I INTEND TO SEE HABROUSH ASAP TO ESTABLISH CONTACT RE THIS QUESTION PER SUWAIDI'S INSTRUCTIONS. WILL ADVISE.

3. APPARENTLY YAR ARB QUBATI STILL WINDING HIS WAY BACK TO ABU DHABI. HE WAS NOT PRESENT AT AIRPORT FOR ZAYID'S DEPARTURE.
HOWELL

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01219 011200Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 010500Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0914
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
X AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0018
USINT CAIRO
USINT ALGIERS

'73 SEP 2 AM 11:54
118382
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1219 SECTION 1 OF 2

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, ENRG, TC, US
SUBJ: US/UAE RELATIONS AND UAE OIL POLICY

REF: A. ABU DHABI 1196; B. BEIRUT 10224

SUMMARY: SPENT VERY CORDIAL HOUR AND HALF MORN AUG 30 DISCUSSING VARIETY OF SUBJECTS (REPORTED SEPARATELY) WITH FORMIN SUWAIDI AND UNDERSEC GHUBASH, BOTH OF WHOM DEPARTING SEPT 1 FOR SERIES VISITS AND ALGIERS NON-ALIGNED CONF. SUWAIDI WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EXPRESS UAEG CONVICTION THAT CONTINUED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH US ESSENTIAL AND GHUBASH VOLUNTEERED CLARIFICATION OF ZAYID INTERVIEW RE ALLEGED THREAT CUT OFF OIL TO US. TOTAL EFFECT OF BOTH PRESENTATIONS WAS TO REASSURE USG OF UAEG DETERMINATION STRENGTHEN RATHER THAN DISRUPT FRIENDSHIP WITH US. END SUMMARY.

1. FINALLY MANAGED SEE FORMIN SUWAIDI 0930 LOCAL AFTER HAVING SOUGHT APPT FOR SEVERAL DAYS. HE APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY AND SAID HE HAD BEEN OUT OF TOWN, PRESUMABLY MAKING PREPARATIONS WITH ZAYID FOR VISITS TO QATAR AND BAHRAIN;

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NLNS 01-23/64 DOS ltr 2/26/02
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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01219 011200Z

ALGIERS NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT; ARAB LEAGUE FORMINS MTG. IN CAIRO; ZAYID'S VISIT TO U.K.; AND UNGA SESSION. MFA BEEHIVE OF ACTIVITY AS FINAL ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE, AND I HAD EXPECTED HAVE ONLY FEW MOMENTS WITH TWO KEY OFFICIALS.

2. SUWAIDI SEEMED IN VERY GOOD MOOD AND SAID HE WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY FOR TALK. I TOLD HIM I HAD SEVERAL MATTERS WHICH I FELT IT IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE (SPECIFIC TOPICS REPORTED IN SEPTELS). CENTRAL THEME OF ENTIRE CONVERSATION WAS IMPORTANCE UAEG ATTACHES TO CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH US. SUWAIDI DID NOT RPT NOT MENTION ZAYID'S ALLEGED THREAT TO CUT OFF OIL SHIPMENTS IF OTHER ARAB PRODUCERS DECIDED TO DO SO, NOR DID I BROACH SUBJECT. HE ZAD, HOWEVER, EMPHASIZE HOPE OF UAEG THAT FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH US, WHICH HE SAID VITALLY IMPORTANT, WILL CONTINUE GROW STRONGER.

3. ACCORDING SUWAIDI, US IS MAJOR POWER IN WHICH UAEG HAS TRUST AND UAEG WANTS USG TO BE QUOTE AT TOP OF LIST OF ITS FRIENDS END QUOTE. HE SAID HE FELT UAE AND US INTERESTS IN STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GULF REGION ESSENTIALLY COINDIDENTAL. CONCLUDING, HE REMARKED THAT UAE NEEDS CONTINUED US FRIENDSHIP AND FRIENDLY ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPMENT. I THANKED SUWAIDI FOR HIS REMARKS AND ASSURED HIM USG RECONIZES MUTUALITY OF BENEFITS FROM CLOSE RELATIONS AND SHARES UAEG DESIRE FOR DEEP AND ABIDING FREINDSHIP. SUWAIDI AGREED VIGOROUSLY THAT AMONG FRIENDS THERE NEED FOR FREQUENT AND FRANK EXCHANGES OF VIEWS AND ROOM FOR OCCASIONAL DIFFERENCES ON APPROACH SO LONG AS COMMON BONDS AND INTERESTS EXIST ON ESSENTIALS.

4. SUBSEQUENTLY SAW GHUBASH TO COVER DETAILS OF SEVERAL TOPICS. WHEN REVIEW CONCLUDED, GHUBASH SAID HE WISHED CLARIFY STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED IN PRESS TO SHEIKH ZAYID. GHUBASH SAID HE WAS PRESENT AT ZAYID INTERVIEW WITH LEBANESE JOURNALIST (SUWAIDI WAS OUT OF COUNTRY AT THE TIME) AND ZAYID'S INTENT HAD BEEN QUOTE BADLY TILTED END QUOTE IN PUBLISHED PRESS REPORTS. ACCORDING GHUBASH, THERE WAS LANGUAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER BETWEEN ZAYID AND JOURNALIST AND THIS, COUPLED WITH EFFORT TO MAKE GOOD STORY BETTER, HAD RESULTED IN DISTORTION OF ZAYID'S VIEWS.

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01219 011200Z

5. GHUBASH SAID ZAYID EXPRESSED TWO MAJOR IDEAS: (A) OIL-RICH ARAB STATES SHOULD ASSIST THOSE WITHOUT OIL REVENUES, BUT HELP SHOULD NOT BE RANDOM OR HAPHAZARD. ARAB STATES SHOULD GET TOGETHER TO ESTABLISH CHANNELS FOR ALLOCATION OF FUNDS ON RATIONAL BASIS. (B) OIL CAN SERVE AS IMPORTANT MEANS OF PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING OF ARAB, AND SPECIFICALLY UAE, POLICY. RE ENERGY CRISIS, GHUBASH SAID THAT ZAYID EXPLAINED THAT, AS ARAB AND MUSLIM, IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TAKE UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION AND, AS FAR AS US CONCERNED, UAEG DOES NOT RPT NOT DEMAND THAT US BECOME ANTI-ISRAELI. UAE SEEKS NEURTAL US POLICY TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE AND GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF ARAB FEELINGS AND VIEWPOINTS.

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01219 011238Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 118629

R 010500Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0197
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USINT CAIRO
USINT ALGIERS

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1219 FINAL SECTION OF 2

EXDIS

6. GHUBASH SAID HE INTERRUPTED, AS REPORTED PARA 1 REFTEL B, TO COUNSEL ZAYID THAT INCRVIEWER MIGHT CONSTRUE WHAT ZAYID HAD SAID AS THREAT TO HALT OIL SHIPMENTS TO US. JOURNALIST THEN ASKED WHAT ZAYID WOULD DO IF ARAB STATES TOOK UNANIMOUS DECISION TO BAN OIL FOR US MARKET? GHUBASH SAID ZAYID ANSWERED THIS PROVOCATIVE QUESTION BY SAYING THAT, AS ARAB AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO FOLLOW SUIT.

7. GHUDESH ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS CLARIFICATION TO DEPT. HE SAID HE FELT ZAYID HAD BEEN HAD BY INTERVIEWER, BUT ADMITTED HE HAD NOT HAD CHANCE DISCUSS QUESTION WITH ZAYID SINCE APPEARANCE OF PRESS REPORTS. SAID I APPRECIATED HIS AMPLIFICATION OF INTERVIEW AND WOULD, OF COURSE, RELAY IT TO WASHINGTON. I ADDED THAT I HAD NOT YET SEEN ORIGINAL INTERVIEW BUT HAD NATURALLY DRAWN ATTENTION OF DEPT TO ITEM WHICH APPEARED IN HERALD-TRIBUNE IN LOW KEY MANNER PENDING CLARIFICATION.

8. COMMENT: HAD IMPRESSION FOLLOWING TALK WITH SUWAIDI AND PRIOR SEEING GHUBASH THAT SUWAIDI ATTEMPTING FORESTALL ANY

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01219 011238Z

DAMAGE TO US/UAE RELATIONS WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM ALLEGED ZAYID THREAT WITHOUT, HOWEVER, BRINGING SUBJECT INTO OPEN. SUWAIDI HAS SPENT LAST SEVERAL DAYS IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ZAYID AND NEWS OF MY REQUEST FOR APPT REACHED HIM WHILE HE STILL IN ZAYID'S COMPANY. WHETHER IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT IN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS RAISE SUBJECT OR NOT, WE SHALL PROBABLY NEVER KNOW, BUT ASSUME ZAYID AND SUWAIDI PROBABLY CONSIDERED HOW BEST DEAL WITH POSSIBILITY USG REACTION. HAVE ALSO RECENTLY HEARD RADIO ACCOUNTS OF INTERVIEW BY SAME LEBANESE MAGAZINE WITH KING FAISAL IN SAUDI ARABIA IN WHICH FAISAL REPORTEDLY CRITICAL OF THOSE WHO URGE USE OF OIL ITSELF RATHER THAN OIL REVENUES IN SUPPORT OF ARAB CAUSE. ZAYID COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THIS KIND OF CRITICISM OF POSITION HE ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN.

9. IN FACT, IT OUT OF CHARACTER FOR ZAYID AND UAEG TO GET OUT IN FRONT ON SO SENSITIVE AN ISSUE. ZAYID UNDOUBTEDLY SOUGHT IN INTERVIEW PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST ATTACKS ON HIS DEDICATION TO ARABISM, BUT PROBABLY DID NOT EXPECT TO FIND HIMSELF WIDELY QUOTED AS PRIMARY ARCHITECT OF OIL BOYCOTT. HAVING MADE WHAT HE REGARDS AS PROPER NOISES, THERE EVIDENCE ZAYID DOES NOT RPT NOT ENVISAGE HAVING PROMISE PUT TO REAL TEST. GHUBASH CONFIDED THAT, WHILE HYPOCRISY IS TOO STRONG A WORD, UAEG DOES NOT EXPECT ARAB STATES TO MEET CRITERION UNANIMOUS, BINDING POLICY DECISION AND HE IMPLIED THAT THIS IN PART BECAUSE UAE AMONG OTHERS, WOULD WORK IN INTER-ARAB COUNCILS TO PREVENT DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENSUS WHICH UAE WOULD HAVE TO ENDORSE.

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TELEGRAM

'73 AUG 30 PM 12:43

~~SECRET~~ 258

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

3

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01216 301012Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 094513

O R 3009257 AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0912
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
LY DTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0221
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1216

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: SMASS, YE, US, TC
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YAR

DEPT PASS SECDEF FOR ISA, DSAA, AND DA AND USCINCEUR

REF: A. STATE 169859
B. ABU DHABI 1208

1. SAW FORMIN SUWAIDI AT 0930 LOCAL (0530Z) AUG 30 TO PROVIDE COST FIGURE PARA 12, REF A. EXPLAINED THIS COST INCLUSIVE OF TRANSPORTATION. SUWAIDI REPLIED CHARGE AWARE HIS RESERVATIONS RE SUCH TRANSACTIONS BUT UNDERTOOK SEEK PRESENT FIGURE TO SHEIKH ZAYID EVENING AUG 30 AND HOPEFULLY RECEIVE VERBAL AGREEMENT FOR FUNDING BEFORE DEPARTURE ZAYID AND SUWAIDI SEPT ONE.

2. RESPONDED THAT I AWARE SUWAIDI'S VIEW AND REITERATED THAT USG INTEREST IN FACILITATWON COMMUNICATION BETWEEN UAEG/ADG AND YARG. SAID THAT, WHILE ASSISTANCE FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT AND ALLEVIATION POVERTY COMMENDABLE AND, IN ABSOLURT SENSE, MAY BE PREFERRABLE TO ARMS, REALITY IS THAT

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01216 301012Z

YARG FINDS ITSELF IN WEAK SECURITY SITUATION IN FACE OF THREAT FROM SOUTH. THEREFORE, STABILIZATION OF SECURITY POSITION PRE-REQUISITE OF EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT. SUWAIDI DID NOT DIS-AGREE BUT STATED THAT, IN MATTERS SUCH AS THIS, ZAYID IS HIS OWN POLICY-MAKER AND WILL DOUBTLESS APPROVE EXPENDITURE.

3. NOTING THAT BOTH ZAYID AND SUWAIDI DEPARTING SEPT 1. FOR EXTENDED PERIODS, INQUIRED AS TO WHO MY CONTACT POINT SHOULD BE ON THIS SUBJECT. ALSO MENTIONED, I UNDERSTOOD AMB QUBATI RETURNING TO ABU DHABI IN NEAR FUTURE AND HE WILL ALSO NEED TO KNOW WHO TO SEE. SUWAIDI SAID IN HIS ABSENCE, I SHOULD TALK WITH MOHAMMED HABROUSH, MINSTATE, WHO WOULD BE BRIEFED IN GENERAL ON SUBJECT OF ARMS FOR YAR. SUWAIDI ADDED THAT UNDERSEC GHUBASH, WHO ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH SUBJECT, COULD ALSO BE HELPFUL WHEN HE RETURNS IN MID-SEPTEMBER.
HOWELL

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD, USCINCEUR.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 AUG 29 PM 3:14 WH

~~SECRET~~ 507

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01208 290845Z

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2/3

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 081474

R 290815Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0907
AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/66 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KWB NARA, Date 4/1/02

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1208

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF FOR ISA, DSAA, AND DA AND USCINCEUR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, US, TC
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YAR

REF: A. STATE 169859; B. SANAA 1669

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING BUT HAVE THUSFAR BEEN UNABLE SEE EITHER FORMIN OR RULER BOTH OF WHOM HAVE BEEN OUT OF TOWN SINCE I REQUESTED APPT UPON RECEIPT REFTEL A. WAS TOLD AWAIT CALL FOR APPT WITH SUWAIDI LATE EVENING AUG 28, BUT INFORMED MORN AUG 29 THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT RETURN AS ANTICIPATED. FIRM APPT NOW SET FOR 0930 LOCAL AUG 30 RPT 30. IN ABSENCE OTHERS FAMILIAR OR EVEN AWARE THIS SUBJECT, MUST WAIT UNTIL THAT TIME.

2. AM HOPEFUL FORMIN CAN DISCUSS PRICE FIGURE CONTAINED REFTEL A WITH ZAYID IMMEDIATELY AND PROVIDE RULER'S APPROVAL BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. WILL PUSH FOR RESPONSE AND ALSO SEEK DESIGNATION POINT OF CONTACT THIS SUBJECT IN ABSENCE RULER AND FORMIN. THIS NECESSARY NOT ONLY

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01208 290845Z

FOR EMBASSY BUT FOR YAR AMB QUBATI. WELCOME NEWS THAT QUBATI FULLY IN PICTURE AND HOPEFULLY, ONCE WE HAVE RULER'S COMMITMENT TO FUND ARMS, PRINCIPALS CAN CARRY THE BALL.
HOWELL

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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73 AUG 23 AM 8:14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01174 230652Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 028686

R 220903Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBSSY ABU DHABI
TO AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0884
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USMTM

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1174

EXDIS

DHAHRAN PASS USMTM

EO 11652:, GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, TC, JO
SUBJ: ABU DHABI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR YEMENI ARMS PURCHASES

REF: A. ABU DHABI 1166
B. SANAA 1595 (NOTAL)

REFTEL A RESPONSIVE QUERIES CONTAINED IN REFTEL B. AGREE UAE AMB SUWAIDI NOT ADEQUATE CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS AND AM SOMEWHAT PUZZLED THAT YARG HAS APPARENTLY NOT RPT NOT SOUGHT ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACT THROUGH ITS AMB IN ABU DHABI. INDEED, IT SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT MAINTAIN SENSE OF URGENCY AMONG GOVT HERE WITH TIME LAGS. HAVING FIRMLY PLANTED IDEA OF

ON-SITE VISIT BY ABU DHABI REP, HOWEVER, WE RISK DEEPER INVOLVEMENT IN THIS TRANSACTION THAN INTENDED IF WE PUSH TOO HARD. BELIEVE MOST EFFECTIVE STIMULUS AVAILABLE FOR NOW IS EARLY SUBMISSION PRITE TAG.
HOWELL

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'73 AUG 21 AM 8:09

~~SECRET~~ 876

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01166 200835Z

2

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 128639

R 200741Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0878
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1166

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS,US, YE, SA, JO, TC
SUBJ: ABU DHABI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR YEMENI ARMS PURCHASES

REFS: A. ABU DHABI 1089
B. SANAA 1453
C. SANAA 1514 (NOTAL)
D. STATE 159482 (NOTAL
E. JIDDA 3450
F. ABU DHABI 1147
G. AMMAN 4408 (NOTAL)

1. AS REPORTED REFTEL A, UAE PRES SHEIKH ZAYID STILL EXPECTING EMBASSY PROVIDE HIM WITH COST FIGURE FOR ARMS DELIVERED YAR FROM US. SPOKE AGAIN AUG 18 WITH UAE MFA UNDER SEC GHUBASH (FM SUWAIDI OUT OF COUNTRY UNTIL APPROX AUG 25) AND GHUBASH CONFIRMED THAT LIST PROVIDED BY YARG (REFTEL B), WHICH I HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN GHUBASH, HAD BEEN SHOWN TO ZAYID. THIS MUST HAVE OCCURRED DURING PERIOD OF KHAMMASH VISIT REPORTED REFTEL G, BUT DETAILS OF KHAMMASH TALKS BEING HELD VERY CLOSELY HERE.

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01166 200835Z

2. GHUBASH SAID ZAYID HAD NO RPT NO DIFFICULTY WITH YARG SHOPPING LIST BUT HAD REPEATED THAT HE AWWITING PRICE TAG FROM USG BEFORE GIVING GO AHEAD ON ADG FINANCING. I TOLD GHUBASH THAT I HAD NOT YET RECEIVED FIRM FIGURE BUT WOULD PASS IT ALONG IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT. NOTING PRESS REPORTS RE VISIT OF SHEIKH FAISAL AL-QASSIMI, ABU DHABI DEP MINDEF, TO JORDAN, I INQUIRED WHETHER HE MIGHT CONTINUE ON TO YAR. WHILE NOT EXCLUDING POSSIBILITY, GHUBASH SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION ZAYID MIGHT NOT RPT NOT WISH INVOLVE MINYDEF AND WOULD PROBABLY PAY BILL FROM HIS PERSONAL PRIVY PURSE. GHUBASH SAID, AS FAR AS HE AWARE, THERE STILL NO RPT NO DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN YARG AND ADG ON THIS MATTER.

3. IN VIEW ZAYID'S PLANS DEPART ABU DHABI O/Q SEPT 1 (REFTEL F), HOPE DEPT CAN PROVIDE ME WITH TOTAL COST REQUESTED REFTEL A IN NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. NOTE FROM REFTELS C AND E, THERE SOME DISAGREEMENT RE TOTAL PRICE, BUT IF WE HOPE HAVE ZAYID FOCUS ON ISSUE AND PROVIDE TIMELY RESPONSE RE WILLINGNESS FUND THIS AMOUNT, BELIEVE I MUST HAVE PRICE OF COMPLETE PACKAGE BEFORE HE BECOMES ENMESHED IN PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE.

4. FOR SANAA AND AMMAN: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO RE ACTIVITIES SHEIKH FAISAL, WHO WE UNDERSTAND PRIMARILY ENGAGED WITH SALADIN DEAL, AND/OR OTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN YARG AND ADG ON THIS QUESTION.
HOWELL

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'73 AUG 6 AM 6:3

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01101 070849Z

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 022981

R 070830Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0825
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1101

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS JO YE US TC
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS ASSISTANCE FOR YEMEN

REF: AMMAN 4138

RE PARA 2 REFTEL, HAVE LEARNED THAT KHAMMASH AND ANOTHER AS YET UNIDENTIFIED VIP DESCRIBED AS QUOTE MINISTER END QUOTE ARRIVED ABU DHABI APPROX 0100 AUGUST 6 VIA REGULAR ALIA FLIGHT. SINCE AUG 6 ALSO ANNIVERSARY ACCESSION SHEIKH ZAYID, IT POSSIBLE SERIOUS CONTACTS WILL BE DELAYED UNTIL AUG 7.
HOWELL

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 01089 021820Z

50/51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 122349

O P 021255Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0816
AMMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0132
AMEMBASSY SANAA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN PRIORITY

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 DOS ltr 2-26-02
NLNS 01-23/70 pt. 3.4(b)(6)
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~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1089

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT--PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5)

DHAHRAN FOR USMTM

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, TC
SUBJ: ABU DHABI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR YEMENI ARMS PURCHASES

REF: ABU DHABI 1088

SUMMARY: UAE PRES SHAIKH ZAYID HAS TOLD CHARGE EXPLICITLY THAT HE WILLING TO PAY FOR EMERGENCY SMALL ARMS SHIPMENTS FROM USG AND GOJ TO YARG. ZAYID HAS REQUESTED PRICE OF TOTAL PACKAGE FROM USG SOONEST. HE RESPONSIVE TO CHARGE'S SUGGESTION THAT SPECIAL EMISSARY BE DESPATCHED SOONEST TO SANAA AND AMMAN TO NEGOTIATE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS ABU DHABI UNDER SEC MINY DEF SHAIKH FAISAL WILL BE SELECTED FOR THIS MISSION. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPT PROVIDE EMB WITH PRICE OF ENTIRE YEMEN ARM'S PACKAGE SOONEST FOR PASSING TO SHAIKH ZAYID.

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29

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01089 021820Z

1. CALLED ON SHAIKH ZAYID EVENING AUG 1 AT HIS ABU DHABI SEA PALACE. TOLD PRES THAT BEFORE LAVING ON HL I HAD VERY SENSITIVE SUBJECT ABOUT WHICH I INSTRUCTED TO REPORT TO DEPT AND ONLY HE COULD PROVIDE ANSWER WE SEEKING. THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN FOR HIM QUESTION OF EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YEMEN. FOLLOWING POINTS CONTAINED IN VARIOUS DEPT, AMMAN AND SANAA CABLES PAST TWO WEEKS CONVEYED TO ZAYID:

A. FROM REPORTS REACHING OUR EMB SANAA SITUATION ON YARG'S SOUTHERN BORDER CRITICAL AND APPARENTLY DETERIORATING:

B. YEMEN ARMY WOEFULLY WEAK AND LACKING EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION. RECOUNTED FOR ZAYID RESULTS OF RECENT SURVEY BY JORDANIAN OFFICERS WHO CONCLUDED IN FACE DETERMINED MIL ATTACK YAR ARMY LIKELY CRUMBLE IN 48 HRS. THAT SEEMED TO SHAKE HIM;

C. PRES IRYANI AND PRIMIN HAJIRI HAD MADE MOST URGENT APPEALS TO USG, GOJ, SAG AND OTHER FRIENDS FOR MIL ASSISTANCE; USG HAD MADE IMMEDIATE POLICY LEVEL DECISION HELP SUPPLY NEEDED ITEMS EQUIPMENT AND AMMO, BUT EXPLAINED OUR LAWS AND REGS PROHIBIT GRANT. ALL ITEMS SUPPLIED YARG DIRECTLY, AND TO BE RESUPPLIED JORDAN, MUST BE COVERED BY CASH PAYMENTS;

D. OUR AMBASSADORS AMMAN AND SANAA INFORMED BY KING HUSSAIN AND PRES IRYANI RESPECTIVELY THAT IT THEIR UNDERSTANDING ABU DHABI GOVT WILLING PAY FOR SHIPMENT EMERGENCY SMALL ARMS TO YEMEN;

E. GOJ CONSIDERING DESPATCH OF MIL TEAM ASSIST YAR AND MAY UNDERTAKE TRAINING YEMENI OFFICERS AND NCOS IN JORDAN;

F. US-SUPPLIED ARMS WOULD BE AIR-LIFTED TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THEN TRANSFERRED TO RSAF PLANES FOR DELIVERY TO SANAA;

G. RE ARMS JORDAN TRANSFERRING TO YEMEN FOR WHICH REPLACEMENTS REQUIRED FROM USG, WE THINK BEST ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE FOR ADG TO PAY JORDAN SO KING HUSSEIN CAN AVOID EMBARRASSMENT OF ASKING FOR MONEY FROM ARAB COUNTRY LESS WELL-OFF THAN HIS OWN;

H. USG DOES NOT INTEND GET INVOLVED IN DETAILS OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN ADG ON ONE HAND AND YEMEN AND JORDAN ON OTHER. ONLY REASON EMB APPROACHING HIM WAS USG MUST BE ASSURED BEFORE IT SHIPS WEAPONS EITHER TO YEMEN OR JORDAN THAT PAYMENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

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29

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01089 021820Z

2. ZAYID LISTENED ATTENTIVELY (MAINLY I BELIEVE, TO DECIPHER MY ARABIC CONSTRUCTIONS) AND ASKED NUMBER OF CLARIFYING QUESTIONS:
A. HOW MUCH WOULD SMALL ARMS AND AMMO COST? REPLIED THAT JORDANIAN TRANCHE IN RANGE DOLS 460-485,000. SAID WE UNDERSTOOD KING DONATING NON-US TYPE ITEMS BUT JAA REQUIRED REPLACEMENT OTHER ITEMS FROM USG TO YARG, TOTAL FIGURE WILL DEPEND ON SIZE YAR SHOPPING LIST, WHICH SANAA REPORTS WILL BE HANDED OVER ANY DAY. ZAYID HAS ASKED THAT EMB OFF HOWELL AS ACTING CHARGE PASS TOTAL BILL TO HIM SOONEST VIA FM SUWAIDI.
B. WHAT ARE SAUDIS DOING TO HELP? REPLIED THAT I NOT PRIVY TO ALL INFO THIS SUBJECT, BUT IT MY IMPRESSION SAUDIS HAVE MADE SOME LONGER TERM COMMITMENTS HELP YAR MILITARILY. DID KNOW THAT YAR NONE TOO HAPPY WITH SAUDI PERFORMANCE. [redacted]

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3. AFTER DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT, I ASKED ZAYID POINT-BLANK WHAT COULD I REPORT TO WASH RE ADG'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY. ZAYID NODDED HEAD SAYING QUOTE I WILL PAY UNQUOTE. LATER BEFORE LEAVING MAJLIS, I ASKED PRES AGAIN IF I COULD REPORT TO DEPT, SANAA AND AMMAN THAT QUOTE EVERYTHING CONFIRMED UNQUOTE. HE REPLIED I COULD. ZAYID APPEARED VERY PLEASED USG PREPARED HELP YAR STRENGTHEN ITS MIL DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST THREAT FROM PDRY.

4. AFTER ZAYID CONFIRMED COMMITMENT, TOLD HIM I HAD DISCUSSED DETAILS OF ARMS SHIPMENTS WITH FM SUWAIDI AND UNDER SEC GHUBASH SUGGESTING THAT BEST WAY TO REDUCE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS AND FINALIZE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED RE DETAILS OF FINANCING AGREEMENT WOULD BE FOR ADG REP, PREFERABLY MILITARY MAN, TO VISIT SANAA AND AMMAN SOONEST. ZAYID AGREED ENTIRELY. BELIEVE WORD MAY HAVE TRICKLED DOWN SINCE UNDER SEC GHUBASH ARRIVED TO SEE UNDER SEC AD MINDEF SHAIKH FAISAL AUG 2 AS I WAS LEAVING. TOGETHER, WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED MATTER AND FAISAL, WHO SAID HE PLANNING VISIT AMMAN NEXT WEEK RE SALADIN PURCHASE, (REFTEL), STATED HE MIGHT BROADEN TRIP NOW TO INCLUDE YEMEN.

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29

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PAGE 04 ABU DH 01089 021820Z

5. HOPEFULLY EVERYTHING NOW SEEMS BE ON RIGHT TRACK WITH RESPECT AD FINANCIAL COMMITMENT; ZAYID HAS GIVEN EXPLICIT VERBAL COMMITMENT TO USG. ONLY POINT YET NEEDING CLARIFICATION IS TOTAL PRICE OF PACKAGE. WOULD RECOMMEND NO SHIPMENTS COMMENCE UNTIL EMB HAS PASSED ZAYID PRICE FIGURE AND HE TELLS US AMOUNT ACCEPTABLE. IN MEANTIME, BALL NOW IN COURT PARITES CONCERNED TO IMPROVE THEIR PERSONAL COMMUNICATION. YEMENI AMB QUBATI LEAVING AUG 7 FOR SANAA AND ADG REP, LIKELY SHAIKH FAISAL, WILL DEPART ABOUT SAME TIME FOR AMMAN, AND HOPEFULLY SANAA. WOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO RECOMMEND THAT GOJ SEND RANKING OFFICIAL HERE TO BRIEF ZAYID FULLY ON GOJ'S ROLE IN ASSISTING YEMEN.

6. FOR SANAA AND AMMAN: IF DEPT CONCURS, REQUEST YOU PASS SUBSTANCE THIS TEL TO PRES IRYANI AND KING HUSSAIN.
GRIFFIN

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0632/01/0 70

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 233

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01088 01 OF 02 021353Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W
---------- 120076

P 021135Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E~~T SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 1088

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OASS, YE, US, SA, JO, TTH
SUBJ: ABU DHABI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR YEMEN ARMS PURCHASES

REF: A. STATE 150182
B. SANAA 1430
C. SANAA 1429
D. ABU DHABI 1059
E. STATE 148978

1. CHARGE AND EMB OFFICER HOWELL MET WITH FOR MIN SUWAIDI JULY 31 TO PASS TO HIM COST DATA CONTAINED REFTEL E. TOOK THAT OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN FOR HIM UNIT COST FIGURES FOR WEAPONS AND AMMO (STATE 143868), WHICH YARG HAS ASKED USG AND JORDAN TO PROVIDE. THIS INFO HAD BEEN PASSED SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER BUT BOTH SUWAIDI AND UNDER SECRETARY GHUBASH MYSTIFIED BY USG STOCK ORDERING TERMINOLOGY.

2. BECAUSE OF INTERRUPTED SUPREME COUNCIL MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT VISIT OF BAHRAIN FOR MIN, SUWAIDI SAID HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DISCUSS YEMENI ARMS QUESTION WITH

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NLN3 01.23/71 DOS ltr 2-26-02
NARA, Date 4-1-02

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25

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01088 01 OF 02 021353Z

SHAIKH ZAYID. HE HOPED TO DO SO EVENING OF THE 31ST, BUT GHUBASH ADVISED AUG 1 THAT DISCUSSION HAS NOT YET TAKDU PLACE.

3. SUWAIDI USED OCCASION OF EMB OFFICER'S VISIT TO RECONFIRM WHAT HE TOLD ME JULY 25, NAMELY, THAT HE UN-INFORMED ABOUT ANY EXPLICIT COMMITMENT GIVEN BY ADG TO YEMEN FOR FINANCING EMERGENCY SHIPMENTS OF SMALL ARMS. MOREOVER, SUWAIDI EXPLICIT IN STATING HE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO PROVIDING ANY MILITARY-TYPE ASSISTANCE TO EITHER YEMEN OR OMAN. HE ACCEPTED FACT THAT COMMITMENT MAY HAVE BEEN MADE BY SHAIKH ZAYID OR MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY. IF COMMITMENT MADE, HE SAID, THERE NO QUESTION THAT IT WILL BE HONORED. AS BEDOUIN LEADER, ZAYID IS MAN OF HIS WORD IN SUCH MATTERS.

4. SUWAIDI SPENT WELL OVER QUARTER HOUR EXPLAINING WHAT HE CONSIDERED DISADVANTAGES OF UAE UNDERTAKING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. FOR NEW STATE LIKE UAE, LACKING IN EXPERIENCE AND PERSONNEL AND WITH SO MANY ORGANIZA-TIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ITS OWN, IT FAR BETTER TO CHANNEL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO POORER NEIGH-BORS IN FORM THAT WILL BE MOST BENEFICIAL TO PEOPLE. DESCRIBING BOTH YEMEN AND OMAN AS UNBELIEVABLY BACKWARD AND POOR, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES FACED WITH MILITARY THREAT FROM RADICAL HDRY, HOWEVER, STRUGGLE, HE STRESSED, IS AS MUCH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AS IT IS MILITARY. HE DOUBTED WHETHER GUERRILLA FORAYS INTO OMANI AND YEMENI BORDER AREAS FROM ADEN WILL EVER BE CON-TAINED UNTIL SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS MADE IN IMPROVING WELFARE OF PEOPLE IN THOSE REGIONS. ANOTHER REASON SUWAIDI OPPOSED TO UAE OR ABU DHABI FINANCING MILI-TARY HARDWARE IS CHANCE IT MAY LEAD TO INVOLVEMENT IN BIG POWER POLITICS. HAD FEELING HE REGARDED MY COOING TO SEE HIM RE ADG WILLINGNESS TO FINANCE ARMS IN THAT LIGHT. FINALLY, SUWAIDI SAID THAT AS BIG POWER USG, ESPECIALLY, HAS LEARNED MILITARY ASSISTANCE BECOMES BOT-TOMLESS PIT WITH OBJECTIVES OF SPENDER SELDOM ACHIEVED AND APPETITE OF RECIPIENT FOR MORE COSTLY HARDWARE ALWAYS INCREASING. SUWAIDI SAID THAT HE COULD FORESEE SITUATIONS, PERHAPS NOW OR IN FUTURE, WHERE YEMEN OR

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01088 01 OF 02 021353Z

OMAN MIGHT SEEK UAE'S HELP IN ACQUIRING CERTAIN WEAPONS ABROAD TO MEET THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCIES. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF THREATS OF SUCH A NATURE THAT SECURITY INTERESTS OF LOWER GULF AREA ALSO THREATENED, THEN UAE/ ABU DHABI SHOULD RESPOND PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY, BUT HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT ASSISTANCE BE EXTENDED AS OUTRIGHT GRANT OF FUNDS TO BE SPENT AS RECIPIENT PREFERS, I.E. NOT TIED TO EQUIPMENT PURCHASES FROM PARTICULAR COUNTRY.

5. IN ONE OF MOST SERIOUS MOODS I HAVE EVER SEEN FOR MIN, HE INFORMED EMB OFFICERS THAT VIEW HE HAD JUST PRO- POUNDED DID NOT REPRESENT HIM ALONE, BUT WAS FEELING OF MOST GOVT OFFICIALS AND YOUNGER GENERATION IN UAE. FROM TENOR OF SUWAIDI'S REMARKS, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE, EVEN IF HE CONVINCED ZAYID HAS GIVEN COMMITMENT WHICH HE OBLIGED FULFILL, THAT FOR MIN WILL GO ON RECORD VOICING HIS OPPOSITION TO MIL AID FOR YEMEN.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 249

2

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01088 02 OF 02 021226Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W
---------- 119338

P 021135Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0815
INFO AMEMBSSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 ABU DHABI 1088

EXDIS

6. ALTHOUGH SUWAIDI REAFFIRMED HE KNOWS NOTHING OF CMM-
MITMENT FOR FUNDING EMERGENCY SHIPMENTS SMALL ARMS TO YEMEN,
HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ADG HAS AGREED TO PURCHASE FROM
JORDAN 30 SALADIN ARMORED CARS FOR YEMEN. FIGURE 30
SALADINS, NOT 40 AS REPORTED FROM AMMAN, QUOTED BOTH BY
SUWAIDI AND JORDANIAN CHARGE SINAWWI. LATTER CONFIRMED INFO
REPORTED FEW WEEKS BACK BY AMMAN THAT OFFICIAL OF AD MINY
DEF INVITED BY GOJ TO VISIT JORDAN FOR FIRST HAND INSPECTION
OF ARMORED CARS AND BUYING. INVITATION EXTENDED SOME
WEEKS AGO BY OUTGOING AMB SHUMAYLEH. CHARGE NOW
TRYING TIE DOWN DETAILS RE WHO WILL BE GOING
AND TIMING. IT APPEARS UNDER SEC AD MINY DEF, SHAIKH
FAISAL, WILL BE SELECTED.

7. IN MEETING JULY 31 WITH SUWAIDI AND AUG 1
WITH MFA UNDER SEC GHUBASH, I AGAIN STRESSED NECESSITY
OF UAE OR ADG SENDING TRUSTED AND CAPABLE REP TO SANAA AND
OMAN TO DISCUSS FINANCING OF ARMS AS SOON AS IT CON-
FIRMED THAT ZAYID WILLING TO PAY. GHUBASH AGREES FULLY
THAT PROMPT DESPATCH OF EMMISARY IS ONLY WAY TO SORT
OUT MYRIAD OF DETAILS, AND HE HAS SO RECOMMENDED TO
SUWAIDI. RE SELECTION OF OFFICIAL GHUBASH BELIEVES IT

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01088 02 OF 02 021226Z

BEST FOR MILITARY MAN TO GO, WHO WILL UNDERSTAND NATURE OF MILITARY THREAT, CONDITION OF YAR ARMY, AND CA= PABILITY AND NOMENCLATURE OF WEAPONS REQUESTED. LOGICAL CHOICE, HE THOUGHT, WAS SHAIKH FAISAL, WHO EDUCATED AND HAS OVER 10 YEARS MILITARY EXPERIENCE.

8. GHUBASH CONFIRMED WHAT EMB HAS CONCLUDED IN RECENT MEETINGS, NAMELY, THAT NOTHING OF ANY SUBSTANCE RE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN UAE AND YEMEN IS CONDUCTED THROUGH UAE AMB SUWAIDI. GHUBASH COMMENTED UAE AMB IN SANAA IS INEFFECTIVE AND WAS CHOSEN STRICTLY FOR TRIBAL POLITICAL REASONS. EXTENT AND SENSITIVITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES NOW REQUIRE MORE CAPABLE ENVOY, AND GHUBASH CONFIDED THAT HE SERIOUSLY THINKING OF RECOMMENDING AMB SUWAIDI BE REPLACED.

9. ON JULY 31 ALSO CALLED ON YAMANI AMB QUBATI WHOSE FRIENDLY NATURE MAKES HIM ONE OF MORE RESPECTED COLLEAGUES IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. BRIEFED HIM GENERALLY ON REPORTS RECEIVED RECENTLY FROM SANAA AND ASKED WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT ADG FINANCING COMMITMENT. QUBATI CONFIRMED INFO REFTEL B THAT ZAYID HAD PROMISED TO ASSIST IN MEETING YEMEN'S NEEDS. ACCORDING QUBATI, THIS STATEMENT MADE IN TERMS DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN BORDER AREA. QUBATI CONFIRMED THAT HE WILL BE RETURNING SANAA FOR TWO WEEKS CONSULTATION AUG 7. FROM DISCUSSION WITH YEMEN AMB, IT MY IMPRESSION THAT HE IS IN THE PICTURE IN GENERAL SORT OF WAY, BUT HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS LATELY. INFORMED AMB THAT I HAD PROPOSED UAEG OR ADG SEND SPECIAL REP TO WORK OUT DETAILS OF FINANCIAL COMMITMENT, AND HE AGREED THIS WOULD BE GOOD IDEA. QUBATI RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO SUGGESTION OUR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT THIS SUBJECT.

10. REGRET RUSH IN LEAVING POST DID NOT PERMIT DRAFTING OF SUMMARY AS REQUIRED.
GRIFFIN

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26

10/10/2690

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 479

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/72 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01062 310712Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- ------ 096441

R 310625Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0807
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1062

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR

DHAHRAN FOR CHUSMTM

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, IR, SA, JO, US, TC
SUBJ: MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN

AT SOCIAL FUNCTION JULY 30, ASKED COUNSELOR BRIT EMB (PRIDHAM) IF HE AWARE OF ANY CONTACTS UNDERWAY BETWEEN ADG AND YARG RE FINANCING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT PURCHASES. PRIDHAM REPLIED THAT UK MANUFACTURER OF SKYVAN MINI-CARGO PLANES RECENTLY REQUESTED TO FURNISH PRICE QUOTATION TO UNDER SEC FAISAL AL-QASIMI, ABU DHABI MINY DEFENSE, FOR TWO SUCH AIRCRAFT. DURING NEGOTIATIONS, COMPANY RAN INTO SOME DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING WHETHER ADG WANTED BUY SPECIAL CONFIGURATION OR REGULAR MODEL OF SKYVAN, WHICH APPARENTLY EXCELLENT PLANE FOR HAULING LIMITED CARGOS INTO AND OUT OF PLACES HAVING SMALL OR UNIMPROVED LANDING STRIPS. PRIDHAM SAID MINY DEF FINALLY SETTLED ON REGULAR VERSION AND PLACED ORDER FOR TWO AIRCRAFT, WHICH COMPANY EVENTUALLY INFORMED WERE TO BE DELIVERED TO YARG.

GRIFFIN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 221

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01059 301131Z 2

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 088835

O P 301020Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0803
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/73 DOS ltr. 2/26/02
By KMD NARA, Date 4-1-02

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1059 SECTION 1 OF 2

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE,SA, JO, TC
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS SHIPMENT TO YAR

REFS: A. STATE 146708
B. STATE /.143871
C. STATE 143868
D. SANAA 1329
E. SANAA 1299
F. SANAA 1296
G. DEPT 138643
H. AMCEN 3854
I. AMMAN 3776

SUMMARY
CHARGE HAS BRIEFED FOR MIN SUWAIDI FULLY ON PLANNING UNDERWAY FOR EMERGENCY SUPPLY OF ARMS TO YAR BY USG AND GOJ ON UNDERSTANDING THAT ABU DHABI WILL FOOT BILL. SUWAIDI SEEMED TO BE UNINFORMED ON ANY SPECIFIC AD COM-MITMENT ASSIST YARHTITH FUNDING OF MIL HARDWARE, ALTHOUGH HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE VAGUE UNDERSTANDING RE ASSISTAFFCE FOR MIL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN BORDER AREA. SUWAIDI

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01059 301131Z

INDICATED THAT SHAIKH ZAYID HIMSELF MAY HAVE GIVEN COMMITMENT DIRECTLY EITHER TO PRES IRYANI OR PM AL-HIJIRI AND FM HAS PROMISED DISCUSS WITH ZAYID AND REPORT BACK TO EMB SOONEST IN VIEW URGENCY OF MATTER. TO OVERCOME COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM, CHARGE SUGGESTED FM DESPATCH SPECIAL EMISSARY TO SANAA AND POSSIBLY TO AMMAN OXO DISCUSS YARG'S ARMS NEEDS AND DETAILS OF FINANCING. BELIEVE IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL FOR GOJ TO SEND RANKING OFFICIAL TO AD SOONEST TO BRIEF ADG ON JORDAN'S ROLE IN SUPPLY EFFORT. EMB PASSING PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA TO SUWAIDI JULY 30. DURING EARLIER DISCUSSION FM ASKED FOR COST OF TOTAL PACKAGE AS SOON AS IT IS KNOWN. IF ZAYID AGREEABLE IN PRINCIPLE TO FUNDING ARMS FOR YARG, DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO HIM WHETHER YAR OR GOJ RECEIVES PAYMENT FOR JORDANIAN TRANCHE.

1. IN VIEW CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF ADG WILLINGNESS PAY TO EFFORTS YARG ACQUIRE EMERGENCY SUPPLY SMALL ARMS AND AMMO FROM USG AND GOJ, PRIOR RECEIPT REFTEL, I MET FOR MIN SUWAIDI JULY 25 FOR FRANK DISCUSSION OF ARMS SUBJECT. TOLD HIM I UNAWARE WHAT HE MIGHT KNOW ABOUT PLANNING UNDERWAY, BUT I THOUGHT TIME HAD COME FOR USG TO PUT HIM AND SHAIKH ZAYID IN THE PICTURE. BESIDES BEING FOR MIN, SUWAIDI HOLDS EQUALLY KEY JOB IN STRICT ABU DHABI CONTEXT, OF MINISTER FOR EMIRI COURT AFFAIRS, WHICH MAKES HIM PRIVY TO MANY DECISIONS OF SHAIKH ZAYID RE DISTRIBUTION ABROAD OF SHAIKHDOM'S LARGESSE.

2. DRAWING ON REFTELS AND SEVERAL OTHER CABLE REPORTS FROM SANAA AND AMMAN, I BRIEFED SUWAIDI THOROUGHLY ON ARMS AID FOR YARG MUCH ALONG LINES OF PARA 1&3 JIDDA 3081, STRESSING THAT IS IS UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH YARG AND GOJ, AS CONVEYED TO USG, THAT ABU DHABI IS PREPARED TO PAY FOR EMERGENCY TRANSFER OF ARMS FROM JORDAN AND REMAINING ITEMS TO BE PURCHASED BY YARG FROM USG. INFORMED SUWAIDI THAT WHILE USG HAD TAKEN PROMPT DECISION IN RESPONSE YARG'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, USG WOULD NOT BE FINANCING ITEMS TO BE FURNISHED BY GOJ FROM ITS STOCKS OR TO BE SHIPPED FROM OUR OWN SUPPLY DEPOTS VIA SAUDI ARABIA. WE ANXIOUS DO WHAT WE CAN HELP OUR FRIENDS IN PENINSULA MEET COMMUNIST THREAT, BUT IT CONSISTENT WITH OUR CURRENT POLICY THAT ANY ASSISTANCE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 01059 301131Z

BE HANDLED ON A REGIONAL BASIS WITH YAR'S AFFLUENT NEIGHBORS BEARING FINANCIAL COSTS. AS FOR ITEMS JORDAN SUPPLYING TO YARG, POINTED OUT TO SUWAIDI THAT SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN FURNISHED BY USG UNDER MAP OR FMS ROUTE, TO MEET GOJ'S LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS, THEREFORE, WE COULD APPROVE THEIR TRANSFER ONLY IF REPLACEMENT WAS MADE ON FMS CASH BASIS. MOREOVER, EMPHASIZED THAT IT ALSO AN UNDER-STANDING THAT ALL FINANCIAL DEALINGS BETWEEN UAE AND BOTH YARG AND GOJ SHOULD BE ON DIRECT BASIS. USG ONLY WISHES CONFIRM UAE'S WILLINGNESS PAY BEFORE WE APPROVE SIGNED LETTERS OF OFFER.

3. WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE FROM MY CONVERSATION EXACTLY HOW MUCH SUWAIDI KNOWS EITHER ABOUT BACKGROUND ABU DHABI COMMIT-MENT BUY EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YARG, OR LTEST PLANNING BETWEEN YARG, ON ONE HAND AND SAG, GOJ AND USG ON OTHER. FM IS MASTER, HOWEVER, OF KEEPING OWN VIEWS OR KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT TO HIMSELFJ HE REACTED WITH SOME SURPRISE WHEN I MENTIONED YEMENI AND JORDANIAN PLANS PREDICATED ON AD PICKING UP THE BILL. FOR MIN COMMENTED THAT ON OCCASION OF SHAIKH ZAYID'S TRIP TO YEMEN AND ON SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO UAE OF PRI MIN HIJIRI, AD HAD AGREED PROVIDE SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE TO YARG. HE SAID, AS USG AWARE AD PREFERS CHANNEL ANY HELP IT GIVES OMAN AND YEMEN INTO NON-MILITARY SPHERE WHERE IT CAN MOST DIRECTLY BENEFIT PEOPLE. SUWAIDI DID ACKNOWLEDGE, HOWEVER, THAT SOME INDEFINITE COMMITMENT MAY HAVE BEEN MADE TO YARG TO ASSIST WITH FINANCING OF CERTAIN MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS LIKE CON-STRUCTION OF ROADS, CANTONMENTS, OR OTHER FACILITIES IN BORDER AREAS TO FACILITATE DEFENSE. AS FOR AD PROMISES FINANCE DIRECT MILITARY PURCHASES, SUWAIDI WAS VAGUE MENTIONING AT ONE POINT POSSIBLY ZAYSD HAD MADE SUCH A COMMITMENT IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIJIRI OR IRYANI. HAVE SOME REASON TO BELIEVE UNDER SEC AD MINY DEFENSE, FAISAL AL-QASIMI, MAY BE LIAISON WITH GOJ AND YARG ON MATTER OF ARMS, BUT THIS NOT CONFIRMED

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 232

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01059 301145Z 2

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
088857

O P 301020Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0805
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBSSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBSSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1059 FINAL SECTION OF 2

EXDIS

4. SUWAIDI DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT ROUND OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN YARG AND ITS FRIENDS. THIS REGARD, I INFORMED FOR MIN THAT AMB CRAWFORD HAD DISCUSSED SUBJECT IN FULL DETAIL RECENTLY WITH UAE AMB SUWAIDI (SANAA 1296). EMB ASSUMED LATTER HAD PROVIDED MFA WITH REPORT DETAILING PROBLEM AND NECESSITY OF YARG'S FRIENDS TAKING RESOLUTE ACTION URGENTLY TO OVERCOME YARG MILITARY WEAKNESS. SUWAIDI SAID HE UNAWARE OF ANY RECENT REPORTING THIS SUBJECT BY UAE AMB, BUT CONCEDED REPORT MAY BE COMING VIA POUCH. FROM OTHER OFFICIALS IN MFA HAVE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT AMB SUWAIDI NOT CONSIDERED ONE OF UAE'S ABLEST, MOST RELIABLE ENVOYS, AND HE MAY BE DELINQUENT IN KEEPING MFA PROPER-
LY
INFORMED. ON OTHER HAND, THERE NO QUESTION UAE AMB IN SANAA MUST LABOR UNDER REAL HANDICAPS IN COMMUNICATING SENSITIVE MESSAGES TO MFA GIVEN A. UAEG INEXPERIENCE WITH CODE SYSTEMS, B. POOR TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SERVICE BETWEEN ABU DHABI AND SANAA, AND C. INFREQUENCY OF DIRECT FLIGHTS FROM GULF.

5. ALSO INQUIRED IF YARG AMB QUBATI HAD RAISED SUBJECT OF ARMS AID HERE. SUWAIDI REPLIED HE NOT AWARE OF ANY DUSCUSSION BUT LEFT IT OPEN THAT QUBATI MAY HAVE DEALT DIRECTLY WITH ZAYID. DESPITE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 01059 301145Z

INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO, IT NOT UNCOMMON FOR ZAYID TO KEEP SUWAIDI IN DARK ON SENSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY, AS MAY BE CASE HERE, WHEN ZAYID FEELS LINE HE PURSUING MAY RUN COUNTER TO HIS FM'S DECIDED ARAB NATIONALIST TENDENCIES.

6. STRESSING URGENCY OF DECISION RE FINANCING, I ASKED SUWAIDI DISCUSS THIS MATTER SOONEST WITH SHAIKH ZAYID AND REPORT BACK TO ME SO EMB COULD COMPLY WITH DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS. HE PROMISED DO SO. IN VIEW EVIDENT LACK OF CONTACTS BETWEEN UAE AND YARG ON THIS SUBJECT, SUGGESTED TGUSUWAIDI THAT HE CONSIDER SENDING SOONEST SPECIAL REP TO SANAA TO BE BRIEFED ON MILITARY SITUATION AND TO DISCUSS IN DEPTH FINANCING OF IMMEDIATE EQUIPMENT NEEDS. SAID REP'S MISSION COULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE STOP IN AMMAN TO DISCUSS FINANCING OF ITEMS GOJ SUPPLYING. SUWAIDI RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY SAYING DESPATCH OF TRUSTED AND COMPETENT AIDE WOULD SEEM TO BE BEST TACTIC TO ASSURE UAE READ INTO PICTURE COMPLETELY AND QUICKLY.

7. CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY REVIEWING FOR SUWAIDI KINDS OF MILITARY HARDWARE ITEMS YARG REQUESTING FROM USG AND GOJ. SAID I EXPECTED HAVE PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA MOMENTARILY. WAS ALREADY IN RECEIPT REFTEL C, BUT UNTIL SUBSEQUENT INSTRUCTION RECEIVED (REFTEL A) WAS UNCERTAIN THIS WAS P & A INFO I WAS SUPPOSED PASS TO UAEG. SINCE ITEMS INVOLVED WERE RELATIVELY MINOR, TOLD SUWAIDI WE DID NOT EXPECT TOTAL FINANCING BILL TO BE VERY EXPENSIVE, BUT FINAL PRICE TAG DEPENDED ON QUANTITIES YARG ORDERED AND COST FACTOR FOR CRATING AND TRANSPORTATION. SUWAIDI INTERESTED IN KNOWING TOTAL PROCUREMENT PRICE SOONEST. HE ASKED WHY THERE WOULD BE TRANSPORTATION CHARGE IF ITEMS SHIPPED VIA USAF AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA. REPLIED THAT WHILE COSTS APT BE CONSIDERABLY CHEAPER THAN MOVEMENT BY COMMERCIAL AIR, THERE IS EXPENSE INVOLVED IN HANDLING AND TRANSPORTING CARGO ON US MILITARY AIRCRAFT, WHICH IN THIS CASE, WE OBLIGED BY LAW PASS ALONG TO BUYER. ON BASIS REFTEL A, EMB WILL FURNISH SUWAIDI JULY 30 WITH COPY OF P&A DATA.

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23

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ABU DH 01059 301145Z

8. IF ZAYID AGREEABLE IN PRINCIPLE TO FUNDING URGENT ARMS NEEDS FOR YAR, DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD MAKE ANY PARTICULAR DIFFERENCE TO ADG IF FUNDS PAID TO GOJ OR YARG FOR HARDWARE FORMER IS SUPPLYING (REFTEL B).

9. IT IS IMPRESSION OF EMB THAT JORDANIAN CHARGE HERE, TAHIR SINAWWI,

COMPLETELY IN DARK ABOUT FINANCING ASPECT OF GOJ ROLE IN EMERGENCY ARMS AID FOR YARG. IF THIS THE CASE, EMB AMMAN MAY WISH SUGGEST TO KING OR CP ADVANTAGE OF DESPATCHING SPECIAL REP OF STATURE AMR KHAMMASH TO BRIEF ZAYID AND TO NEGOTIATE FINANCING. IT UNLIKELY THAT UAE EMB AMMAN WILL BE OF ANY HELP AS IT IN PROCESS OF BEING SET UP AND IS HEADED BY NON-ABU DHABIAN, AMB AL-QASIMI FROM SHARJAH. HAVE DOUBTS KING WILL WISH INVOLVE HIS CHARGE HERE VERY DEEPLY AS HE IS JUNIOR OFFICER OF PALESTINIAN ORIGIN.

10. EMB HAS NEVER BEEN VERY CLEAR ABOUT ORIGIN OF ABU DHABI FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO YARG FOR MIL EQUIPMENT. AS WE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ON DISTRIBUTION FOR EARLIER MESSAGES THIS SUBJECT, WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CLARIFICATION SANAA OR AMMAN CAN PROVIDE.

11. WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT NEXT DAY OR SO SEE SUWAIDI, WHO HAS BEEN TERRIBLY BUSY LAST WEEK WITH FEDERATION AFFAIRS, TO GET RUN DOWN ON HIS CONSULTATION WITH ZAYID. WOULD HOPE TO BE TOLD SOMETHING DEFINITE AND ENCOURAGING BEFORE I DEPART ON HL AUG 3. CAN NOT EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY THAT EMBASSY IS DEALING WITH GOVERNMENT NOT YET FULLY ORGANIZED, RELATIVELY INEFFICIENT, TOTALLY LACKING IN EXPERIENCE RE CONDUCT OF MUTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY DEPENDENT FOR ULTIMATE DECISION-MAKING ON ONE MAN SHAIKH ZAYID, WHO NOT

KNOWN FOR HIS DECISIVENESS. THEREFORE, BELIEVE ADDRESSEES CAN EXPECT CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DELAY IN OBTAINING CLEAR POLICY LINE FROM UAEG OR ADG ON QUESTION ARMS FOR YARGAP

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 366

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01015 230708Z

2

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
026774

R 230610Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0778
INFOHNUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0111
AMEMBSSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

'73 JUL 23 PM 3:07
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 1015

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, TC, JO
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: A. STATE 143868
B. STATE 143871
C. SANAA 1299
D. STATE 138643

1. REACTION PROPOSAL OUTLINED PARA 2 REFTEL B FORTHCOMING. EMBASSY COMPLETELY TIED UP PAST 48 HOURS WITH JAL HIJACKING.

2. FOR DEPT: PLS ADVISE IF PLANNING INFO CONTAINED REFTEL A CONSTIT-

UTES PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA MENTIONED PARA 3 REFTEL B.
GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/74 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 220

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00966 160503Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W

R 160425Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
SECSTATE WASHDC 0744

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0966

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IR, TC, US
SUBJ: INQUIRY RE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED US CHARGE IN ABU DHABI

REF: TEHRAN 4918

1. STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO CHARGE BY FM KHALATBARI CAT-

EGORICALLY UNTRUE. POSITIONS CHARGE ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE TO LINE EMB FOLLOWS IN DISCUSSIONS THESE SUBJECTS WITH CONTACTS, NAMELY:

A. WE HAVE WELCOMED ANY MATERIAL ASSISTANCE SHAIKH ZAYID ELECTS GIVE TO SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMA IN ORDER DISSUADE SAQR FROM SEEKING FINANCIAL HELP FROM STATES NOT WORKING IN BEST INTERESTS UAE, AND LESSEN RAS'S ISOLATION BY MAKING IT FEEL LIKE FULL-FLEDGED MEMBER OF UAE.

B. FROM ESTABLISHMENT OF UAE, USG REPS HAVE CONSISTENTLY STRESSED THAT IN OUR VIEW THERE NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE AT PRESENT TIME TO SHAIKH ZAYID AS PRESIDENT OF UAE.

2. CHARGE DOES NOT RECALL HAVING HAD ANY RECENT DISCUSSIONS EITHER IN ABU DHABI OR DUBAI IN WHICH STATEMENTS HE MADE MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED IN WAY MENTIONED IN IRANIAN REPORT.

3. DISCUSSED SUBJECT THOROUGHLY JULY 15 WITH IRANIAN

'73 JUL 16 AM 7:59
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
093120

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NARA, Date 4-1-02

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00966 160503Z

AMB BEHNAM, WHO DENIED REPORTING SUCH INFO. HE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE VAGUELY RECALLS HEARING OR READING SOMETHING SIMILAR, BUT COULD NOT IDENTIFY SOURCE. ASKED BEHNAM IF PERHAPS HIS CONSUL GENERAL IN DUBAI, FAROOJI, (WHO WELL CONNECTED WITH SHAIKH RASHID AND LOCAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY), OR SAVAK, MIGHT HAVE AUTHORED REPORT. BEHNAM CONSULTED HIS FILE OF REPORTS FROM FAROOJI, AND RE-READ ONE PARTICULAR REPORT SEVERAL TIMES. HE THEN COMMENTED TO ME THAT HE COULD FIND NO REFERENCE TO FAROOJI REPORTING SUCH INFO, BUT HE HINTED THAT IRANIAN CG MIGHT HAVE PASSED ALONG TO TEHRAN SOME UNSUBSTANTIATED RUMORS ABOUT POSITIONS AMERICAN CHARGE ALLEGEDLY TOOK IN CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS DUBAI CONTACTS. BEHNAM ALSO SUGGESTED THAT FAROOJI, WHOSE ARABIC IS NOT STRONG, MAY HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD SOMETHING SAID TO HIM BY ONE OF SHAIKHS OR MERCHANTS.
AS FOR SAVAK BEING SOURCE, BEHNAM SEEMED TO RULE IT OUT AS SAYING HE RECEIVES MOST OF THEIR MATERIAL AND DOES NOT RECALL ANY SUCH INFO ATTRIBUTED TO CHARGE.

4. BEHNAM SEEMED VERY UPSET OVER ERRONEOUS REPORTING, ESPECIALLY IF IT MIGHT HAVE ORIGINATED FROM ONE HIS SUBORDINATES. HE PROMISED SEND CABLE IMMEDIATELY TO FOREIGN MINISTER TO CLARIFY SITUATION.

5. COMMENT: AT LOSS TO EXPLAIN HOW SUCH STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO ME BY GOI SOURCE AS I HAVE HAD RELATIVELY FEW CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN EMB SINCE IT OPENED AND HAVE NEVER MET CG FAROOJI. GIVEN EXTREME SENSITIVITY BOTH THESE SUBJECTS, AND POTENTIAL HARM IT WOULD CAUSE EMB IF ALLEGED STATEMENTS REPORTED BACK TO ZAYID OR FM SUWAIDI, WOULD HOPE EMB TEHRAN WILL DO UTMOST SET RECORD STRAIGHT AT ONCE WITH GOI. WOULD BE INTERESTED LEARN FROM WHICH POST REPORT ORIGINATED. AS GENERAL OBSERVATION, IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT REPORTING ON DEVELOPMENTS THIS SIDE OF GULF, BOTH DIPL AND INTELL, TENDS BE VERY INACCURATE. SINCE IRANIAN INTENTIONS OFTEN SUSPECT, THEIR REPS FIND IT DIFFICULT DEVELOP RELIABLE INFO, OR TEST CREDIBILITY OF WHAT THEY DO LEARN. AMB BEHNAM MENTIONED FAROOJI TENDS REFER TO "AMERICAN CONSUL" IN HIS DESPATCHES, WHEN HE FULLY AWARE US HAS NO RESIDENT REP IN DUBAI.

6. RECOMMEND THAT CLASSIFICATION REFTEL BE RAISED SECRET/

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 00966 160503Z

EXDIS AND THAT ALL SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES THIS SUBJECT BE
SO TREATED.
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~~SECRET~~ 874

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00609 130728Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/26 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMT NARA, Date 4-1-02

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 049117

P R 121300Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0580
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 609

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR TC SA
SUBJ: OTAIBA-YAMANI MEETING

1. PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE ON TRIP TO U.S., I CALLED ON AD MINPET MANAI OTAIBA FOR RUNDOWN ON HIS TALKS APRIL 28-29 IN DAMMAM WITH YAMANI.

2. OTAIBA SAID MTG UAE AND SAUDI DELS BROKE NO NEW GROUND, BUT DISCUSSIONS MOST USEFUL AND SET STAGE FOR CONTINUING CONTACTS9 HE SUMMARIZED RESULTS AS FOLLOWS:
A. ATMOSPHERE EXTREMELY CORDIAL, AND HE CAME AWAY WITH IMPRESSION THAT, IF BOTH PARTIES WILLING COMPROMISE, SETTLEMENT BORDER DISPUTE COULD BE REACHED VERY SOON. OTAIBA CONFIDED PLEASURE AT HAVING OPPORTUNITY MEET LEGENDARY SAUDI PROTAGONIST ON BURAIMI ISSUE, AMIR TURKI UTISHAN IN DAMMAM. OTAIBA RESPONDED BY INVITING UTISHAN VISIT UAE.
B. ALTHOUGH NO NEW PROPOSALS TABLED, MTG DID GIVE UAE DEL OPPORTUNITY
CLARIFY TERRITORIAL COUNTER-PROPOSAL MADE BY SHAIKH ZAYID TO KING FAISAL IN 1971. OTAIBA SAID HE REITERATED ZAYID'S WILLINGNESS PROVIDE SAUDIS OUTLET TO SEA AT KHOR UDAID NEAR QATAR BORDER, AND TO CEDE CERTAIN OTHER TERRITORY IN SOUTH.

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00609 130728Z

FOR JOINT EXPLOITATION OF OIL IN DISPUTED RUB'AL KHALI AREA, OTAIBA RENEWED ZAYID'S PROPOSAL APPARENTLY FIRST PUT FORTH IN 1971 FOR NEUTRAL ZONE STRADDLING BORDER TO COMPRISE 20 KM TERRITORY DONATED BY ABU DHABI AND 10 KM TO BE CEDED BY SAG.
C. OTAIBA AND YAMANI AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT THIS SUBJECT, AND IT POSSIBLE THEY WILL MEET AGAIN SOON AFTER OTAIBA RETURNS FROM U.S.
D. CONTINUING CONTACTS WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN MINISTERS THEMSELVES AT THIS PRELIMINARY STAGE OF TALKS. BOTH RECOGNIZE DELEGATION APPROACH USELESS. IF BROAD AGREEMENT ON TERMS BORDER SETTLEMENT CAN BE WORKED OUT IN OTAIBA-YAMANI MEETINGS, THEN DELEGATIONS WOULD BE FORMED TO HAMMER OUT DETAILS OF FINAL AGREEMENT.

3. FROM TENOR OTAIBA'S REMARKS AND FROM WHAT WE HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES, TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF UAE DEL THAT ATTENDED DAMMAM MTG, INCLUDED STRICTLY FOR WINDOW DRESSING TO GIVE APPEARANCE OF UAE SOLIDARITY. NEITHER SEEMS TO HAVE PLAYED SIGNIF-ICANT ROLE AND, FROM REMARK TO CHARGE BY SHAIKH RASHID OF DUBAI, BOTH SUPPORTING MEMBERS REPORTEDLY WERE ANNOYED OVER FAILURE SHAIKH ZAYID TO BRIEF THEM ON RECENT BACK-GROUND OF DISPUTE TO ALLOW THEM VISIT AREAS INVOLVED IN ADVANCE OF MTG, OR INSTRUCT THEM ON LINE HE WANTED HIS DEL FOLLOW AT DAMMAM.

4. A. PURPOSE OTAIBA'S MTG WITH YAMANI ACTUALLY WAS TWO-FOLD, TO SOUND SAUDIS OUT ON BORDER PROBLEM, BUT ALSO TO PROPOSE CLOSER COORDINATION OF TWO STATES OIL POLICY ON INTN'L LEVEL. WHAT OTAIBA HAS IN MIND WOULD INVOLVE, FOR EXAMPLE, HARMONIZING IN ADVANCE, POLICY LINE OR APPROACH TWO STATES WOULD TAKE AT OPEC CONFERENCES. IN OTAIBA'S VIEW, TWO COUNTRIES HAVE TOO MUCH AT STAKE TO FIND THEMSELVES DIVERGING ON SUBJECT, WHICH SO VITAL THEIR EXISTENCE. MIN SEES GREATER COOPERATION ON OIL LEVEL AS ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IN DIRECTION OF GENERAL RAPPROACHMENT ON ALL OUT-STANDING PROBLEMS. OTAIBA ADMITTED TO CARRYING HIS PROPOSAL STEP FURTHER WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF ZAYID BY SUGGESTING TO YAMANI OVER-ALL FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION BETWEEN UAEG AND SAG TO PRESERVE STABILITY OF AREA. OTAIBA STRESSED THAT PENINSULA MUST BE CONSIDERED AS GEOGRAPHIC WHOLE, AND THREAT

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 00609 130728Z

TO ONE STATE BECOMES COMMON THREAT. IN TALKS WITH YAMANI OTAIBA DESCRIBED UAE AS "WINDOW" OF SAUDI ARABIA ON GULF. UNLESS UAE AND SA

WORK TOGETHER, RADICAL AND OTHER DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS (HE MENTIONED PALESTINIANS SPECIFICALLY) THREATEN TO ELIMINATE THIS "WINDOW", OR TO TURN IT INTO HOSTILE BASE.
B. OTAIBA REITERATED POINT HE MADE AT OUR LAST DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT, NAMELY, THAT UAEG DOES NOT EXPECT U.S. BECOME EMBROILED IN SPECIFICS OF DISPUTE, BUT PARTIES WOULD WELCOME FROM TIME TO TIME USG EXPRESSION OF GENUINE INTEREST IN THEIR EFFORTSEQEACEFULLY RECONCILE LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES.

5. OTAIBA CLOSED CONVERSATION BY OBSERVING THAT POINTS SET FORTH PARA 4 A AND B ABOVE WOULD FORM BASIS OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ON SUBJECT SAUDI-UAE RELATIONS TO ACTING SECRETARY AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS WHILE HE IN WASHINGTON.
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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00608 130849Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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R 121200Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0579
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 608

EXDIS

EO: 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS JO TC US
SUBJ: POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT OF GOJ AMBASSADOR; TRANSFER OF 106S TO ABU DHABI

REF: A. ABU DHABI 495
B. AMMAN 1629

1. JORDANIAN AMB SHUMAYLEH RETURNED UNEXPECTEDLY FROM AMMAN THIS PAST WEEK, DESPITE PERSISTENT RUMORS THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO RESUME HIS DUTIES HERE AND WOULD BE REPLACED SOON. SHUMAYLEH EXPLAINED HIS SEVERAL WEEK ABSENCE DUE TO REQUEST OF KING HUSSEIN THAT HE REMAIN FOR PERIOD IN AMMAN ON CONSULTATION. WHILE SHUMAYLEH SOMEWHAT VAGUE ABOUT HIS FUTURE, HE DID SAY KING HAS TOLD HIM HE CAN REMAIN AS LONG AS HE DESIRES, BUT APPARENTLY HE UNDECIDED IN VIEW OF CONTINUING SECURITY THREAT. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT SHUMAYLEH WENT TO AMMAN SHOPPING FOR MINISTERIAL JOB AND TO VERIFY REPORTS HE MAY BE REPLACED SOON. WHEN NO WORD FORTHCOMING FROM KING ON EITHER SCORE, HE ORDERED OR DECIDED HIMSELF RETURN TO ABU DHABI.

2. CALLED ON SHIMAYLEH TO INQUIRE STATUS OF

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00608 130849Z

106 RR TRANSACTION. TOLD SHUMAYLEH THAT I HAD HESITATED TO RAISE SUBJECT WITH HIS DEPUTY, WHOM I UNDERSTOOD WAS NOT PRIVY TO MUCH OF BACKGROUND. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED SOME DIRECT FMS REQUESTS FROM ADG, INCLUDING ONE FOR 106 AMMO, USG WOULD PREFER TIDY UP REMAINING ADMIN DETAILS CONNECTED WITH GOJ TRANSFER OF 106, BEFORE EMBARKING ON DIRECT FMS PROGRAM WITH UAEG AND OR ANY ITS CONSTITUENT EMIRATES. SPECIFICALLY ASKED SHUMAYLEH ABOUT STATUS DELIVERIES OF 106S TO ADDF AND THIRD PARTY COMMITMENT THAT AMB KHAMMASH HAS DISCUSSED WITH ADG.

A. RE DELIVERIES, AMB SAID 19 WEAPONS TRANSFERRED LEAVING BALANCE OF 12. HE AT LOSS TO EXPLAIN WHY REMAINDER NOT YET DELIVERED BY GOJ AND HE UNDERTOOK PROD AMMAN AGAIN. THUS FAR, ADG HAS NOT PRESSED HIM OR AMMAN ON DELAY IN COMPLETING TRANSACTION. ONLY NEW DEVELOPMENT WAS EFFORT BY US ABU DHABI MINDEF FAISAL AL-QASIMI TO EXTRACT FROM AMB PRICE TAG FOR TRANSFERRED 106S. AMB REITERATED TO FAISAL THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS MAKING OUTRIGHT GIFT OF 106S TO ABU DHABI AND COMPENSATION OUT OF QUESTION. (COMMENT: EMB SUSPECTS FAISAL WOULD PREFER PAY FOR 106S IN ORDER NOT BE BEHOLDEN TO GOJ. FAISAL PROBABLY REASONS THAT BY MAKING GIFT OF 106S, GOJ INTENDS CASH IN LATER WITH ADDITIONAL HEALTHY FINANCIAL REQUEST TO SHAIKH ZAYID).

B. SHUMAYLEH CONFIRMED THAT ADG HAS AGREED ORALLY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH KHAMMASH TO PROVIDE COMMITMENT REQUIRED BY USG. HE NOT CONCERNED THAT AGREEMENT NOT REDUCED TO PAPER YET, SINCE IT UNLIKELY ADG WOULD WISH SIGN COMMITMENT BEFORE RECEIVING ALL WEAPONS PROMISED. IN RESPONSE MY REQUEST, SHUMAYLEH PROMISED DISCUSS MATTER AGAIN WITH SHAIKH FAISAL REITERATING OUR INTEREST IN OBTAINING COMMITMENT BEFORE NEGOTIATING DIRECT FMS ARRANGEMENT.

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PAGE 1 ABU DH 00495 190815Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 190715Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE 0526
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0495

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS US JO TC
SUBJ: MILITARY SALES: TRANSFER OF 106S TO ADDF

REF: A. AMMAN 1629
B. ABU DHABI 407

1. UNDER SEC ABU DHABI MINY DEF HAS INDICATED TO CHARGE THAT MINY SOON MAY APPROACH EMB WITH SALES REQUEST FOR SUPPLY OF 106 RR AMMO. SMALL AMOUNT 106 AMMO, ACC FAISAL, SHIPPED BY JAA WITH RECENT TRANSFER TO ADDF OF ADDITIONAL 106S, BUT HE SAID THIS BARELY ENOUGH MEET INITIAL TRAINING NEEDS. IN REPLY QUESTION WHETHER DELIVERIES OF 106S UP TO 31 WEAPONS PROMISED ABU DHABI BY JORDAN HAD BEEN COMPLETED, FAISAL UNCERTAIN OF NUMBER SO FAR RECEIVED. HOWEVER, HE OBVIOUSLY PLEASED THAT PREVIOUS ADMIN AND POL ROADBLOCKS SURMOUNTED SO DELIVERY OF REMAINING WEAPONS ABLE PROCEED SMOOTHLY.

2. JORDANIAN AMB HAS BEEN ABSENT FOR SOME WEEKS SO UNABLE CHECK WITH HIM WHETHER FM SUWAIDI EVER SIGNED TRANSFER UNDERTAKING LEFT BY KHAMMASH (REFTEL A). SHOULD AMB BE REPLACED WITHOUT RETURNING TO POST AS RUMORED (SEPTEL), WILL BE OBLIGED RAISE SUBJECT WITH JORDANIAN CHARGE, WHO GENERALY NOT PRIVY HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ASPECTS BILATERAL

'73 APR 19 PM 4:08
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NLNS 01-23/78 DOS 2/26/02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00495 190810Z

REVISIONS. CAN AMMAN SHED ANY LIGHT ON SIGNING OF UNDER-
TAKING BY UAE FM SUWAIDI?
GRAFFIN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'73 APR 17 PM 3:15

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00488 171413Z

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 090478

R 171000Z APR 73
FM AMEBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0522
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/79 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMD NARA, Date 4-1-02

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 488

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, SA, TC
SUBJ: SAUDI/UAE COMMITTEES TO MEET IN DAMMAM DISCUSS BORDER PROBLEM

REF: ABU DHABI 326 (NOTAL)

1. DURING APRIL 16 MTG TO COORDINATE HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO US (SEPTEL), ABU DHABI MIN PET MANA' OTAIBA MENTIONED THAT IN ADDITION ENERGY QUESTION, SHAIKH ZAYID WANTS HIM MEET WITH RANKING USG OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS CERTAIN POLITICAL MATTERS OF CURRENT CONCERN TO UAE, INCLUDING SAUDI-ABU DHABI BORDER DISPUTE.

2. AS OTAIBA TRUSTED CONFIDANTE OF ZAYID, I USED THIS OPENING TO INQUIRE IF HE AWARE ANY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TOWARD INITIATION OF DIALOGUE, WHICH I MIGHT PASS ALONG TO DEPT. OTAIBA REPLIED THAT IN FACT THERE HAS BEEN NEW DEVELOPMENT WHICH HE COULD REPORT. HE SAID DECISION RECENTLY TAKEN BY ZAYID AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE HIM (I.E. OTAIBA) HEAD UAE RPT UAE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE TO GO TO DAMMAM FOR PRELIMINARY TALKS WITH THREE-MAN SAUDI TEAM TO BE HEADED BY MIN PET YAMANI AND INCLUDING SAUDI AMB LONDON AND UNDER SEC MFA MASUUD. OTHER MEMBERS FROM UAE SIDE WILL BE MUHAMMAD SAID AL-MULLA, LEADING DUBAI MERCHANT, WHO SERVES AS UAE

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00488 171413Z

MIN STATE FOR UNITY AND GULF AFFAIRS, AND UAE MIN EDUCATION ABDULLAH UMRAN TURYAM, NATIVE OF SHARJAH WHO PARTICIPATED IN GOOD WILL MISSION TO KINGDOM SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. BOTH OTAIBA AND TURYAM HOLD UNIV DEGREES AND WE HAVE FOUND AL-MULLA TO BE FRIENDLY BUT SHREWD CONTACT. INCLUSION OF NON-ABU DHABI NEGOTIATORS APPARENTLY RECOMMENDED TO ZAYID BY SOME OF FELLOW RULERS, WHO EAGER NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS AND SEE EFFECTIVE WAY OF CREATING BEST POSSIBLE CLIMATE FOR TALKS IS BY NEUTRALIZING POTENTIALLY HARD-LINE ABU DHABI ELEMENT.

3. OTAIBA SAID ZAYID FIRST HAD SUGGESTED BAHRAIN AS VENUE FOR TALKS, BUT WHEN SAUDIS RELUCTANT, HE INFORMED FAISAL THAT HE PREPARED SEND HIS REPS ANY PLACE KING DECIDED. FAISAL REPLIED WITH MSG PROPOSING DAMMAM AND AGREEMENT REACHED IN PAST WEEK OR SO FOR RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES COMMENCE TALKS THERE APRIL 28.

4. COMMENTED TO OTAIBA THAT IT HAS OFTEN OCCURRED TO ME AND SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES IN AREA THAT GOOD PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL RAPPORT BUILT UP OVER PAST FEW YRS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND YAMANI MIGHT BE USEFULLY TAPPED TO CREATE PROPER ATMOSPHERE FOR FRANK, REALISTIC EXCHANGE ON BORDER PROBLEM BETWEEN PARTIES AT WORKING-LEVEL. HOPEFULLY, SUCH CONTACTS WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR EVENTUAL MTG BETWEEN ZAYID AND KING AT WHICH EQUITABLE BORDER SETTLEMENT COULD BE FINALIZED. OTAIBA SAID SCENARIO MUCH ALONG THIS LINE HAS DEVELOPED TO DATE. HE AND YAMANI HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING VARIOUS ASPECTS OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTE OVER LAST SIX MONTHS AND HAD ACHIEVED FAIR DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING. BOTH MINISTERS APPARENTLY
THEN PERSUADED THEIR LEADERS THAT THEY BE GIVEN CHANCE PROBE FURTHER ON OFFICIAL COMMITTEE LEVEL. ACC OTAIBA, UAE WORKING COMMITTEE
HE HEADS WILL REPORT RESULTS INITIAL CONTACTS WITH SAG TO ALL-ABU DHABI COMM ESTABLISHED RECENTLY (REFTEL), WHICH COMPRISES INTER ALIA FM SUWAIDI AND SOME OUTSIDE ADVISORS (UK AMB FOR ONE). OTAIBA SAID HE WELCOMES OPPORTUNITY TACKLE THIS VEXATIOUS PROBLEM WITH MAN OF SUCH OUTSTANDING ABILITY, JUDGEMENT, AND MODERATION AS YAMANI, WHO KNOWN TO ENJOY FULL CONFIDENCE OF FAISAL. OTAIBA ALSO CLAIMED BE CLOSE FRIEND OF SAUDI AMB TO UK.

5. RESPONDING MY STATEMENT THAT USG VERY PLEASED LEARN LONG

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 00488 171413Z

SOUGHT DIALOGUE WILL SOON BEGIN AND WE READY DO ALL POSSIBLE FACILITATE DIRECT UAE/SAUDI CONTACTS. OTAIBA SAID UAE DOES NOT EXPECT USG BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED THIS DISPUTE, BUT GRATIFIED TO KNOW US ON SIDELINES SHOULDING ENCOURAGEMENT TO BOTH FRIENDS.

6. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO JIDDA OR DHAHRAN MAY HAVE DEVELOPED ON FORTHCOMING MTG IN DAMMAM.
REQUEST JIDDA POUCH COPY ABU DHABI 326 TO DHAHRAN FOR BACKGROUND.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00407 260857Z

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 260185Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0487
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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'73 MAR 23 AM 8:15

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ABU DHABI 0407

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FROM GRIFFIN

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/80 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KSG NARA, Date 4-1-02

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, JO, TC
SUBJ: TRANSFER OF 106S TO ABU DHABI

REF: AMMAN 1411

1. ANTICIPATING EARLY ABU DHABI REQUEST FOR 106 AMMO (PARA 3, REFTEL), BELIEVE TIME NOW RIPE FOR APPROACHING UAEG TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENT CORPORATING GROUND RULES, BASED ON PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION, FOR FMS TRANSACTIONS WITH UAE AND ITS CONSTITUENT STATES. WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE.

2. IF ADDF MUST PURCHASE AMMO FROM USG STOCKS, KNOW FACTOR THAT WILL BE UPPERMOST IN MINYDEF'S PLANNING, ESPECIALLY UNDERSEC AL-QASIMI, WILL BE DELIVERY TIME. ASSUMING DEPT WOULD APPROVE SUCH SALE, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO SUPPLY ALL OR PART OF BASIC LOAD FROM US EUROPEAN STOCKPILE? ALTERNATIVELY, IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE FOR ABU DHABI TO PURCHASE 106 AMMO FROM ONE OF EUROPEAN LICENSEES THIS WEAPON, I.E. SPAIN.

3. IN EVENT ADDF DESIRES IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF AMMO AND GOJ IS UN-

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00407 260857Z

WILLING TO PROVIDE MINIMUM AMOUNT, IT OCCURS TO US POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY AMMO AVAILABLE IN EUROPE, EITHER THROUGH USG CHANNELS OR COMMERCIALLY, COULD BE PICKED UP BY JORDAN AIR FORCE

PLANE AND AIRLIFTED TO ABU DHABI. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT NO RPT NO REQUEST FOR AMMO YET MADE TO EMBASSY BY ADDF BUT BELIEVE IT PRUDENT FOR US TO DO LITTLE PLANNING PRIOR TO RECEIVING FIRST MAJOR MILITARY SALES REQUEST FROM UAE ENTITY.
HOWELL

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00378 191054Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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R 190430Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0476
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 378

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/81 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KWS NARA, Date 4-1-02

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS US, JO, TC
SUBJ: TRANSFER OF JORDANIAN 106S TO ABU DHABI: KHAMMASH TO VISIT ABU DHABI

REF: A. AMMAN 1300
B. STATE 047707
C. ABU DHABI 342

1. ON MARCH 18 JORD AMB SHUMAYLEH ASKED ME CALL ON HIM FOR DISCUSSION 106 QUESTION. AMB INFORMED ME THAT ACCELERATED AIRLIFT OF REMAINING 106S WHICH ZAYID BIN SHAKER HAD MENTIONED TO AMMAN AS COURSE OF ACTION HE RECOMMENDING TO KING, COMMENCED MARCH 16 WITH C-130 FLIGHT BRINGING FOUR ADDITIONAL JEEP- MOUNTED 106S TO ABU DHABI. AMB KHAMMASH WAS PLANNING COME ON SECOND FLIGHT SCHEDULED MARCH 19, BUT SHUMAYLEH FELT IT NECESSARY CABLE KHAMMASH URGENTLY ASKING THAT HE POSTPONE VISIT FEW DAYS, AS TIMING OF FLIGHT WOULD HAVE CONFLICTED WITH ARRIVAL ON OFFICIAL VISIT TO UAE OF YEMEN PRIME MIN HAJRI. AMB NOW ANTICIPATED THAT KHAMMASH AND ANOTHER LOAD OF 106S WILL ARRIVE D/A MARCH 23, I.E. DAY OR SO BEFORE QABUS BEGINS HIS OFFICIAL VISIT. AMB WOULD NOT BE DRAWN OUT WHETHER KHAMMASH PLANS STAY THROUGH QABUS VISIT, BUT INFERENCE WAS HE WOULD NOT.

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29

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00378 191054Z

2. SHUMAYLEH QUITE CERTAIN ONE OF PURPOSES OF KHAMMASH VISIT IS SO HE CAN REASSURE SHAIKH ZAYID AND AD MINDEFENSE SHAIKH KHALIFA THAT REMAINDER 106S WITH ADEQUATE SPARES, WHICH PROMISED BY KING, WOULD BE SHIPPED SOONEST. KHAMMASH ALSO EXPECTED EXPLAIN TO ZAYID PERSONALLY USG REQUIREMENT FOR WRITTEN COMM-
ITMENT FROM ABU DHABI PROHIBITING RE-TRANSFER OF 106S TO ANY THIRD APRTY WITHOUT PRIOR USG CONSENT. SHUMAYLEH CONFIRMED THAT TO DATE HE HAS NEVER RECEIVED AUTHORIZATION FROM AMMAN TO OBTAIN SUCH COMM-ITMENT FROM ADG, ALTHOUGH HE HAD DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH MINY. HOWEVER, AMB AND I AGREED ON BASIS OUR SEPERATE CONVERSATIONS WITH UNDER SEC AL-QASIMI THAT GOVT QUITE PREPARED PROVIDE WRITTEN COMMITMENT AND IT PREFERABLE FOR GOJ CARRY BALL ON THIS TRANSACTION TO AVOID USG DIRECT INVOLVEMENT.

3. TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF SHWOAYLEH ON MY TALK 10? DAYS AGO WITH AL-QASIMI (REFTEL C), AND TO URGE THAT GOJ TRY CLEAR UP THIS MATTER SOONEST IN WAY THAT WILL SATISFY AND PROTECT INTERESTS ALL PARTIESCONCERNED. IN THIS REGARD, AMB MENTIONED THAT JAA HAD DESPATCHED ON TDY OFFICER AND 2 EM WITH MARCH
16 FLIGHT TO TRAIN ADDF IN OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF 106S BEING TRANSFERRED.

4. DURING OUR DISCUSSION, SHUMAYLEH SAID HE HAS IMPRESSION FROM MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AMMAN THAT INTER ALIA ONE OF PURPOSES BEHIND KHAMMASH'S VISIT TO ABU DHABI WAS TO BRIEF ZAYID ON RESULTS OF HUSSEIN'STRIP TO US.
GRIFFIN

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SECRET

29

180/10/7890

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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'73 MAR 12 PM 2.24 ~~SECRET~~ 571

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00342 121040Z

2/3

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 027716

R 111405Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
SECSTATE WASHDC 0456
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USCINCEUR

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 342

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/82 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMD NARA, Date 4-1-02

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS US JO TC
SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF 106S FROM JORDAN TO ABU DHABI

REF: A. STATE 29091. B. STATE 28728

1. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO AFTER RECEIPT REFTELS I HAD OCCASION TO DISCUSS WITH JORDANIAN AMB SHUMAYLEH TRANSFER OF 106S TO ABU DHABI. ALLUDING TO AIR DELIVERY OF SIX JEEP MOUNTED QPYS, I ASKED AMB WHEN DELIVERY OF REMAINING 25 106S, WHICH GOJ HAD AGREED SELL OR DONATE TO ABU DHABI, COULD BE EXPECTED. AMB CONFIDED HE SURPRISED AS USG WAS ABOUT SUDDEN AIRLIFT, AND TENDED TO REGARD IT AS GESTURE OF GOOD WILL ON PART KING ON EVE HIS DEPARTURE FOR US TRIP. ALTHOUGH HE HAD RECEIVED NO DEFINITE TIMETABLE FROM AMMAN, AMB ASSUMED REMAINING 106S WOULD BE DELIVERED SOONEST.

2. SINCE SHUMAYLEH FROM BEGINNING HAS BEEN VERY MUCH AWARE OF USG LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR THIRD PARTY RECIPIENT OF FMS OR GRANT SUPPLIED ARMS TO PROVIDE COMMITMENT THAT ITEMS WILL NOT BE TRANSFERRED WITHOUT PRIOR USG APPROVAL, I SUMMARIZED FOR HIM CONTENTS REFTEL. IN PARTICULAR, I WISHED ALERT HIM TO LIKLIHOOD HE WOULD BE RECEIVING INSTRUCTION FROM AMMAN RE SIGNED COMMITMENT WE WOULD REQUIRE UAEG/ABU DHABI TO

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00342 121040Z

EXECUTE WITH RESPECT TO 106S. SHUMAYLEH AND I AGREED THAT IT WAS PREFERABLE JORDANIAN EMBASSY HANDLE THIS TRANSACTION STRICTLY AS UAEG--GOJ BILATERAL MATTER WITHOUT USG BECOMING PARTY TO IT. KNOWING JORDANIAN BUREAUCRATIC METHODS, SHUMAYLEH DOUBTED HE WOULD BE HEARING OFFICIALLY FROM AMMAN ON THIS MATTER UNTIL ZAYID RIFA'I AND KING'S PARTY RETURNED FROM US.

3. DURING MARCH 8 COURTESY CALL ON ABU DHABI UNDER SEC MIN DEF, SHAIKH FAISAL AL-QASIMI, HE RAISED SUBJECT OF SUBJECT OF 106S COMPLAINING THAT ONLY SIX (LATER CONFIRMED AS SEVEN) WEAPONS DELIVERED TO DATE; WHAT EXPECIALLY IRKED HIM WAS SEVEN SENT WITHOUT SPARE PARTS.

THEREFORE, 106S PRACTICALLY USELESS. MOREOVER, FAISAL ANNOYED BECAUSE JORDANIANS HAVE GIVEN NO INDICATION WHEN REMAINDER WILL BE SENT. FAISAL SAID SHUMAYLEH HAD MENTIONED SEVERAL WEEKS BACK SOMETHING ABOUT COMMITMENT REQUIRED BY USG, AND MINY READY TO PROVIDE NECESSARY GUARANTEE, BUT JORDANIAN AMB FROZE ISSUE WHEN HE SAID HE COULD NOT FORMERLY APPROACH GOVT UNTIL INSTRUCTED BY SUPERIORS. FAISAL OBVIOUSLY ANNOYED OVER WHAT HE REGARDS AS FAILURE GOJ FOLLOW THROUGH ON DELIVERIES AND LEAVE ADDF SADDLED WITH INCOMPLETE WEAPONS.

4. A. FAISAL EMPHASIZED GOVT'S WILLINGNESS GIVE USG WHATEVER COMMITMENT REQUIRED, AND IF IT WOULD SPEED UP PROCESS, AD MINYDEF PREPARED DEAL DIRECTLY WITH USG. TOLD FAISAL I THOUGHT DEPT STILL PREFERRED HAVE GOJ COMPLETE 106 TRANSACTION WITHOUT WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT USG, BUT IN ITS CABLE REPORTING BISCO-RIFA'I DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT, DEPT HAD INDICATED IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR USG DEAL DIRECTLY. B. AT FAISAL'S REQUEST, I UNDERTOOK TO INQUIRE OF DEPT AND AMMAN RE STATUS INSTRUCTIONS GOJ HAD AGREED TRANSMIT TO ITS AMB IN ABU DHABI. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE AMMAN DISCREETLY INQUIRING RE TIMETABLE FOR DELIVERY REMAINDER 106S. THIS INFO FOR EMB'S USE AND WOULD NOT BE PASSED FAISAL IF DEPT OR AMMAN SO ADVISES. AT CONCLUSION OUR CONVERSATION FAISAL HINTED THAT FURTHER PROBLEMS DELAY ACQUISITION 106S FROM JORDAN, HE MAY APPROACH USG FOR DIRECT FMS SALE.

5. FROM TENOR HIS REMARKS IT CLEAR FAISAL FED UP WITH LONG-DRAWN OUT 106 DEAL AND QUITE DISAPPOINTED OVER POOR SHOWING OF GOJ IN

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 00342 121040Z

MEETING ADDF'S BASIC EQUIPMENT NEEDS. IN RELATED CONVERSATION WITH ADDF CHIEF STAFF SHARPE (UK SECONDED OFFICER), HE CONFIRMED THAT NO SPARES SENT EITHER FOR WEAPONS OR JEEPS. SINCE LATTER IS VEHICLE NOT IN USE HERE DUE BOYCOTT ACTION AGAINST MANUFACTURER, SHARPE SAID ADDF HAD DECIDED REMOUNT 106S ON LANDROVERS.
GRIFFIN

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~~SECRET~~ 043

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00333 101602Z

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO UCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 021307

R 081220Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0451
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 333
EXDIS
BEIRUT FOR RSS: TEHRAN FOR RSO

EO 11652: XGDS2
TAGS: PINS, TC
SUBJECT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN LIGHT OF TERRORIST THREAT

REFS: A. ABU DHABI 320
B. KUWAIT 683
C. BEIRUT 2530
D. STATE 40640

SUMMARY:
LOCAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION HAS REACTED PROMPTLY TO EMBASSY'S REQUESTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION, AND POLICE ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS ARE NOW DEPLOYED AT OFFICE AND RESIDENCES. IN ABSENCE ZAYID, CHARGE MET WITH PRESIDENT'S SON, SHAIKH KHALIFA, TO EXPLAIN SECURITY PROBLEM. LATTER PROMISED FULL COOPERATION. POST HAS ALSO INSTITUTED NUMBER INTERNAL PROCEDURES TO TIGHTEN UP SECURITY. SOME OF THESE HAVE INVOLVED EXTRA EXPENDITURES, WHICH WE WILL TRY TO FUND FROM OPERATING BUDGET, BUT REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL MONEY MAY BE REQUIRED. MOST URGENT NEED IS FOR PORTAMOBILE RADIO UNITS FOR INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

ACTION REQUESTED:
EMB KUWAIT AND DEPT EXPEDITE ACTION ON REQUEST OF POST THROUGH KUWAIT FOR SUPPLY OF PORTAMOBILE UNITS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/83 pg 3.4(b)(7) DOS 2/26/02
By KMS NARA, Date 4-3-02

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00333 101602Z

1. AS SOON AS POST HEARD OF ATTACK ON SAUDI EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM IT REQUESTED MFA FURNISH POLICE PROTECTION FOR OFFICE AND FOR HOMES OF CHARGE, AND ECON AND CONS OFFICERS. OUR FIRST REQUEST WAS FOR TWO POLICEMEN, ONE FOR OFFICE AND ONE FOR THREE HOMES, WHICH LOCATED WITHIN SAME GENERAL AREA. MFA AND LOCAL SECURITY ORGN COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE AND HAD SENTRIES ON DUTY WITHIN TWO DAYS.

2. IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT REFTEL C, CHARGE DISCUSSED INCREASED NEED FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY WITH ABU DHABI INTELL CHIEF CLEMENS. ACTING ON HIS SUGGESTION CHARGE MET MARCH 6 WITH SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYID, CROWN PRINCE AND PM OF ABU DHABI, TO ACQUAINT HIM WITH SUBSTANCE OF REPORTS WE HAD RECEIVED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF BSO STRIKE AGAINST US EMB OR PERSONNEL IN ABU DHABI AND TO REQUEST STATIONING ADDITIONAL POLICE ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AT OFFICE AND AROUND ALL RPT ALL RESIDENCES. SHAIKH KHALIFA PROMISED FULL COOPERATION TO SAFEGUARD PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY NOTING THAT JORDANIAN AMB HAD ALREADY MADE SIMILAR REQUEST. HE DEPLORED ACTIVITIES OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS AND SAID SHAIKH ZAYID WOULD NOT TOLERATE THEIR MUSUSING UAE TERRITORY TO CARRY OUT SUCH CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES. DHALIFA AND MIN STATE HABBROUSH, WHO ALSO PRESENT, SOMEWHAT SHAKEN WHEN CHARGE INFORMED THEM THERE INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE OF DIRECT FATAH INVOLVEMENT IN KHARTOUM ATTACK. KHALIFA SAID SIMILAR REPORTS OF POSSIBLE BSO ACTION IN NEAR FUTURE HAD REACHED GOVT AND POLICE AND ABU DHABI DEFENSE FORCE PLACED ON HIGH STATE OF ALERTNESS. RETURNING TO SUBJECT OF GOVT PROVIDING ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR DIPL MISSIONS, KHALIFA ASSURED CHARGE THAT GOVT IN EXTREMIS SITUATION READY ASSIGN ARMY TO GUARD DUTY AROUND AMERICAN FACILITIES; HE HAD ALREADY ORDERED ARMY TO HOME OF JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR. AS OF AFTERNOON MARCH 7, ALL ADDITIONAL POLICE PERSONNEL WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS ON DUTY WITH EXCEPTION ONE MAN TO STAND GUARD ON FLOOR OF APARTMENT WHERE CLERK AND COMMUNICATOR LIVE. IN FOLLOW UP CONTACTS WITH POLICE AUTHORITIES WE WILL PUSH FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION THIS MEASURE AND ALSO REQUEST THAT POLICE PERSONNEL ON DUTY BE EQUIPPED WITH RADIO SETS. AT OFFICE ONE MAN ON DUTY ON THIRD FLOOR IN FRONT OF MAIN CHANCERY DOOR; SECOND GUARD LOCATED ON ROOF SO HE CAN OBSERVE UNOBTRUSIVELY ALL PERSONS ALIGHTING FROM ELEVATOR. FROM THAT POSITION HE ALSO ABLE COVER FIRST

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PAGE 03 ABU DH 00333 101602Z

MAN.
MFA IN RESPONSE OUR QUERY HAS ALSO ASSURED POST THAT APPRO-
PRIATE PROTECTION WILL BE AFFORDED DIPS AT LARGE SOCIAL GATHERINGS.

3. IN ADDITION REQUESTING ADEQUATE POLICE PROTECTION,
POST ITSELF HAS TAKEN FOLLOWING MEASURES IMPROVE OVER-
ALL SECURITY POSTURE:
A. ALL AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND FAMILIES BRIEFED THOROUGHLY
ON SERIOUSNESS OF THREAT, PARTICULAR EMPHASIS PLACED ON
CONTROLLING MOVEMENTS AND CONTACTS, ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT
THAT COLLEAGUE OR FAMILY MEMBER BE KEPT INFORMED AT ALL
TIMES OF USG PERSONNEL WHEREABOUTS. SIGN-IN AND -OUT LOG
BEING ESTABLISHED AT OFFICE FOR ALL AMERICAN PERSONNEL.
LOCAL PERSONNEL GIVEN GENERAL BRIEFING TO BE ALERT AND
REPORT ANY SUSPICIOUS TEL CALLS, VISITORS, INQUIRIES FROM
STRANGERS ETC.
B. DUTY OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES AND SCHEDULE NOW FORMALI-
ZED.
C. FOR BUDGETARY REASONS PRIMARILY, POST FOR SEVERAL MONTHS HAS
EMPLOYED NIGHT-WATCHMAN ONLY FROM 10:00 PM TO 6:00 A.M. WE
NOW IN PROCESS OF HIRING SECOND WATCHMAN WHO WILL GIVE US
FULL COVERAGE DURING ALL NON-DUTY HOURS. WATCHMAN WILL
BE LOCATED IN SHACK WE CONSTRUCTED FOR HIM IN RECESS
ADJACENT TO MAIN CHANCERY DOOR. SHACK WILL HAVE PHONE
OUTLET WHICH WATCHMAN WILL USE TO CONTACT COMMUNICATOR WHEN SELCAL
ALARM IS ACTIVATED. FYI: SELCAL WILL BE HOOKED UP
WHEN SECOND WATCHMAN ON BOARD AND TELEPHONE INSTALLED.
D. ALL DOORS AT EMB AND RESIDENCES BEING FITTED WITH
PEEPHOLES AND NIGHT LATCHES.
3. [redacted]

SANITIZED 3,4(A)(G)

4. ESTIMATED COSTS FOR ABOVE WORK $270. WHICH NOT BUDGETED. HOW-
EVER, POST WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT FUND EXPENDITURES FOR REQUIRED
SECURITY WORK NOTED 3 C-E ABOVE FROM FY 73 ALLOTMENT,
BUT WISH ALERT DEPT AND KUWAIT THAT REQUEST EXTRA MONEY MAY HAVE
TO BE MADE.

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PAGE 04 ABU DH 00333 101602Z

5. MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR POST IS INTERNAL COMMO CAPABILITY. AT RECENT MTG OF CHARGES IN KUWAIT, RECALL THAT POST SECURITY OFFICER UNDERTOOK TO ORDER PORTAMOBILE UNITS FROM DEPT FOR DELIVERY ALL GUF POSTS SOONEST. WOULD APPRECIATE KUWAIT ADVISING STATUS THIS REQUEST. WHEN SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEM EXISTS AS NOW, IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL POST HAVE INTERNAL COMMO CAPABILITY. IF PORTA-MOBILES NOT YET ORDERED, REQUEST THIS BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY. GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: MESSAGE DELAYED DUE TO GARBLED (UNPROCESSABLE CONDITION) OF ORIGINAL. NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. EALUM, 1 /10/73

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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~~SECRET~~ 643 2

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00320 061425Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 109611

O R 061410Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 441
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 320

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, AFSP, TC
BEIRUT FOR RSS: TEHRAN FOR RSO

SUBJECT: SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN LIGHT TERRORIST THREAT

REF: A. KUWAIT 0683; B. BEIRUT 2530; C. STATE 040648

BOTH BEFORE RECEIPT REFTEL (A), AND SUBSEQUENTLY,/
POST HAS BEEN IN CLOSEST CONTACT WITH ABU DHABI SECURITY
ORGANIZATIONTO REQUEST ADDITIONAL SECURITY PROTECTION
BOTH FOR OFFICE AND RESIDENCES. MARCH 6 CHARGE CALLED ON
SHEIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYID, ABU DHABI PRIMIN AND MINDEF,
TO ALERT HIM TO INFORMATION RE POSSIBLE BSO ATTACK IN
THIS AREA, AND TO REQUEST ADDITIONAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS.
HE PROMISED FULL COOPERATION AND MEASURES REQUESTED NOW
BEING IMPLEMENTED. DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED IN SEPTEL
MARCH 7.
GRIFFIN

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/84 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By AMS NARA, Date 4-1-02

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 744

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00192 131045Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

---------- 061661

R 120620Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0399
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

'73 FEB 12 PM 3:20

2/3

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0192

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/85 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

SUBJECT: SAUDI-UAE RELATIONS

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR TREADWELL INFORMED ME FEBRUARY 11 THAT DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH SHAIKH ZAYID FEW DAYS EARLIER, ZAYID TOLD HIM IN GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT FIRST STEP TAKEN IN INITIATING DIALOGUE WITH SAUDIS TO SOLVE SAUDI-ABU DHABI BORDER PROBLEMS AND TO NORMALIZE SAG-UAE RELATIONS. WITH ZAYID'S BLESSING, FOREIGN MINISTER SUWAIDI APPROACHED SAUDI COUNTERPART OMAR SAQQAF AT CAIRO CONFERENCE TO SAY SHAIKH ZAYID AND OTHERS ABU DHABI LEADERS RECOGNIZE BORDER DISPUTE WAS HAVING DE-STABILIZING INFLUENCE ON AREA AND WAS IMPEDIMENT TO COOPERATION AND MUTUAL TRUST AMONG PENINSULA COUNTRIES. THEREFORE, UAE WOULD LIKE INITIATE DIALOGUE WITH SAUDIS TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES. SUWAIDI ADVISED SAQQAF THAT TO SHOW GOODWILL SHAIKH ZAYID WAS PREPARED GO TO RIYADH FOR MEETING WITH FAISAL, WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SPECIFICALLY DEVOTED TO BORDER PROBLEM. TO FURTHER IMPROVE CLIMATE FOR DIALOGUE, SUWAIDI RECOMMENDED SAG EXTEND IMMEDIATE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO UAE, AND EXCHANGE OF REPS. ZAYID SAID SAQQAF'S REACTION POSITIVE AND UPON HIS RETURN TO JIDDA WOULD RELAY OFFER OF VISIT AND REQUEST FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO KING.

2. A. TOLD TREADWELL THIS WAS SPLENDID NEWS AS I HAD URGED SUWAIDI PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR CAIRO TO TRY INITIATE DIS-

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FORM DS-1650

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00192 1310457

CUSSIONS, WHICH ADMITTEDLY MIGHT BE PROLONGED. USG TOO, THOUGHT POSITIVE FIRST STEP MIGHT BE SAUDI RECOGNITION OF UAE WITHOUT PREJUDICE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES. TREADWELL COMMENTED HE OPTIMISTIC ZAYID FINALLY DETERMINED SETTLE ISSUE AS HE HAS TAKEN FIRST STEP, COURSE OF ACTION HMG HAS LONG URGED.

B. DURING THEIR RECENT MEETING, ZAYID MENTIONED CONCERN OVER GROWING SAUDI INFLUENCE IN RAS AL-KHAIMA, ESPECIALLY INTRODUCTION SAUDI MILITARY AND POLICE ADVISORS. KNOWING SHAIKH SAQR'S PREDILECTION FOR PLOTTING, ZAYID SAID SAUDI PRESENCE COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO INTRESTS OF UAE. DESPITE HIS CONCERN, ZAYID TOLD TREADWELL HE WOULD LET MATTER REST FOR MOMENT IN ORDER NOT RPT NOT TO INTERJECT POTENTIALLY HARMFUL ELEMENT INTO CLIMATE OF CONCILIATION.

3. IN RELATED DEVELOPMENT, MAHDI TAJIR INFORMED ME HE HAD STRONGLY URGED ZAYID TO TAKE LEAD IN INITIATING DIALOGUE WITH SAUDIS. SPECIFICALLY, TAJIR RECOMMENDED SUWAIDI COME TO LONDON DURING MID-FEBRUARY TO MAKE CONTACT WITH AMIR FAHD, WHO SPENDING 10-14 DAYS IN UK RPT UK. TAJIR SAID ZAYID ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT INITIATING DIALOGUE, BUT AGREED WITH MY OBSERVATION CAREFUL GROUNDWORK SHOULD BE DONE BEFORE ZAYID AND FAISAL SIT DOWN TO DISCUSS BORDER ISSUE.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT CABLING ANY SUMMARY INFO ON SUWAIDI-SAQQAF MEETING IN CAIRO THAT MAY HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY JIDDA. HOPE SEE ZAYID NEXT WEEK AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD PASS ON ANY FAVORABLE SAUDI REACTION. THIS VERY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT WHICH I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING TO PROMOTE.
GDS
GRIFFIN

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580/10/2690

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 251

PAGE 01 KUWAIT 00312 031143Z

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11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 116751

O 031057Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 5915

~~S E C R E T~~ KUWAIT 0312

EXDIS

SUBJ: 106S FOR ABU DHABI

REF: AMMAN 0611 (NOTAL)

RJAF C-130 FEB 1 TOOK FOUR JEEP MOUNTED 106 RR TO ABU DHABI WITH JORDANIAN CREW PLUS THREE USAF PERSONNEL WHO ON FLIGHT FOR TRAINING JORDANIAN CREW. PLANE HAD JORDANIAN MARKINGS BUT USAF INSIGNIA STILL ON TOP WING. USAF CREW DID NOT LEAVE ABU DHABI MILITARY AIRPORT BUT DID TALK WITH "RAF LIAISON OFFICER" DURING OFFLOADING. GIVEN RATHER UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS ENTIRE OPERATION, WE FEEL IT BEST IF DEPARTMENT PROVIDES YOU WITH FULL FACTS DIRECTLY. REFTEL BEING POUCHED.
MCCLELLAND

'73 FEB 1 PM 2:01

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/86 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KWB NARA, Date 4-1-02

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'73 FEB 9 AM 8:48

~~SECRET~~ 817

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00169 082119Z

2

72
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W
---------- 029054

R 070500Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0391
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 0169

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SANAA

SUBJECT: MIRAGES FOR ABU DHABI

REFERENCE: 804

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/87 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMB NARA, Date 4-1-02

1. RELIABLE SOURCE IN DUBAI TOLD ME FEBRUARY 1 THAT HE INFORMED SAME DAY BY UAE AMB TO UK, MAHDI TAJIR, THAT MIRAGE DEAL WAS PRACTICALLY DEAD, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HMG HAD SCREAMED LOUD AND LONG TO SHAIK ZAYID OVER HIS FAILURE GIVE BRITISH AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING FIRMS CHANCE TO BID ON ABU DHABI FIGHTER RE-QUIREMENTS. WHEN INDIA TESTED REPORT OUT ON FRENCH CHARGE FEBRUARY 5 HE CATEGORICALLY DENIED SALE OFF, BUT COMMENTED ACIDLY THAT IF AT THIS LATE STAGE ABU DHABI WERE TO CANCEL ORDER, "IT WOULD PAY HANDSOMELYHFOR ITS INDECISION".

2. BOTH FRENCH REP AND PAKISTANI AMB HAVE INSISTED IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS THAT MIRAGES WILL BE STATIONED IN ABU DHAIB. EMBASSYS A-13 DATED JANUARY 29 REPORTED FRENCH CHARGE AS SAYING FIRST MIRAGE DELIVERIES WOULD NOT COMMENCE BEFORE DECEMBER 73, AND ADDF SOURCE ADVISED EMBASSY OF ADDFS INTENTION FORM AND EQUIP MIRAGE SQUADRON BY FALL.

3. COMMENT: IN VIEW TAJIRS REPORTED STATEMENT AND LINGERING

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PAGE 02 ABU DH 00169 082119Z

LOCAL RUMORS THAT MIRAGE DEAL HAS RUN INTO SNAGS. EMBASSY PARTS MAY WISH DISCREETLY QUERY QUAI CONTACTS ON STATUS MIRAGE DEAL FOR ABU DHABI.

GDS GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SANAA.

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L80/10/2690

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

37040

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 00158 070119Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/88 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KWS NARA, Date 4-1-02

73-60
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 010952

P R 060700Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0388
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 158

EXDIS

SUBJ: 106S FOR ABU DHABI

REF: KUWAIT 312 (NOTAL)

1. MUST CONFESS TO SOME CONCERN OVER LACK OF INFO AVAILABLE TO THIS POST ABOUT SUDDEN TRANSFER 106S TO ABU DHABI. FROM BITS AND PIECES AVAILABLE TO ME, REALIZE THAT GOJ MAY HAVE FAILED INFORM USG IN ADVANCE ABOUT TRANSFER, BUT IT HARD FOR ME TO COMPREHEND HOW RJAF C-130 CARGO FLIGHT COULD HAVE EMBARKED FOR ABU DHABI CARRYING USAF PERSONNEL WITHOUT SOME ECHELEON IN USG KNOWING ABOUT IT. FIRST OFFICIAL WORD EMBASSY HAD WAS REFTEL, WHICH SENT IMMEDIATE TWO DAYS AFTER FLIGHT TOOK PLACE AND ON LOCAL HOLIDAY WHEN COMMO PERSONNEL ALERTED ONLY FOR NIACT AND HIGHER PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC.

2. ACTUALLY LEARNED OF FLIGHTS (UNDERSTAND THERE HAVE BEEN TWO DELIVERING TOTAL SIX WEAPONS) TO MY EMBARRASSMENT AT ADDF SOCIAL GATHERING FEBRUARY 3 FROM JORDANIAN CONTRACT OFFICER. LATTER WAS OPENLY DISCUSSING BRITISH AND OTHER ARAB OFFICERS DISQUIETUDE THAT US EQUIPMENT HAD SECRETLY BEEN FURNISHED ADDF VIA JORDAN. FACT THAT EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTED ON NEWLY ACQUIRED AIRCRAFT WITH USAF PERSONNEL ON BOARD REPORTEDLY RAISED MORE EYEBROWS WITHIN ADDF. IT CLEAR FROM MY REACTION TO NEWS THAT EMBASSY KEPT IN DARK. HAVE SINCE BEEN INFORMED BY STAFF MEMBER HE TOO LEARNED OF TRANSFER FEBRUARY 2 FROM ADDF FRIEND IN MUCH SAME EMBARRASSING MANNER. BRIT SHARPE, CO OF ADDF INFORMED ME HE PLEASED HAVE 106S, BUT SURPRISED BY TIMING OF

~~SECRET~~

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 ABU DH 00158 070119Z

DELIVERY. SAID HE TOLD SIX MORE VEHICLE MOUNTED WEAPONS ON WAY.

3. MY INITIAL REACTION WAS TO ASSUME WEAPONS TRANSFERRED ON BASIS USG CLEARANCE. HOWEVER, ON BASIS FURTHER EVIDENCE, HAVE CONCLUDED GOJ MAY HAVE PULLED END-RUN ON US AND TOOK UNILATERAL DECISION DELIVER WEAPONS. IF THIS CORRECT, ASSUME WE NOW FACED WITH DELICATE PROBLEM OF REACTING TO ILLEGAL ARMS TRANSFER BY FRIENDLY STATE TO THIRD PARTY. THEREFORE, REQUEST DEPT SUMMARIZE FOR EMB BACKGROUND THIS TRANSACTION AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE REGARDING LINE I SHOULD TAKE WITH UAE AND ABU DHABI GOVT, AS WELL AS JORDANIAN AND BRITISH COLLEAGUES.

4. RELATED ABOVE, LEARNED FEBRUARY 3 THAT KHAMMASH VISITED ABU DHABI SEVERAL DAYS AGO, AND NOW ON WAY JOIN KING IN WASHINGTON. MAIN PURPOSE HIS VISIT, WE UNDERSTAND, WAS TO PRESSURE ZAYID FULFILL PROMISED MONETARY ASSISTANCE. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME HUSSEIN HAD ASKED ZAYID FOR BD 10 MILLION (DOLLARS 23 MILLION); BUT WAS SATISFIED IF JORDAN GOT BD FIVE MILLION (DOLLARS 11.5 MILLION). AS RESULT OF FOOTDRAGGING BY ZAYID COUPLED WITH UNHAPPINESS DEMONSTRATED BY AD MINDEF TOWARD JORDANIAN SECONDED PERSONNEL, WHO REPORTEDLY EXPLOITING THEIR CONTRACTS, GOJ HAS CONCLUDED THAT ZAYID UNHAPPY WITH JORDANIAN PERFORMANCE, AND IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION NEEDED. CAN ONLY SURMISE, THEREFORE, KING DECIDED ON EVE HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON WIN ZAYIDS GOODWILL BY FULFILLING LONGSTANDING REQUEST FOR WEAPONS. HUSSEIN MAY HAVE CONCLUDED HE COULD LIVE WITH US DISPLEASURE EASIER THAN DOING WITHOUT ZAYIDS LARGESSE.

5. IN CONCLUSION, MUST EMPHASIZE THAT IN AREA OF DEFENSE MATTERS AND ANY GOJ ACTIVITIES LOCALLY, INVOLVING USG DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IT IMPERATIVE EMBASSY BE KEPT INFORMED AT LEAST IN BROAD YUU#LINE WHAT IS TRANSPIRING.

GDS. GRIFFIN

NOTE BY OC/T: # AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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880/10/7890

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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~~SECRET~~ 784

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00332 151004Z

17
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 041448

P 111125Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0209
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ MANAMA 0332

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 2 LN 1 ORGINAL CORRECT AS RECEIVED)

FOR DICKMAN ARP

1. DISCUSSION OF GOB COASTAL SURILLANCE NEEDS WITH UK AMBASSADOR STIRLING REVEALED NEW DIMENSION OF WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AWARE.

2. UK HAS NOT ONLY HAD NO ROLE WITH BDF BUT HAS AB INITIO CONSISENTLY ADVISED GB LEADERSHIP AGAINST HAVING ANY BDF AT ALL. BRITISH RATIONALE HAS BEEN THAT ESTABLISHING AND ARMING A DEFENSE FORCE WITH NO CLEARLY DEFINED MISSION WAS SIMPLY INVITING TROUBLE FOR AL-KHALKAH FAMILY. APART FROM DETECTION ABOUT 18 AMONTHS AGO OF SMALL CELL SUBVERSIONIST IN BDF, BRITISH HAVE NO CURRENT EVIDENCE INDICATING POTENTIAL DISLOYLTY IN BDF. BDF IS CLOSELY WATCHED BY SPECIALBRANCH. NONETHELESS BRITISH ARE WORRIED IN PRINCIPLE ABOUT ANY MOVE TO STRENGTHEN BDF.

3. STIRLING ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS IS LONG-RANGE WORRY AND ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED BAHRAIN'S NEED FOR COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY. BRITISH BELIEVED HOWEVER THAT POLICE NOT BDF SHOULD HAVE CAPA-BILITY.

4. I POINTED OUT POTENTIAL DILEMMA FOR US. REQUEST HAD COME FROM BDF WITH FULL GOB CONCURRENCE. IF WE WANTED RESOND FAVO-RABLY, WE COULD NOT TELL GOB THAT WE THOUGHT POLICE NOT BDF SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COASTAL SURVEY, AT LEAST NOT UNTIL SURVEY HAD BEEN MADE.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/89 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By Knb NARA Date 4-1-02

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PAGE 02 MANAMA 00332 151004Z

5. IT WAS AS RESULT TALK WITH STIRLING THAT RADM BAYNE AND I HAD DISCUSSION WITHIAN HENDERSON. HENDERSON EXHIBITED CONSIDERABLY LESS CONCERN THAN STIRLING, AND BZLIEVED NEED FOR NEW CAPABILITY OVER-RODE WHATEVER RISK THERE WAS IN STRENGTHENING BDF. WHAT WILL BE NEEDED, HE SAID. WILL BE MORE FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE LIAISON BETWEF POLICE AND WHATEVER COASTAL FORCE DEVELOPS AS RESULT SURVEY. HE NOTED GOOD BDF PERFORMANCE DURINGH RECENT LABOR TROUBLES, WHICH RESULTED IN INCREASED IDENTIFICATION BDF IN BAHRAINI MINDS AS SECURITY FORCE ON PAR WITH POLICE.

6. COMMENT: SCOPE OF POTENTIAL THREAT TO AL-KHALIFAHS FROM BDF IS ONE OF IMPONDERABLES SUCH AS WE HAVE FACED AND ARE FACING ELSEWHERE IN ARAB WORLD. FOR THIS PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE ADDITION COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY IN BDF WOULD INCREASE ITS POENTIAL FOR DISLOYAL ACTION AGAINST RULING FAMILY. I HAVE INFORMED STIRLING THAT RECOMMENDATION FOR SURVEY TEAM WAS GOING FORWARD DESPITE HIS RESERVATION.
GATCH
GP-1

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLWS 01-23/90 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KWS NARA, Date 4-1-02

~~SECRET~~ 126

PAGE 01 DHAHRA 00028 050612Z

19
ACTION SS-45

41

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

---------- 006837

70 JAN 5 PM 6:27

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 050535Z JAN 70
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1474

~~S E C R E T~~ DHAHRAN 028

EXDIS

SECSTATE PASS: AMEMBASSIES, JIDDA KUWAIT LONDON TEHRAN

REF: KUWAIT 0002

1. BRITISH POLITICAL RESIDENT CONFIDED WITH GUARDED OPTIMISM ON DECEMBER 31 THAT STEPS TO RESOLVE BAHRAIN/IRAN PROBLEM HAVE RECENTLY CLAIMED LARGE PORTION HIS TIME. WHILE THIS NOT ONLY REASON FOR GULF'S PROBLEMS, IT AFFECTS ALL OTHERS. IF BAHRAIN COULD GAIN IRAN'S ABANDONMENT OF ITS CLAIM, SAY BY MIDDLE 1970, THERE STILL REMAINS OUTSIDE CHANCE THAT ELEMENTARY FEDERATION OF NINE GULF PRINCIPALITIES COULD BE LAUNCHED BY TIME BRITISH MILITARY APPARATUS IS DUE TO DEPART. FAILURE RESOLVE BAHRAIN'S STATUS COULD PROLONG CURRENT INDECISION.

2. INDEPENDENT FEDERATION STILL SEEMS PREFERABLE TO SITUATION IN WHICH EITHER SAUDI ARABIA AND/OR IRAN ATTEMPTED CONTROL PORTIONS OF THE AREA, OR IF MORE THAN ONE COALITION OF STATES WERE TO BE FORMED. WHETHER GOI HAS WORKED TO SOW SEEDS OF DOUBT, SUSPICION AND CONFUSION AMONG THESE TODDLING ENTITIES MAY BE QUESTIONABLE. NEVERTHELESS IRAN'S DIRECT AND PRIVATE BUTTERING-UP OF UNSOPHISTICATED AND HEADSTRONG ARAB AMIRS IN PURSUIT OF WHAT GOI REGARDS A MATTER OF NATIONAL HONOR AND SECURITY HAS HAD AND CONTINUES HAVE UNSETTLING EFFECT ON EFFORTS TO CREATE FEDERATION.

3. GULF ARAB STATES ARE CHARACTERIZED BY A VARIETY OF COMPLICATED WEAKNESSES BUT CONGEN DOUBTS IRANIANS CAN IMPROVE SECURITY OF AREA BY ATTEMPTING TO CONCLUDE PRIVATE AGREEMENTS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 DHAHRA 00028 050612Z

WHICH MISLEAD SOME OF THESE ARAB LEADERS INTO THINKING THEY CAN GAIN INCREASED FREEDOM OF ACTION THROUGH AN ARRANGEMENT WITH IRAN. RESULT MORE LIKELY TO BE ADDED CONFUSION, AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH ONLY RADICAL ELEMENTS WILL THRIVE.
GP-3.
DINSMORE

NOTE: NOT PASSED JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON AND TEHRAN BY OC/T.

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060/10/2690

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 409

PAGE 01 STATE 146708

'73 JUL 26 AM 9:57
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

71
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:SWBUCK:MB
7/25/73 X22686
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
PM:DFARNHAM
DOD/ISA:ESCHAEFER
NEA/ARN:DRANSOM
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
S/S:O P. SARROS

========== 057680

P R 260205Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 146708

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, TC, JO
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: (A) STATE 143868; (B) STATE 143871; (C) ABU DHABI 1015;

1. FOR PURPOSES CHARGE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH ADG, INFO CONTAINED REFTEL A CONSTITUTES PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA FOR PLANNING PURPOSES MENTIONED PARA 3 REFTEL B. CHARGE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE THIS DATA TO ADG.

2. AMMAN 3871, BEING REPEATED TO ABU DHABI, CONTAINS

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/91 DOS letter 2/26/02
By Kyto NARA, Date 4-3-02

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 146708

INFO ON AMMO WHICH GOJ HAS SUPPLIED OR IS PLANNING TO SUPPLY TO YARG. BY SEPTEL WILL PROVIDE PRICE/AVAILABILITY DATA ON AMMO NOT COVERED IN REF A AS WELL AS ESTIMATES ON COSTS OF TRANSPORT AND ACCESSORIAL CHARGES FOR REPLACEMENT OF AMMO TO JORDAN. WE ARE URGING GOJ TO MAKE EARLY APPROACH TO ABU DHABI GOVERNMENT RE FINANCING OF REPLACEMENT FOR ANY AMMO JORDAN SUPPLIES TO YEMEN. ROGERS

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160/10/2690

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 493

'73 APR 26 AM 7:58

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 STATE 078565

63
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:FMDTCKMAN
4/25/73 X22647
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. ATHERTON
DOD/ISA - MR. TIMBERLAKE
DOD/DSAA - MR. THIEBERGER
PM/MAS - COL FARNHAM
DOD/JCS-5 - CAPT. CONNELLY
NEA/ARN - MR. KORN
S/S - MR. BARNES

---------- 033830

R 260144Z APR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USCINCEUR

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 078565

EXDIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, JO, TC
SUBJ: MILITARY SALES: 106MM AMMUNITION

REFS: A. ABU DHABI 407; ABU DHABI 495
B. AMMAN 1421
C. KUWAIT 424

1. WE ARE STILL AWAITING WRITTEN UAE GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO USG ALONG LINES STATE 029091 NOT TO TRANSFER 106MM RECOILLESS RIFLES RECEIVED FROM JORDAN TO ANOTHER PARTY WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING US CONSENT.

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By KWS NARA, Date 4-3-02

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PAGE 02 STATE 078565

2. ONCE THIS WRITTEN COMMITMENT RECEIVED, WE ARE PREPARED TO SELL ON FMS BASIS 106MM AMMUNITION DIRECTLY TO UAE GOVERNMENT. WE HOPE THAT FMS SALE OF FILMS TO UAEG FOR USE OF ABU DHABI DEFENSE FORCE AND GUIDANCE PROVIDED FOR THIS TRANSACTION WILL SET PATTERN FOR FUTURE FMS SALES TO ADDF CHANNELED THROUGH UAEG. ROGERS

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0632/01/092

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 206

PAGE 01 STATE 050639 2

14
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:GQLUMSDEN,JR.
3/19/73 X21481
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. ATHERTON
NEA/ARP - MR. DICKMAN
/CCT - MR. GATCH
S/S -O: W.NEWLIN
S/CCT - AMB. MEYER

---------- 096274

R 200020Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 050639

EXDIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, TC
SUBJ: TERRORISM: BSO THREAT

REF : A) ABU DHABI 366
B) STATE 47847

1. RE SUMMARY PARAGRAPH ITEM D, REFTEL (A): ADDRESSEE POSTS ARE ON DISTRIBUTION FOR ALL PERTINENT STATE CABLES SUCH AS REFTEL (B) REGARDING BSO ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL. THESE REPORTS WILL INCLUDE REFERENCES TO YOUR SPECIFIC COUNTRIES, BUT WE SHALL ALSO KEEP YOU POSTED, ON AN IMMEDIATE BASIS, OF ANY SPECIAL SITUATIONS DEVELOPING WHICH INVOLVE YOUR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND WHICH SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, PRIME MINISTERS, OR RULERS. ROGERS

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/93 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4-3-02

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'73 FEB 8 AM 9:30

~~SECRET~~ 777

PAGE 01 STATE 023735

62
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
2/7/73 X22647
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
EA/IRN - MR. ROUSE
/S - MR. BARNES

020444

R 072308Z FEB 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 023735

EXDIS

SUBJ: 106S FOR ABU DHABI

REF : ABU DHABI 158

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/94 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KWB NARA, Date 4-3-02

1. APPRECIATE EMBASSY ABU DHABI REQUIREMENT BE KEPT INFORMED IN AREA OF DEFENSE MATTERS INVOLVING USG DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. ASSUME EMBASSY KUWAIT HAS PASSED TO YOU NOT ONLY AMMAN 611, WHICH FIRST NEWS WE HAD 106 TRANSFER MADE BY JORDANIANS, BUT ALSO AMMAN 568 AND STATE 19400. IF NOT KUWAIT SHOULD DO SO SOONEST. WE ALSO REPEATING AMMAN 614 AND 615 WHICH CONTAIN ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

2. PENDING DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE, YOU SHOULD AVOID INITIATING QUESTIONS WITH UAE OR ADDF AUTHORITIES RE 106 TRANSFER. IN EVENT SUBJECT RAISED WITH YOU, SHOULD STATE YOU AWAITING DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE.

3. GDS. ROGERS

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~~SECRET~~

49

VV EHA615
OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 140198 2321724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201711Z AUG 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 140198

1969 AUG 20 17 28

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/95 DOS ltr 2/26/02
By KMP NARA, Date 4-3-02

SAN CLEMENTE FOR DR. KISSINGER

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT UNSC LEBANESE RESOLUTION WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH YOU ON THE PHONE:

QUOTE:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE AGENDA CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/AGENDA/1498/REV. 1,

HAVING NOTED THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF LEBANON (DOCUMENT S/9383),

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL,

GRIEVED AT THE TRAGIC LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY,

GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,

RECALLING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON OF MARCH 23, 1949,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 262 (1968),

MINDFUL OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

1. CONDEMNS THE PREMEDITATED AIR ATTACK BY ISRAEL ON VILLAGES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS;

ASTERICK 2. DEPLORES THE EXTENSION OF THE AREA OF FIGHTING;

3. DEPLORES ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND DECLARES THAT SUCH ACTIONS OF MILITARY REPRISAL AND OTHER GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE CANNOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER FURTHER AND MORE EFFECTIVE STEPS AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER TO ENSURE AGAINST REPETITION OF SUCH ACTS.

ASTERICK WE UNDERSTAND LEBANON WOULD BE WILLING TO REVERSE THE ORDER OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3, MAKING THIS PARAGRAPH THE LAST ONE. END QUOTE

ROGERS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 563

PAGE 01 262047Z

81
ACTION NEA 06

INFO OCT 01,SS 20,JPM 04,INR 07,CPR 01,NSC 04,E 04,/047 W
092912

R 261200Z MAY 69
FM NCSO BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE
INFO AMCONGEN DHAHRAN
AMMB JIDDA
AMEMB KUWAIT
AMMB LONDON
AMEMB TEHRAN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A~~ L
DINSMORE SENDS FROM BAHRAIN.
1. MET WITH SHAIKH 'ISA MORNING MAY 26. MUHAMMAD BIN MUBARAK, DIRECTOR FONAFF ALSO ATTENDED. I SAID DEPARTMENT HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO VISIT SHAIKH AND TO INDICATE IT LOOKING FORWARD TO OPPORTUNITY MEET RULER AND EXCHANGEVIEWS WHEN HE VISITS U.S. AS CALTEX GUEST. ADDED THAT UNDERSECRETARY HAS EXPRESSED DESIRE ENTERTAIN RULER AT LUNCHEON.
2. I ADDED PERSONAL OBSERVATION THAT THIS DEPARTMENTAL EVIDENCE OF INTEREST IN HAVING EXCHANGE WITH HIM WAS GOOD SIGN OF OFFICIAL GOODWILL OF U.S.G.
3/ 'ISA THANKED DEPARTMENT FOR MESSAGE. SAID "IF" HE GOES TO

PAGE TWO RUQPRYA 0013 C O N F I D E N T I A L
U.S. HE WILL EXPRESS HIMSELF FRANKLY.
4. BIN MUBARAK SPOKE UP AND ASKED WHAT "ACTUAL PLANS" FOR WASHINGTON VISIT
WERE. WOULD RULER BE ABLE "CALL UPON" PRESIDENT, FOR INSTANCE, TO "PAY HIS RESPECTS". HE SAID THEY WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING "DISCUSSION" WITH PRESIDENT BUT "COURTESY CALL" ONLY.
5. I REPLIED THAT I DOUBTED CALL ON PRESIDENT WAS PLANNED MR LIKELY. EXPLAINED NATURE AND NUMBER OF STATE VISITS BY HEADS OF STATE. POINTED OUT THAT U.S.G. HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OVER 100 STATES, THAT MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND THEIR CHIEFS OF STATE RARE. CASE OF BAHRAIN WAS "SPECIAL" I SAID AND REPEATED DOUBTS SUCH A VISIT POSSIBLE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/96 DOS ltr. 2/26/02
By KMB NARA, Date 4/3/02

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0632/01/096

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 262047Z

6. 'ISA SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT EXPLAIN IN ARAB WORLD AND PARTICULARLY ON BAHRAIN ITSELF IF HE COULD NOT SEE ANYONE BUT UNDERSECRETARY STATE. BIN MUBARAK INTERJECTED THAT EVEN SOME FOREIGN MINISTERS (READ ABBA EBAN) CALL ON PRESIDENT.
7. I SAID I WOULD CONVEY THEIR REMARKS BUT ADDED THAT THERE WAS OPPORTUNITY IN THIS VISI
T TO MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT AND
IMPRESSION. I HOPED HE WOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ALL ASPECTS OF TRIP AND EXPRESSED VIEW HE WAS OVERESTIMATING POSSIBILITY NEGATIVE REACTIONS. THOSE WHO WANT BE NEGATIVE TO HIM IN NEAR EAST WILL BE WHETHE HE GOES TO U.S. OR NOT.

PAGE THREE RUQPRYA 0013 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
8. 'ISA REPEATED BIN MUBARAK'S COMMENT, THAT HE HOPED BRIEF COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT COULD BE ARRANGED. OTHERWISE HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE MORE TO LOSE THAN GAIN BY TRIP.
9. I ASSURED HIM I WOULD CONVEY LETTER AND SPIRIT HIS REPLY TO MY

APPROACH.
10. COMMENT: PERHAPS NOW RPT NOW FOLLOWING RECENT DISCOURAGING FAA RULERS MEETINGSHAIKH 'ISA FEELS BAHRAIN SHORTLY MUST FACE BIG DECISIONS ABOUT FUTURE. HE CANNOT AFFORD LOSE FACE NOW.
DINSMORE
GP-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saudi Arabia

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 191

PAGE 01 STATE 084687

17
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO OCT 01,EUR 17,CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,

NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,E 15,COM 08,INT 06,/1

66664
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP:JNGATCH
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARP - WILLIAM D. BREWER
NEA/IRN - MR. HALLMAN
J - MR. DILLON

095254

R 262309Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 084687

SUBJECT: BAHRAIN RULER'S VISIT

REFERENCE: DHAHRAN 376

1. DEPARTMENT NOW UNDERSTANDS INFORMALLY FROM CALTEX HERE THAT SHAYKH 'ISA HAS DECIDED VISIT U.S. AND WILL ARRIVE SEPTEMBER 5.

2. WITH REFERENCE PARA THREE STATE 071047, REQUEST YOU CONTACT RULER OR SENIOR BAHRAINI OFFICIAL TO CONVEY OUR HOPE RULER WILL VISIT WASHINGTON DURING HIS PROSPECTIVE TRIP. WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING HIM AND EXTENDING HOSPITALITY AS OUTLINED STATE 071047. GP-3. RICHARDSON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLNS 01-23/97 DOS ltr. 2/26/02
By KWO NARA, Date 4-3-02

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